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Abstract 
The study of inter-state cooperation on the environment seems an incomplete way 
of understanding environmental governance in Southeast Asia. Focusing only on 
state cooperative frameworks and assessing the effectiveness of international 
regimes in terms of problem-solving not only leads to the conclusion that ASEAN fails 
to deal with the problems; this approach also fails to find a solution to improve the 
effectiveness of those regimes. This thesis applies the network approach to 
understand better the dynamics and potential for cooperation of actual governance 
activities operating below the level of inter-state cooperation. This thesis proposes 
that policy networks are a kind of governance mechanism supporting ASEAN 
environmental cooperation through better processes. To examine the influential role 
of policy networks on the development of regimes, the transnational haze issue and 
the illegal transnational trade in wildlife issue are selected as case studies to 
investigate the relationships between components of the macro-structure of 
networks and the effectiveness of regimes. A comparison of the two cases reveals 
the similar role of policy networks in sustaining the environment and supporting 
environmental policy through functional activities in the policy monitoring and 
implementation stages. However, varying levels of success in improving the 
effectiveness of regimes result from different political opportunities, which are 
determined by the nature of international cooperation problems and the attributes 
of regimes. Since cooperation in the form of networks can enhance the effectiveness 
of regimes, the connections between intergovernmental organizations and 
transnational non-state actors should be considered for developing countries as an 
option for improving international cooperation in areas that are not priorities for 
states. 
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 Introduction 
Governing transnational environmental issues effectively is a critical challenge for 
states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). In Southeast Asia, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has addressed the issues and established 
regional mechanisms to manage them. However, these attempts are considered to 
have failed because of the recurrence of the problems in the region. Detractors also 
point out several factors, including crony capitalism (Nguitragool, 2011; Pas-Ong and 
Lebel, 2000) and the ASEAN cooperation principles called ASEAN Way (Elliott, 2003; 
Elliott, 2011; Aggarwal and Chow, 2010). On assessing the cooperation in terms of 
physical environmental outcomes, it seems there are no possible solutions for the 
region to make the environmental situation better, despite a considerable number of 
activities and efforts having been continuously taken by states, IGOs and civil society 
organizations (CSOs). These attempts have been developed and have helped sustain 
environmental governance in the region. But these are outweighed by the continued 
presence of the problem. Considering the complexity of the environmental problems 
and the difficulties in finding effective solutions, my thesis explores contemporary 
governance activities contributing to the development of the international policy 
process in governing transnational environmental issues to examine whether or not 
policy networks are a potential factor that influences the improvement of regional 
mechanisms in Southeast Asia. 
1.1 Background 
It is challenging for states to find effective, appropriate measures and solutions to 
transnational environmental issues. Difficulties in managing them are rooted in the 
characteristics of environmental problems, which are complicated and 
interconnected; the causes and effects of the problems – as well as policy options, 
which potentially and unexpectedly impact other policy areas at different levels of 
governance – are also uncertain (Connelly et al., 2012: 2, 142; Connelly and Smith, 
2003: 124). In addition, the multiscalar features of environmental problems – 
spatially, sociopolitically and temporally – also increase the complexity for 
stakeholders and policymakers involved in the policy process at the grassroots, 
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subnational, national and international levels (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006). The nature 
of the environmental problems, which variously affect stakeholders at different 
policy levels, are a fundamental explanation for the difficulties that states have in 
initiating adequate environmental policy to respond to them nationally and 
internationally. 
At the national level, there are several reasons why governments cannot succeed in 
dealing with environmental problems. Where governments have an incentive to 
tackle them, governments may face several operational obstacles, including 
insufficient knowledge, technology and resources to cope with the uncertainty of the 
causes and effects of the issues. In weak states and in developing countries, 
environmental policy is less attractive than economic development policy, and is 
often ignored. The governments in those countries often fail in addressing the 
problems, implementing environmental laws and/or preventing corruption (Mitchell, 
2010). 
At the international and global levels, the achievement of international cooperation 
in solving environmental problems requires several necessary policy stages to be 
fulfilled. International negotiation among states is possible only if shared benefits can 
be identified. However, individual states have different incentives to deal with a 
particular problem: the tragedy of the commons (where both perpetrator and victim 
suffer) or the upstream/downstream problem (a perpetrating state may not be 
concerned about reducing another’s interest, while a victim state has to pay for the 
cost) (Mitchell, 2010). However, success in multilateral negotiation does not 
guarantee the reduction of the problem. Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow (2002) 
propose that environmental issues require more than state ratification and 
compliance. The adoption and implementation of measures at the domestic level are 
necessary to make an impact on the agreed policies. The key for inter-state success 
in managing the environmental problem physically does not depend on one policy 
stage but all of them. Failure at one policy stage can lead to unsuccessful results 
overall. The achievement of inter-state cooperation on the environment needs full 
responsibilities on all parties to monitor, comply with, implement and enforce what 
they have agreed. 
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International cooperation to manage environmental issues, which are mostly by 
nature transnational, would not be a problem if the state which is the source of the 
problem has a strong aspiration and makes effort to take its obligations seriously. 
While there is no global government as the highest legitimate authority in 
international relations, international institutions and organizations have been 
established to support the objectives of international cooperation through activities 
ranging from ensuring that all parties follow the agreements to monitoring to prevent 
free-riders and seeking collective sanction mechanisms to punish offenders. Young 
(1997b) suggests that, to deal effectively with environmental problems that cross 
jurisdictional boundaries, states should establish joint institutions to manage shared 
natural resources and transnational externalities that affect other states’ welfare. In 
addition, intervention on the ground is required (Young, 1997b). But, in the current 
international context, apart from the most advanced example of regional integration, 
the European Union (EU), states rarely bestow part of their sovereignty to any 
international institution to enforce treaties. Therefore, IGOs cannot take overall 
responsibility for implementing at the domestic level. The fulfilment of 
environmental agreements depends on individual states. 
The combination of the nature of the environmental problems, the difficulties at 
different levels of the policy process in finding solutions, states’ incentives to join 
international agreements, and the limited capacity of international institutions 
explains why environmental problems are hard to solve effectively, especially in 
terms of problem-solving, which only measures by identifying the absence or 
presence of the problem. Owing to lengthy processes gradually contributing to 
overcoming challenges in the environmental problem, the failure and success of 
international cooperation on the environment should be determined not only by 
physical, preferably environmental, outcomes such as the absence of pollution or the 
abundance of biodiversity. Lemos and Agrawal (2006) make an interesting 
observation that signed agreements and established institutions relating to 
environmental problems around the world vary in their effectiveness. International 
agreements and declarations can instead be a guideline which cannot significantly 
secure the success of states’ cooperation. The considerable difficulties in managing 
transnational environmental issues are the main reason why this thesis decides to 
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examine the progress of international cooperation, in terms of process rather than 
product, through different stages of international policy process. 
Among the literature on international relations, the failure of international 
cooperation paves the way to broaden the field by increasingly including non-state 
actors as parts of analytical explanation and understanding international politics and 
phenomena. While states and IGOs are still the main and critical actors in 
international politics, civil society actors (especially non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs)) are gaining popularity in standing up for international concerns in the less 
prioritized areas such as poverty eradication, human rights, social equality and the 
environment. In the environmental area, Boehmer-Christiansen and Kellow (2002) 
highlight that NGOs become a critical actor because they realize the states’ 
constraints in carrying out international agreements and the limitations of IGOs in 
intervening in domestic affairs. In addition, some NGOs can finance environmental 
projects for states and operate transnationally in activities which IGOs cannot do, 
such as lobbying and criticizing state policy or behaviour (Boehmer-Christiansen and 
Kellow, 2002). By recognizing their roles in international environmental governance, 
they can position themselves against state policy while, at the same time, 
complementarily fulfil states’ and IGOs’ intentions. 
Non-state actors are included in the concept of international regimes, governance 
and networks to provide support in the states’ unsuccessful cooperative areas. They 
have the potential to manage the problem globally and to make those regimes 
function more effectively (Young, 1997b). Lemos and Agrawal (2006) believe that the 
greater levels of citizen participation and involvement in the international 
cooperation process can bring about the effectiveness of environmental governance. 
They also suggest that alternative efforts can come in the form of formal and informal 
networks between state and non-state actors to create or maintain international 
regimes in the public policy process without changing the key rules and procedures 
underlying that cooperation (2006: 302–303). 
The concept of network is also applied in the study of international relations (IR). The 
concept is not only useful in examining states’ relations on security and economic 
interdependence. It also allows analysts to include non-state actors in examining 
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their roles responding to the areas where the progress of inter-state cooperation 
cannot go further. Distinctive types of networks in the field exemplify how relations 
between actors can influence changes in international politics. Firstly, in traditional 
network theory, the network of the United Nations Global Compact, which consists 
of UN-related stakeholders (businesses, governments and civil society groups), 
formed communicative structures to influentially address specific norms and/or 
other social problems for the policy community (Gilbert and Behnam, 2013). 
Secondly, activists constructed transnational advocacy networks to influentially bring 
new ideas, norms and identities into the global system (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). The 
network targeted particular states or IGOs which failed to carry out international 
norms in the areas of human rights, the environment and violence against women. 
Activists operated transnationally to gain information, as well as lobbying to address 
domestic and international concerns. Nationally, they also investigate, and pressure 
governments to change policies (Keck and Sikkink, 1999). Finally, the connection 
between decision makers and technical experts – called the epistemic community – 
was developed because of the complexities and uncertainties of global problems. 
Nationally, the network can influence states’ interest by providing salient informative 
elements for policymakers, whereas it can internationally contribute to the 
establishment of social institutions to guide international behaviour (Haas, 1992). 
These types of network bring optimism about an improvement of environmental 
governance since networks can be a potential options for dealing with environmental 
issues. 
1.2 Environmental problems and ASEAN cooperation on the 
environment 
Although Southeast Asia is in the rainforest zone and rich in biodiversity, these 
invaluable natural resources are severely threatened and have been degraded by 
large-scale exploitation. Dense forests have been cleared for agricultural land, dam 
construction, mining and urbanization. In general, the rapid growth of economic 
development, which has come alongside poor governance of natural resources, is an 
explanation for the environmental problems in the region. The richness of natural 
resources has been consumed unsustainably with less concern from governments. 
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From a state orientation perspective, environmental problems should be effectively 
governed nationally by governments and/or internationally by IGOs. Therefore, 
noticeably, there are two distinct sets of literature on transnational environmental 
problems in the region. The first emphasizes the environmental issues which cannot 
be solved by national governments. A prominent example is deforestation for 
industrial farming and logging in Indonesia, which is the root cause of the 
transnational haze issue. Scholars point to an interest-based explanation and the 
connection between politicians and agricultural businesses called crony capitalism 
(Nguitragool, 2011; Pas-Ong and Lebel, 2000; Varkkey, 2015). Furthermore, because 
of the complex nature of environmental problems and the limitation of current 
knowledge and technology, governments in the region have encountered policy 
problems in finding proper options or implementing them. Moreover, since the 
environmental problems overlap with other policy areas, the capacity of 
governments – especially in the decentralized political system – is restricted by 
coordination difficulties among national departments and ministries at different 
levels of governance in enforcing law and implementing policy to deal with 
environmental problems. 
Another set of literature focuses on the failure of ASEAN as a regional institution to 
create effective regimes to achieve international cooperation on the environment. 
Even though environmental issues have been addressed by the organization since 
1977 under the concept of sustainability to balance development needs and 
environmental protection, environmentally sustainable objectives in ASEAN 
documents are still ambiguous. Several studies identify the inability and 
ineffectiveness of the ASEAN institutional structure, norms and regimes in ensuring 
members’ compliance and policy implementation as sources of the weakness of 
regional environmental governance (Litta, 2012; Tan, 2005; Contreras, 2008; 
Aggarwal and Chow, 2010; Elliott, 2011; Nguitragool, 2011; Lian and Robinson, 2002). 
While this set of literature assesses the deficiency of ASEAN cooperation on the 
environment, this does not equate to an absence of cooperation. Therefore, breaking 
up particular factors underlying and representing the cooperation would help better 
to analytically justify the position of ASEAN cooperation, which hangs somewhere 
between failure and success. 
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1.2.1 General context of ASEAN cooperation 
ASEAN cooperation, in general, can be observed from three components: the ASEAN 
Way (as the principles and norms underlying state practices for regional 
cooperation), the ASEAN Secretariat (as an intergovernmental body for facilitating 
cooperation) and regimes (which are regional mechanisms for governing specific 
concerns). These components are interrelated. Separating and then examining them 
together could also help understand the international context and the possibility of 
improving the progress of ASEAN cooperation. 
The ASEAN Way is the key norms underlying members’ practices for regional 
cooperation. It was developed as a diplomatic instrument for conflict management 
and the peaceful settlement of disputes when ASEAN was established during the Cold 
War; it caused the organization to be praised for its success in security cooperation 
in the developing world (Loke, 2005). The foundation norms – including principles of 
non-interference, consensus and non-intervention – worked well in promoting 
regional peace and security through dialogue among members characterized by 
recent statehood, experiences of colonization and bitter historical tensions among 
each other. However, it has been criticized as a major obstacle for deeper 
cooperation in non-traditional security issues, especially on the environment (Elliott, 
2003; Elliott, 2011; Aggarwal and Chow, 2010). While the principle of consensus 
minimizes the shared interests which all members can accept, the non-intervention 
and non-interference principles constrain regional attempts to intervene in individual 
countries whether or not they wish to transform what has been agreed at the 
national level. These ASEAN foundational norms reveal the state-centric nature of 
the members that prioritizes their sovereign rights over their territories. Thus, the 
norms are especially impractical when the regional problems are transnational and 
need intervening measures to address. 
The ASEAN Way is the key reason why ASEAN’s mechanisms are presented in a soft 
form of cooperation without firm commitment, obligations and/or sanction 
mechanisms. However, ASEAN has already acknowledged the environmental 
problems and prepared the ground for cooperation, which at least can present some 
common benefits shared by them. 
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A more concrete set of ASEAN cooperation is the ASEAN Secretariat and its affiliated 
bodies. ASEAN as an intergovernmental organization can be separated into two main 
components: the organs responsible for regional policy (including the ASEAN Summit, 
the ASEAN Coordination Councils, the ASEAN Community Council and the ASEAN 
Sectorial Ministerial bodies) and the ASEAN Secretariat (the secretary-general and 
the deputy secretaries-general of ASEAN) representing the ASEAN view. While the 
first comprise mainly national representatives, senior officials, ministers and heads 
of state working through meetings and forums, the second takes responsibility for 
coordinating, facilitating, monitoring and reporting progress of implementing ASEAN 
agreements and decisions (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007a: 10–19). When conflicts 
between members occur, the secretary-general can act as an ex officio consultant or 
mediator. However, the role of the Secretariat and the secretary-general is rather 
limited since the decision on results and whether states have complied to those 
results shall be settled by the ASEAN Summit (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007a: 24–25). 
Therefore, from this aspect, the independent role of the Secretariat in directing or 
accelerating the progress of cooperation is blocked by the ASEAN Way, and this does 
not give much hope for regional achievement on transnational environmental issues. 
More specifically on cooperation on the environment, the international regimes were 
created and developed by the specialized ASEAN bodies responsible for managing a 
particular issue. Regimes are sets of intervening tools – which include agreements, 
regional action plans, procedures, mechanisms, policies and projects – to deal with a 
particular issue. While these tools are not strong owing to the ASEAN Way and the 
ASEAN organization structure – which are hard to shape in the short term – improving 
the quality of the existing regimes could be a possible option for gradually achieving 
objectives and goals of ASEAN cooperation addressed by the members. Examining 
the regional tools through the process helps to identify what the regimes’ 
weaknesses are. These weaknesses can be the vagueness of obligations and 
appropriate policies in practice, the organization’s inability to monitor members’ 
compliance, and/or the incapacity of members to implement and enforce policy and 
law at the national level. Considering them in this way allows us to look at non-state 
actors as an alternative factor which can possibly facilitate and improve these flaws 
of the ASEAN regimes. 
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ASEAN cooperation on the environment, therefore, is often separated into two main 
levels: regional (which includes policy consultation, negotiation and initiation) and 
national (which is the implementation responsible by members). Although 
environmental problems require every stage of the policy process to be solved 
successfully, these two sections of policy process are not well connected. The 
mismatching of the existing regional mechanisms to the issues is part of the reason 
why the problems recur. Transnational operations – such as policy monitoring or the 
implementing projects designed at the regional level by the ASEAN Technical Working 
Groups, the ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment, and the coordinating centres 
– are restricted by ASEAN norms and the organizational structure stated above. 
This feature of the ASEAN policy process in dealing with regional issues, therefore, 
presents multiple levels of governance; however, it is very different from the aspect 
of multilevel governance in the EU cooperative model. Some distinctions can be 
pointed out. Firstly, while multilevel governance is a policy-creating process where 
members’ authority and decision-making are shared across multiple levels of 
government including supranational, national and subnational levels (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2001: 2); this kind of policy aspect does not happen in environmental policy 
process in ASEAN. Secondly, the EU members have legally binding commitments, a 
more precise timeline, and better authoritative coordinating bodies to follow up 
policy implementation at the local level; on the other hand, the timeframe for policy 
implementation and enforcement by ASEAN members is unclear and unpredictable. 
The systems of government – the centralized or decentralized power – can 
additionally be an explanation for different lengths of time taken to translate what 
they agree into national laws in the process of national implementation and 
enforcement. Thirdly, diverse types of political system in ASEAN – most of which are 
not fully democratic – bring about careful consideration of the horizontal aspect of 
governance. Because the EU countries are governed by the democratic system as a 
key criterion for membership, civil society actors and stakeholders can participate in 
the national political process through political channels. In contrast, owing to 
different types of government in ASEAN, these political channels are not obvious. 
Non-state actors’ political opportunities at the national level vary and depend on 
each government deciding to control different kinds of political issue. Therefore, 
- 10 - 
even though the international policy process in managing environmental issues in 
ASEAN contains multiple levels of governance, the process is still highly reflective of 
a strong state-centric character of inter-state cooperation in the region. 
1.2.2 Non-state actors, networks and their promising role on regional 
environmental governance 
Since ASEAN cooperation is state-centric, non-state actors are overlooked and they 
are not considered a relevant factor for ASEAN or the international policy process. 
Despite non-state actors, especially NGOs, actively working to solve environmental 
problems, they are always observed as being antagonistic to states and ASEAN. Some 
literatures, which focus only on the regional negotiation process, exclude non-state 
actors from the political sphere because of their absence of formal seats at the ASEAN 
forum and/or a strong voice in the forums they can attend (Litta, 2012; Contreras, 
2008). However, the absence of a voice in regional meetings does not mean that they 
are insignificant in their ability to join in at different stages of the policy development 
process on the environment. Many studies on environmental governance in 
Southeast Asian countries present the crucial role of non-state actors in applying 
alternative strategies to protect the environment at national and/or community 
levels (Simpson, 2013; Abdul-Aziz and Ofori, 2012; Storey, 2012; Steenbergen, 2016; 
Steenbergen, 2013). These pieces of governance are pervasive and contribute to 
environmental conservation in the region. Those operations occur in different areas 
across the region but they are not yet considered parts of international 
environmental governance. Existing literature on ASEAN cooperation on the 
environment focuses only on the international level. This understanding neither goes 
beyond why the cooperation fails nor proposes alternative options on how 
cooperation can be improved once institutions have no capacity to enhance 
cooperation. On the other hand, actual environmental governance activities which 
happen at other levels are not yet investigated in terms of how their attempts affect 
regional environmental outcomes. The absence of an explanation for how non-state 
actors interact to respond to the ineffectiveness of ASEAN cooperation creates a gap 
in the literature. By observing the relationships among ASEAN, its member states and 
non-state actors outside the negotiation process, this thesis attempts to fill this gap 
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by exploring those interactions through stages of the international policy process 
governing particular environmental issues that are obviously addressed but still not 
successfully achieved by ASEAN. 
Networking among actors becomes a promising option which potentially leads to 
better achievement in dealing with environmental issues in Southeast Asia. The 
achievement of networks of transnational activists on human rights, anti-slavery and 
the environment in Latin America and some developing countries in establishing 
global norms of national politics and domestic debates (Keck and Sikkink, 1998) 
exemplifies the influential role of networked governance in shaping political 
outcomes. In addition, in the conventional inter-state orientation, 
transgovernmental networks – networks of government officials including courts, 
regulatory agencies, executives and legislatures – are offered as a different 
perspective for analysing international cooperation on issues by focusing on the 
existing role of national substate or governmental officials who work transnationally 
on various kinds of international activity in the absence of supranational authorities 
(Slaughter, 1997; Slaughter, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 
2009). The network approach and studies in the field of environmental cooperation 
and politics are worth further exploration for these reasons. Firstly, collective 
collaboration in the network form can be a strategy adding power to relatively less 
powerful actors. The connections and loose alliances of actors can increase their 
ability to achieve policy which none can accomplish on its own (Reinicke, 2000: 44; 
Rohrschneider and Dalton, 2002: 510). 
Secondly, because of the complex nature of environmental problems, it is impractical 
and not sensible to disregard non-state actors, especially academics, scientists and 
NGOs who have actively worked in and understand the issue. In addition, since they 
possess expertise and practical knowledge, the professional links between them and 
policymakers can bring alternative solutions and options in the policymaking areas 
(Feldman, 2012; Haas, 1992). In addition, to solve complex environmental problems, 
transferring new knowledge and technological options should not be limited to 
states; the public and other stakeholders should receive them as well. By the nature 
of the problem, it is necessary to include all relevant actors as much as possible to 
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join operations after policy is made. Since the causes and impacts of the 
environmental issues sometimes contain scientific language that is hard to 
understand, these experts can also have an important role in translating it into an 
understandable language for raising awareness and support from the public. 
Finally, despite literature on networks in international politics always highlighting the 
networks’ influence in shaping international norms and policy outcomes, those works 
also present the network’s activities beyond the policy negotiation process (Bae et 
al., 2011; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; Downie, 2014). While the formal inclusion of non-
state actors in the policy discussion process provides a legitimate component to the 
global policy forum (Reinicke, 2000), their influence on international outcome is also 
derived from their actual governance activities at different stages of policy process, 
especially policy monitoring and implementing. For example, to ensure that 
negotiated compliance is carried out, transnational advocacy networks keep an eye 
on target actors to adopt new policies. This might possibly result in an amendment 
to procedures, policies and, ultimately, behaviours (Keck and Sikkink, 1998). The 
existence of environmental policy does not make any changes unless it is carried out, 
complied with and implemented by states and/or other kinds of actor. 
1.3 Hypothesis and research questions 
From the conventional perspective, which focuses only on states and 
intergovernmental organization in the region, the progress of international 
cooperation on the environment has been blocked by ASEAN norms and incapacity. 
On the other hand, non-state actors, whose operations contribute to environmental 
conservation in the region, are active in the environmental area. Owing to their weak 
voice in the formal ASEAN forum, they are excluded from the frame in analysing 
ASEAN cooperation. However, non-state actors, especially environmental NGOs, 
collectively share a common goal in terms of problem-solving, and their work may 
complement each other in supporting regional governance on a particular issue. 
Therefore, this can lead to the formation of policy networks in governing a particular 
environmental issue. 
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The varying application of the concept of networks in sociology, administrative 
studies and international studies leads to a lack of consensual meaning of the word. 
To avoid any confusion, this thesis finds a useful term applied by Perkin and Court 
(2005), who propose that in general networks are ‘simply collections of linked nodes’. 
However, the difficulty in defining the word results from different perspectives that 
perceive networks as ‘organizational structures or processes that bring actors 
together’. Therefore, with the intention of providing a broad definition which 
includes both informal groups and rigid organization, Perkin and Court adjust 
Tennyson’s (2003) meaning of network and define it as ‘formal or informal structures 
that link actors (individuals or organizations) who share a common interest on a 
specific issue or a general set of values’ (Perkin and Court, 2005: 2). Any network 
related to the policy process will be called a ‘policy network’ (Perkin and Court, 2005: 
8–9). Guided by and adjusting from Perkin’s and Court’s notion, the definition of 
policy networks refers in this thesis to formal and/or informal structures that link 
actors (states, IGOs and/or CSOs) who share a common goal on a particular issue and 
operate to achieve that goal in the international policy process. 
The difficulties in dealing with transnational environmental issues require more than 
states and IGOs to manage them. Cooperative efforts from non-state actors who 
share a common goal to end the problem can be another factor supporting the 
effectiveness of existing environmental regimes. This thesis argues that policy 
networks are a critical factor supporting ASEAN cooperation on the environment. 
Since the function of ASEAN as a regional body is limited by the ASEAN Way and 
resources, this thesis hypothesizes that links between IGOs and transnational NGOs 
are a crucial factor facilitating the effectiveness of international regimes in governing 
transnational environmental issues in Southeast Asia. The argument and hypothesis 
are examined under the main research question and subquestions as follows. 
Main research question: under what circumstances can policy networks facilitate 
inter-state cooperation in governing transnational environmental issues? 
The main question will be answered by asking these following subquestions. 
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1. What are the components (kinds of actors, number of ties, subgroups and central 
nodes) of policy networks? 
2. How do policy networks operate to improve the effectiveness of international 
regimes? 
3. To what extent can non-state actors in policy networks engage in the ASEAN policy 
development process? 
4. What are the significant roles of policy networks in governing transnational 
environmental issues in the region? 
To answer these questions, two transnational environmental issues are chosen to 
examine the role of policy networks in governing the issues. The cases are purposely 
selected from Southeast Asia. Although the region is criticized for a failure of inter-
state cooperation on the environment, international regimes for tackling the issues 
have been addressed and supported by ASEAN member countries. In addition, with 
an awareness that most of these are developing countries, which are less likely to 
prioritize the environment, and non-democratic without strong civil societies as in 
Western developed countries, this thesis may reveal different features of 
relationships between state and civil society actors that go beyond fighting each 
other outside the areas of political suppression. Environmental governance in a group 
of developing countries may be better understood by considering efforts and 
connections among different kinds of actors governing on a particular environmental 
issue guided by an international agreement. More importantly, to analyse how policy 
networks can better operate to improve international regimes, ASEAN, as a regional 
institution, serves as a similar inter-state cooperative structure for comparing the 
networks in two cases. Comparing two cases with similar contexts and in the same 
category would help to identify factors which cause different results in the 
effectiveness of the regime in each case study.    
For these reasons, two selected transnational environmental cases are the 
transnational haze issue (hereafter called the haze case) and the transnational illegal 
wildlife trade issue (hereafter called the wildlife case). The Coordination and Support 
Unit within the ASEAN Secretariat acts as a regional coordinating body on the 
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transboundary haze issue for member countries, while ASEAN-WEN Program 
Coordination Unit was established as a centre for ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement 
Network (ASEAN-WEN) to solve the illegal wildlife trade and trafficking issue. Both 
cases are governed and guided by international agreements: the former is based on 
the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution, and the latter is based on 
the Convention of International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES). 
1.4 Original contribution and significance of research 
Although there are key studies providing a comprehensive account of international 
environmental cooperation and environmental governance in Southeast Asia, a gap 
in literature can be identified. With the conventional perspective, which focuses 
mainly on inter-state cooperation and organization, extensive research has explained 
well why environmental cooperation in the region has failed and cannot be achieved 
(Litta, 2012; Tan, 2005; Contreras, 2008; Aggarwal and Chow, 2010; Elliott, 2011). 
However, these studies have not yet answered how environmental cooperation in 
the region can be improved. Although non-state actors should be another option for 
developing regional environmental governance, they are often perceived as 
antagonistic to governments’ economic development initiatives and gain less 
attention owing to their less powerful voice and/or having no seat in the formal 
decision-making process (Nguitragool, 2011; Litta, 2012). The separation of state and 
civil society world in the existing literature does not only limit understanding of 
regional environmental governance on transnational environmental issues since the 
non-state actors’ attempts and activities are not considered parts of regional 
governance. It also rarely brings about promising options for the region to improve 
environmental cooperation. This thesis attempts to close this literature gap by 
applying a network perspective to investigate the progress of international 
cooperation through actual collaborative attempts among state and non-state actors 
for a better understanding of environmental governance in the region. 
From a state-oriented view, international cooperation cannot be taken seriously 
without looking at states’ mutual interests and incentives. Environmental issues 
become a problem of international cooperation since the different consequences of 
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the problems create various incentives to individual states. That is why 
environmental cooperation has always been unsuccessful despite the problems 
having been addressed by states. The state-oriented perspective therefore is not 
adequate for answering how environmental cooperation can be developed. 
Moreover, environmental problems are complicated and cooperation requires more 
than agreements negotiated at the international level. This is why environmental 
cooperation should be addressed in different ways. Looking at other stages of the 
international policy process and examining cooperative efforts by both state and non-
state actors can lead to better understanding of the dynamic and potential 
development of environmental cooperation in the region. 
The concept of networks has been applied in the Southeast Asian literature on 
international cooperation; however, very few attempts have been made to explain it 
in the environmental area. Many pieces of existing literature on networks are on 
economic development, including inter-state political economy relations 
(Katzenstein, 1996; Dent, 2003) and regional cooperation on sustainable energy and 
resource exploitation (Karki et al., 2005; Poocharoen and Sovacool, 2012). On the 
other hand, some of them present the promise of networks among civil society actors 
in the field of human rights (Crouch, 2013), and the establishment of the ASEAN 
People’s Assembly, which would ideally contribute to the foundation of community 
building (Morada, 2007). While there is a network study on the regional environment, 
the author points out the absence of networked regionalism in the environmental 
sphere owing to the vertical mode of governance covering up the horizontal ones 
(Elliott, 2011). Even though Elliott’s work presents the network perspective, 
cooperative efforts between states and non-state actors are detached by different 
modes of governance. 
In the absence of a network approach for investigating the relationships between 
state and non-state actors through collaborative efforts in governing transnational 
environmental issues in Southeast Asia, this thesis aims to fill in the literature gap. By 
applying the method of network analysis to the case study, it will reveal how policy 
networks facilitate environmental cooperation in the region and how an 
environmental issue is actually governed. The findings of the research questions 
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contribute to understandings and debates on environmental governance, 
international cooperation on the environment among ASEAN countries, and the 
concept of network as a hybrid mode of governance in Southeast Asia. 
While judging regional cooperation on the environment in terms of problem-solving 
cannot give any new answers to states and international organizations in dealing with 
environmental problems, examining the development of that cooperation through 
the process can probably bring about more practical options for dealing with the 
complexity of environmental issues. Exploring different stages of the environmental 
policy process helps to identify existing activities resulting from regimes and other 
governance mechanisms at different levels and across levels of governance. Policy 
networks can also be a potential intervention for improving those processes, 
resulting in better situations even if goals are not reached in terms of problem-
solving. If a policy network can facilitate regional environmental cooperation, 
strengthening or investing in these connections will be a practical and promising 
option for developing countries. 
1.5 Structure of thesis 
The thesis contains seven chapters: (1) Introduction; (2) Theoretical and conceptual 
foundation; (3) Research methodology, analytical framework and data collection 
methods; (4) Policy networks in governing the transboundary haze issue; (5) Policy 
network in governing the illegal wildlife trade and smuggling issue; (6) Comparative 
analysis; and (7) Conclusion. 
Chapter 2 focuses on the theoretical foundation, concepts in international 
cooperation and the key terms applied in this thesis. Debates on international 
cooperation theories and justifications for which one is suitable for this thesis are 
discussed in this chapter. Since key words – especially international cooperation, 
regimes, governance, civil society and networks – are applied variously in the IR 
literature, this chapter also aims to clarify those key terms and definitions to avoid 
any confusion before applying them in the following chapters. 
Chapter 3 presents research methodology and methods applied for analysis. The 
purpose of this chapter is to make sense of methodological choices and use them as 
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devices bridging concepts and methods for empirical study. An analytical framework 
is developed as a structural observation for the case studies in Chapters 4 and 5.  
Chapter 4 (the haze case) and Chapter 5 (the wildlife case) are case studies of 
transnational environmental issues in Southeast Asia. Each chapter reveals the 
background (causes, impacts and importance) of the issue, the necessity of 
international cooperation, the establishment of international regimes developed to 
deal with the issue, governance gaps existing in the regimes, and the role of non-state 
actors and policy networks in making those regimes function better. 
Chapter 6 is a comparative analysis. Two steps of comparison are applied in this 
chapter: the comparison through an analytical framework (developed in Chapter 3), 
and the comparison of the components of the macro-structure of networks. The first 
step of comparison is done to identify similar categories of governance gaps as a basic 
step before analysing the different components of the macro-structure of networks 
in relation to the effectiveness of regimes. The purpose of this chapter is to identify 
the key differences and the similarity of the cases before answering the main 
research question and subquestions in the conclusion. 
Chapter 7 is the conclusion, which includes the summary of the thesis, research 
findings and their implications, and the original contribution of this thesis to IR 
literature. The limitations of the research as well as prospects for future studies are 
also noted here.  
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 Theoretical and conceptual foundation 
Conflict and cooperation among states are the main focus of international relations 
(IR) and there are several perspectives and approaches in insightfully explaining and 
understanding them. While transnational environmental issues require more than 
international agreements to effectively govern them, an examination of inter-state 
cooperative efforts and interactions on their own produces neither sufficient further 
understanding nor potential alternatives to better manage them. This chapter 
comprises two main sections. The first section explores the concept of international 
conflict and cooperation in different key IR theories. The second section aims to 
search for a suitable theoretical foundation in constructing the thesis’s framework. 
Under the umbrella of the liberal perspective and the concept of governance, the 
network approach is founded and justified as the most appropriate prospective in 
delivering an answer to my research questions. This is because the approach 
potentially develops a better understanding of environmental governance and 
cooperation through interactions among different kinds of actors in the region. This 
section also serves to clarify the concept of governance, regimes, policy networks, 
governance gaps and relationships among them. At the final part of the section, the 
concept of civil society is discussed, with focus on applying it in the Southeast Asian 
context. Definitions to differentiate and specify particular types of actors including 
non-state actors, CSOs, and NGOs are also clarified in this part before applying them 
in the following chapters. This chapter serves as a foundation step in constructing an 
analytical framework, which will be discussed in the next chapter. 
2.1 International cooperation: definitions, theories and concepts 
International cooperation is defined, applied and interpreted variously in the 
international politics and IR literature. Despite scholars having given different 
definitions of it as a guideline to interpret and infer cooperation through states’ 
interactions in international politics, the problem of determining which events are 
considered cooperative action still exist (Milner, 1992: 470). Prominently, there are 
three ways to perceive cooperative action in international politics. Firstly, 
cooperation can be perceived as an opposite type of ‘uncooperative’ efforts. Milner 
(1992) raises a concern about which behaviours are defined as ‘uncooperative’ to 
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identify competition and conflict which reduce other states’ gains. Unintended 
unilateral action and/or inactivity is considered non-cooperative when that action 
leads to negative consequences for others’ policy (Milner, 1992). Even though this 
definition is useful in identifying unilateral uncooperative behaviour affecting to 
other states, it is not clear whether cooperation is a normal or pervasive situation 
before discord between actors has occurred. 
The problem in clearly identifying what cooperation is can be answered by the second 
category of the definition of cooperation. Cooperation happens when two or more 
states find mutual interests and voluntarily contribute their resources to achieve their 
goal. According to Holsti (1988), states’ cooperation – ‘the commitment of resources, 
plans, and ideas toward some common purposes, according to agreed-upon rules and 
cost formulas’ – are normal relations (1988: 432-433). Another definition of 
cooperation which follows Holsti’s notion and makes cooperation more observable 
is recognizing international organization as concrete evidence for cooperation. James 
and Pfaltzgraff (2001) look at international organizations such as the United Nations 
(UN), the EU and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization; they then define 
international cooperation as a set of relationships that is legitimized by the mutual 
consent of members and is not based on coercion. Although this definitional category 
helps to straightforwardly perceive what cooperation is through the establishment 
of mutual goals and international organizations, cooperation is recognized as a 
product of inter-state interactions. This definition, therefore, neither emphasizes the 
process nor explains cooperation in relation to international conflict. 
The third category of the definition of cooperation regards conflict as essential in 
considering cooperation. Keohane (2005) emphasizes the importance of conflict and 
potential conflict as a necessary condition that stimulates demands for cooperation 
(Keohane, 2005: 63). Cooperation can be seen in the process of mutual policy 
adjustment and coordination (Martin, 2001; Keohane, 2005: 63). Additionally, 
Axelrod and Keohane (1985) note that cooperation must be differentiated from 
harmony, which requires that complete identity of interest or unilateral action 
automatically provides benefits for others. However, cooperation can occur in 
situations that ‘contain a mixture of conflicting and complementary interest’ (Axelrod 
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and Keohane, 1985: 226). For Keohane (1984), conflict and cooperation are not 
necessarily reversed types of relationships. He also shows that, even where there is 
a shared goal, disagreement on the means of achieving it might occur (Keohane, 
1984). His perspective goes well with Slaughter’s idea that conflict can be positive in 
long-term cooperation because it provides an opportunity for collective discussion 
(Slaughter, 2004). This category of the definition of cooperation focuses on process 
of interactions among states. Cooperation does not mean there is no conflict or that 
it is necessarily good. Conflicts may exist, but states are able to overcome them 
through policy adjustment to achieve their mutual interests. 
Compared with the first and second categories of the definition of cooperation, the 
third presents the most realistic nature of international politics, revealing both 
cooperation and conflict. Within the mixture of cooperation and discord, it allows this 
thesis to explore IR theories explaining and understanding international politics 
through conflicts and cooperation. Asking questions – on why states cooperate, how 
they can manage and overcome their conflicts, and how cooperation is maintained 
and/or further developed in an anarchic world – reveals different opportunities and 
constraints of each theoretical perspective in examining international politics on 
transnational environmental issues. Exploring theories and concepts relevant to 
international cooperation and conflicts with regard to the nature of environmental 
issues is a critical path in justifying which theory or concept provides a sufficient 
analytical perspective for this thesis to test hypotheses and deliver answers to the 
research questions. Next, cooperation in different IR perspectives is examined before 
justifying which is the most appropriate for positioning my thesis. 
2.2 International cooperation in IR theories 
This section explores the explanation and understanding of conflicts and cooperation 
in international politics. There are four parts emphasizing the power-oriented 
perspective, the social constructivist perspective, the liberal perspective and the 
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concept of governance.1 Each part illustrates an IR perspective on the nature of 
international anarchy, the possibility of cooperation, the issues at hand, and the 
perspective’s view towards non-state actors in changes of international actions and 
outcomes. 
2.2.1 Cooperation in power-oriented perspectives 
For realism and neorealism, international cooperation is possible; however, there is 
little room for it. Anarchy, in the meaning of the absence of a supreme authority, 
constrains states to rely on themselves to guarantee their security. Grieco (1993) 
notes that international anarchy brings about states’ competition and conflicts. That 
bars state cooperation even if they share common advantages. For realists, states 
keep in mind that ‘today’s friend may be tomorrow’s enemy in war’. Therefore, states 
are seriously concerned about the relative gains of partners (Grieco, 1993). In 
addition, states are rational actors who formulate their own policies to maximize 
their own interests. Within these circumstances, states have to compete with each 
other to gain power and security. Although the structure of power (Waltz, 1979) 
crucially differentiates realism and neorealism, states are the most important actors 
in the study of international politics. Thus, non-state actors are always ignored by 
realists; they are not important enough to study. International cooperation is an 
incentive for states if it is a tool designed to increase their power or national security 
goals. 
While realist and neorealist perspectives on cooperation offer a very useful analytical 
tool to examine state cooperation in form of bilateral or multilateral alliances to 
obtain and/or balance power, it is not sufficient for this thesis, in which the main 
focus is on environmental cooperation. In addition, neither intergovernmental 
organizations nor non-state actors are included or analysed in international power 
                                                     
1 It should be noted that the concept of governance is developed from the liberal perspective; 
however, this thesis intentionally takes this part equally from the liberal perspective to 
emphasizing the concept of governance, which offers broader analytical approaches to 
investigate the importance of non-state actors, especially as an additional intervention to 
inter-state cooperation, in shaping international outcomes in temporary international 
politics. 
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politics despite increasingly having potential influence to shape the outcomes of 
international affairs. The role of non-state actors, especially NGOs and corporations, 
are obvious in security-related issues but their role has not been investigated by 
realists. For instance, international NGOs working in peace building operations, in 
protesting against wars or in supporting humanitarian intervention are not clearly 
mentioned by realists. Nor is the role examined of business groups whose interest in 
arms trading could be a key explanation of current state conflict. Limited areas of 
concern to focus only on security and power, insufficient attention paid to non-state 
actors, and little room for international cooperation are key reasons that the power-
oriented approach is neither suitable nor flexible enough to be a theoretical 
foundation for my research. 
2.2.2 Cooperation in social constructivist perspective 
Constructivism is also an important approach which gives explanation to 
international cooperation. The social constructivist perspective identifies the 
importance of states’ interactions as a source of changes in the perceptions, 
interests, norms, identities and structure of international politics. Actors’ 
antagonistic or friendly relationships are constituted by social structures, which are 
defined as shared understandings, expectations or knowledge. What states do to 
each other will affect the structure through the logic of reciprocity (Wendt, 1995). 
States are the main actors in the international arena; however, the constructivist 
approach also emphasizes the impact of institutions on international outcomes in 
socializing individuals, policymakers and states (Karns and Mingst, 2010). Social 
constructivism provides a dynamic explanation of international cooperation across a 
wide range of areas where environmental issues are also included (Haas, 2002). 
The constructivist approach contributes to a better understanding of how states’ 
perceptions, identities, interests and norms can be altered over time through 
interactions. It is useful since it gives an account of the significance of history in 
explaining and understanding phenomena and changes in international politics. 
However, there are some difficulties in applying this approach to my thesis. Firstly, 
while mutual interests, values, norms and goals can be shaped through interactions, 
those factors which can change require time for observation. It is hard to precisely 
- 24 - 
identify them since they depend on actors’ historical perceptions of each other. 
Secondly, analysing international conflicts and cooperation for multiple parties is 
complicated. The increasing number of actors requires more observation of historical 
interactions. This sometimes needs to take into account other conflictual and 
cooperative areas which may be, directly or indirectly, relevant to understand their 
historical relationships. Importantly, the approach does not provide a clear 
distinction between interactions which lead to inter-state cooperation and the role 
of existing institutions in contributing to that cooperation. Based on Stein’s brilliant 
observation in combining a broad view of institution with a view of reality which is 
inter-subjectively constructed through interaction, it leads to the argument that ‘the 
sovereign state system is itself an institution of international political life’ (Stein, 
2008: 207). Processes of interactions are a fundamental explanation for reality, 
perceptions, identity, conflicts, cooperation, institutions and even the international 
system; the perspective does not offer clarity on which factors, through this infinite 
interaction process, prominently cause changes to international politics, outcomes 
and/or actions. It is very difficult to make a clear distinction between dependent and 
interdependent variables in the dynamic and infinite changes in international politics. 
Based on dynamic and various historical backgrounds of actors’ perceptions and 
interactions, this approach seems to add more difficulty in testing my thesis’s 
hypothesis and/or delivering answers to my research questions. 
2.2.3 Cooperation in liberal perspectives 
Liberal perspectives have provided considerably broad accounts of international 
cooperation. The liberal perspectives share two key basic assumptions with the 
power-oriented approach: states are rational actors, and the nature of international 
system is anarchic – it lacks a supreme authority. But what makes liberal perspectives 
more fascinating for this research is their extensive explanation for and 
understanding of why cooperation is possible and pervasive in international politics 
under anarchy. Although there are different liberal perspectives discussed in this 
thesis, their central focus is on international institutions as a condition allowing 
cooperation under anarchy to be achievable. 
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Studies of international institutions2 can be classified into two groups: an old 
institutionalism and a new institutionalism. The old institutionalism refers to the 
functionalist and neo-functionalist approach, which emphasizes the role of formal 
institutions in international politics; the new institutionalism – international regime 
theory and/or neo-liberal institutionalism – has replaced and broadened the scope 
of the former conceptualization (Stein, 2008: 204). 
Functionalism theory in the 1940s and neo-functionalism in the 1950s addressed the 
role of international institutions in fostering states’ cooperation. Functionalism, neo-
functionalism and interdependence theory have emphasized the importance of 
transnational interactions among state and non-state actors in the process of 
integration. International economy and social relations is necessary for political 
cooperation. From a functionalist view, Mitrany (1966) proposes that higher 
interdependence between countries will lead to peace. In transnational relations, 
technical experts, not politicians, will arrange cooperation. International activities 
should be linked like a web (Mitrany, 1966). However, neo-functionalists take a 
different view by arguing that the intensifying of cooperation – which was developed 
in Europe – requires political decisions and intentions to enhance cooperation from 
one area to another. Political integration, according to Hass, ‘is the process whereby 
political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their 
loyalties, expectations, and political activities toward a new centre, whose 
institutions possess or demand jurisdictions over the pre-existing national states’. 
This will form a new political community over the pre-existing ones (Haas, 1968). Both 
functionalism and neo-functionalism explain the higher level of cooperation, which 
would finally move to political integration. As a concept, integration refers to both 
the process and an end-state (Evans and Newnham, 1998: 253). The process of 
integration occurs voluntarily and consensually, and it is closer to the concept of 
supranationalism. Even though this old institutionalist approach cannot be practically 
and completely applied to regional cooperation in ASEAN, it has obviously highlighted 
                                                     
2 In order to develop his systemic and insightful reviews on the concepts in institutional 
perspectives in IR theories, Stein accepts North’s definition of institutions and defines them 
as ‘the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, [the] humanly devised constraints 
that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990: 3, cited in Stein, 2008: 204). 
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IGO as an international actor representing states’ mutual interest in international 
politics. This is helpful in investigating the role of IGOs in shaping international 
outcomes. International cooperation can be easily identified through the physical 
presence of institutional organizations and machinery, and those international 
organizations, in turn, accommodate cooperation among members. 
To differentiate institutions referred to in the old institutionalist perspective, neo-
liberal institutionalists replace institutions with regimes with the aim of broadening 
the concept of institutions (Young, 1989; Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 2005; Stein, 2008). 
A widely accepted definition of international regimes is given by Krasner (1983). 
Regimes are ‘sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations’ (Krasner, 1983: 2).3 As rational actors, states – which basically 
have an incentive to cooperate to maximize their gains – purposively create regimes 
to achieve their mutual goals through the process of bargaining, agenda setting and 
forming international political coalitions and initiatives (Keohane and Nye, 1989). 
Regimes function as states’ tools to facilitate international cooperation in anarchy. 
International organizations, as parts of regimes, are founded to provide a framework 
for interaction, bargaining, reducing cheating, facilitating transparency and settling 
disputes. According to Young (1989), international regimes include a wide range of 
functional scope, geographical domain and membership. From his perspective, the 
nature of IR is not an extreme level of conflict, but there are well-stocked institutions 
and organizations to accommodate cooperation (Young, 1989). 
In addition, neo-liberal institutionalists explain the advantages of institutions through 
game theory. Cooperation under anarchy is possible owing to the existence of 
institutions and the awareness of the repetition of the game. Although achieving 
cooperation is not easy in an anarchic world since there is no supreme authority to 
                                                     
3 Krasner’s definition of regimes is used in this chapter for illustrating a standard meaning of 
regimes which can be generally accepted in IR debates on whether regimes can determine 
international outcomes or/and state’s behaviour in international politics. However, it should 
be noted that the definition of regimes referred to in this thesis is not exactly the same as 
Krasner’s. The definition of regime applied in this research is clarified in this chapter under 
the heading of ‘regimes as parts of global governance’. 
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enforce the law, Axelrod and Keohane (1986) show that mutual interest, the shadow 
of the future and the number of players can help us to understand the success and 
failure of attempts at both military and political economic cooperation. The 
prisoner’s dilemma game illustrates that institutions can provide mutual interests 
and future expectations for states. Reciprocity can be a strategy to persuade states 
to cooperate (Axelrod and Keohane, 1986). Holsti (1988) also highlights that states 
have learned to achieve some purposes by establishing systems of reciprocity to 
coordinate policies with others. In an interconnected world, states have 
acknowledged that reputation will be a crucial component of diplomatic 
effectiveness so that efficient, successful cooperation can happen. Karns and Mingst 
(2010) notice that states choose to continuously interact with each other in the 
anarchic society because they become aware that in the future they will interact with 
them. 
Through attempts in explaining how institutions affect international outcomes and 
actors’ behaviour, neo-liberal institutionalists have clearly added the characteristics 
of decentralized institutions and complex interdependence into the nature of IR. 
Decentralized institutions, which are potentially enacted and coordinated by the 
individual members of regimes, create international compliance and sanction 
mechanisms despite the absence of a supreme authority responsible for enforcing 
them (Young, 1979: 35; Keohane, 2005: 98). Even though states have an incentive to 
violate the rules, they instead choose to comply with them. Interactions through 
regimes offer open-ended prisoner’s dilemma and make them realize that violation 
of a commitment in a particular issue may lead to negative reputations and 
consequences in other issues and regimes in the future (Keohane, 2005: 103). Since 
normally states do not cooperate only in one area, this consideration creates 
complicated relationships and unforeseen opportunity costs which constrain states’ 
behaviour. When regimes are established this will facilitate cooperation as well as 
form a basis for the necessary conditions – including information availability, dense 
patterns of issue linkages, and members’ future plans – for fostering further 
cooperation (Martin, 2001). Examining cooperation through this perspective reveals 
the complex interdependent structure implicitly existing in IR which states have to 
calculate before choosing any course of action. 
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The neo-liberal institutional perspective importantly forms a basis for the 
understanding of the nature of IR under anarchy in world politics for this thesis. It 
clearly and extensively highlights the crucial functions of international institutions in 
addition to the physical presence of international organizations and mechanisms 
emphasized by the old institutionalist perspective. This broadens understanding of 
how and why inter-state cooperation can be created, maintained and developed 
pervasively under international anarchy. It explains the important functions of 
regimes in shaping international outcomes in world politics on various cooperative 
areas and issues, the linkages between which construct complex interdependence in 
IR. Through international interactions, states can identify mutual interests and 
cooperation occurs when states create and/or adjust existing regimes as a tool to 
achieve members’ goals. Moreover, under international anarchy, where 
decentralized institutions and regimes are plentiful, regime theorists demonstrate 
how international compliance and sanction mechanisms – through multilateral 
efforts – can potentially operate to secure what states have agreed, even though 
there is no supreme authority or hegemony in the world system. Cooperation can 
occur when states can identify their mutual interests. Once institutions are 
established, it forms a cooperative mechanism for achieving members’ goals and 
enhancing necessary conditions, which pave the way for future cooperation. This 
seems to be an endless process of enhancing mutual interests and expectations, 
which importantly explains why international cooperation is pervasive in IR according 
to this perspective. 
Although neo-liberal institutionalists substantially contribute a comprehensive 
understanding of the nature of IR for analysing the effects of regimes on international 
outcomes, some limitations can be pointed out as a reason why this perspective 
cannot be fully applied in analysing international cooperation on environmental 
issues. Firstly, the neo-liberal institutionalist view limits the study of international 
cooperation in world politics on interaction among states. International cooperation 
can be explained only by focusing on the role of states in establishing regimes for 
achieving members’ goals where mutual interests can be identified. Cooperation can 
occur only when at least one state raises its concern and calls for others to address it 
through the international negotiation process. Without states’ incentive and the 
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ability to identify mutual interests, cooperation cannot be achieved and regimes 
cannot be established (Mitchell, 2010: 116). 
Secondly, since the concept of cooperation in neo-liberal institutionalism does not by 
itself clearly explain how regimes emerge without pre-existing cooperation, it is 
questionable how environmental cooperation can be created and developed. In 
examining the development of economic cooperation, a hegemon who possessed 
superiority of economic and military resources has historically been responsible for 
providing collective goods to secure international order, which in turn serves its 
interests. Under the hegemonic period – the British Empire in the nineteenth century 
and the leading role of the United States after World War II – economic regimes were 
established and maintained. Thus, in the period after the decline of hegemony, these 
economic regimes were well established for fostering further economic cooperation 
by leading capitalist states (Keohane, 2005). However, a hegemon dedicated to 
bearing the high cost of collective goods to protect the environment cannot be 
obviously identified. At the core of the concept that emphasizes cooperation in 
states’ incentive and interest, cooperation can happen when states realize that they 
can gain some benefit or some cost reduction, or when the benefits outweigh the 
cost. Environmental cooperation can occur as a result of states realizing that 
collective action is needed; however, with different incentives and interests, 
established environmental regimes have different effects on international outcomes. 
The neo-liberal perspective does not offer other factors which can change states’ 
incentive to cooperate in areas where mutual interests are hard to find and develop 
by rational state actors. 
While this thesis accepts the neo-liberal institutionalists’ assumption on the nature 
of IR, the approach does not offer a sufficient explanation of how regimes can be 
improved for better functioning after they have been established. In international 
politics, regimes are pervasive for fostering cooperation in different concerned areas; 
however, their effects on international outcomes and states’ behaviour are various. 
Focusing only on states’ initiatives on cooperation on the environment through a neo-
liberal institutionalist perspective can merely understand why cooperation is 
antagonistic to commerce, while looking at other environmental collaborations can 
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broaden understanding of how non-state actors react to the slow progress of inter-
state cooperation. The roles of non-state actors are well constructed under the 
umbrella of liberalism in the context of globalization. The following part delves into 
the concept of governance, which is still under the liberal perspective. However, 
more attention is given to analysing the increasing role of non-state actors as a kind 
of international mechanism in shaping international politics. 
2.2.4 Cooperation in the concept of governance 
Although neo-liberals see that there is pervasive cooperation under international 
anarchy, it does not mean that states have equal intentions and willingness to 
cooperate on every relevant area. While there are ranges of issues on which states 
have decided to cooperate, states as rational actors often prioritize their cooperation 
in areas which can better maximize their gain. This is why economic cooperation can 
develop over time, whereas other cooperative areas – on which it is difficult to attain 
mutual consensus or mutual benefits – are left behind. This explains the situation 
that under complex interdependence states tend to better cooperate on the issues 
which clearly serve their national interests. This raises critiques on the role of states 
in dealing with non-economic or non-security issues. Despite there also being 
considerable international cooperation on the environment, human rights and/or 
inequality, these issues are not always managed promptly and successfully. With 
different degrees of achievements in international non-economic and/or non-
security cooperation, scholars have developed analytical approaches for better 
explanation and understanding of international cooperation on those issues under 
the concept of governance. The concept not only broadens international cooperation 
by taking non-state actors into international politics; it also allows alternative options 
to be examined aside from regimes as alternative interventions to shape 
international outcomes and actors’ behaviour. 
The scope for international cooperation in world politics has been broadened under 
the concept of governance. Although states are the key actors which establish 
regimes for dealing with global issues, the capacity of civil society actors is highlighted 
in complementing, but not replacing, states’ tasks in governing international affairs 
(Wapner, 1997: 67). As interdependence has been developed basically through 
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economic cooperation, actors and societies can be connected through multiple 
channels to collaborate in their relevant areas. At the same time, interdependencies 
also partly disable individual actors to isolate themselves from impacts of collective 
problems. This leads to the demand for governance (Young, 1997a: 273). The private 
sector and NGOs have played a crucial role in contributing to governing collective 
action problems, and not only by supporting intergovernmental efforts (Mitchell, 
2010: 4). They also attempt to establish mechanisms of governance whose authority 
arises outside government to commit themselves in cooperative strategies in various 
kinds of governance activities (Wapner, 1997: 65). It can be noticed that what regime 
perspective and global governance have in common is an attempt to explain how 
compliance and sanction mechanisms, as an intervention, can be developed by 
international actors in the absence of a world government. Since the governance 
approach provides an explanation of the role of non-state actors in shaping 
international outcomes, it offers an option to examine how these actors can 
contribute to inter-state cooperative areas where regimes are established but 
function ineffectively. 
2.2.4.1 Regimes as parts of global governance 
Although governance and regimes are similar in focusing on process and social 
institutions over the collective activities of groups in governing members’ relevant 
areas, it is necessary to clearly differentiate regimes from other modes of 
governance. Regimes are parts of governance (Commission on Global Governance, 
1995: 2; Karns and Mingst, 2010: 4–5; Viotti and Kauppi, 2010: 131, 135) under the 
widely accepted definition of governance, which is ‘the sum of the many ways 
individuals and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs. It is a 
continuing process through which conflicting or diverse interests may be 
accommodated and cooperative action may be taken. It includes formal institutions 
and regimes empowered to enforce compliance, as well as informal arrangements 
that people and institution have agreed to or perceive to be in their interest’ 
(Commission on Global Governance, 1995: 2). This definition is useful to give a broad 
idea of what can be identified as governance; however, it is not clear how these 
governance processes, mechanisms and actors are related to each other in 
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international politics. Nor is there an idea of how to clearly separate regimes from 
other kinds of governance tools. Therefore, exploring the concept of governance 
applied in the IR and the public administration (PA) literature can help clarify the 
meaning and norms attached to the concept of governance. The concept of 
governance in the fields of IR and PA is beneficial because a part of each field is 
concerned with how to manage the collective problems in different contexts. The 
nature of transnational environmental issues is that they are an international 
problem which requires international collective action from states in governing them. 
At this point, the PA approach proposes an idea for how the modes of governance 
can contribute to the public policy development process. 
In the IR literature, governance means different things, ranging from inter-state-
oriented perspectives to non-state actors’ activities where states and IGOs fail to do 
their function. It can be used interchangeably in emphasizing the activities of inter-
state relations horizontally and their vertical processes at multiple levels of 
government activities, ranging from local to global (Vogler, 2000, cited in Paterson et 
al., 2003: 5). The wider scope of governance appears in the study of international 
politics to include non-state actors in relations to states. For example, Elliott and 
Breslin (2011) relate regional environmental governance to structures of authority in 
managing environmental collective problems and conflicts among stakeholders in the 
variety of processes both in vertical modes of governance (conventional and 
intergovernmental arrangements) and horizontal modes of governance (multiple 
public–private arrangements and networks) (Elliott and Breslin, 2011: 3). From the 
institutionalist perspectives, Lemos and Agrawal (2009) define governance as the 
application of institutionalized power or interventions aiming to shape processes and 
outcomes, and it differs from government by including the actions and mechanisms 
of non-state actors (Lemos and Agrawal, 2009: 71–72). Additionally, governance can 
be more than governmental or intergovernmental institution, since it also involves 
relations between the state and people and the collaborative mechanisms across 
sectors, and the norms of inclusion and equality (UNDP, 2014: 2). Governance can 
also refer to the functional relations of non-state actors – civil society actors and/or 
the private sector – to initiate mechanisms in the issues that states fail to do (Steets, 
2009; Delmas and Young, 2009). The IR literature often emphasizes governance in 
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terms of functional relations among actors in their focus in explaining and 
understanding the outcomes emerging from interactions among actors in the 
absence of world authority. It can be seen that the concept of governance is 
connected to the state and/or the government in at least three ways: conventionally 
directed to state relations, the hybrid relations among state and non-state actors, 
and the relations among non-state actors relating to the absence of state capacity 
and initiatives. More recently, governance in the meaning of traditional relations 
between states is less likely applied than others, especially in global and transnational 
issues. These are where non-state actors can also play their part in dealing with those 
problems in international politics (Chhotray and Stoker, 2010: 13). 
In the PA literature, the concept of governance focuses mainly on changes in public 
policy processes. Within the field, ‘governance’ is defined in various ways. Firstly, 
Whitman (2005) points out governance is the business of government in steering and 
control to maintain order and stability in which it operates. The term’s use in this way 
also concerns the relations between government and non-authoritative actors, 
interested parties and transnational actors in the internal public policy processes 
(Whitman, 2005: 16). Secondly, governance is not equal to government but rather 
‘the art of coordinating administration actions’ in the policy processes between 
different administrative levels (Saunier and Meganck, 2009: xiv, 159). Thirdly, 
governance refers to the ways in which states, non-state actors operating as partners 
through networks rather than a hierarchical structure, or markets for better 
coordination in managing policy files to avoid redundancies (Phillips, 2004: 1, 15). 
This use of governance is called variously, for example, as horizontal governance, 
alliances, joint ventures and partnership (Ferguson, 2009: 1). In addition, the 
application of the word ‘governance’ in the PA field refers to the complexity of the 
issues, which requires that higher collaboration, coordination and responsibility 
sharing for decision-making across public, private and voluntary sectors are necessary 
for governance collaboration (Phillips, 2004: 14; Ferguson, 2009: 1). This is, 
moreover, the change in condition of the public policy processes, where Stoker 
(1998) points out the unclear boundaries and responsibilities between and within the 
public and private sectors. Therefore, the essential focus of governance should be 
‘governance mechanisms which do not rest on resource to the authority and 
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sanctions of government’ (Stoker, 1998: 17). Rhodes (1996) clearly notes that 
‘governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a new 
process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by 
which society is governed’ (Rhodes, 1996: 652–653). 
Although the PA approach is mainly oriented in the changing modes of governance 
within the context of national public policy, the meaning of governance – similarly to 
the IR approach – reflects the increase of political space for non-state actors to 
engage in the public policy area. Moreover, the PA perspective provides a framework 
for how governance can be interpreted by separating governance into two different 
structures: vertical and horizontal. It assists with distinguishing the conventional, 
formal chains of commands – which can be normally found in governmental 
departments and agencies – from the flat organizational relations emphasizing the 
need for coordination, participation and information sharing among various kinds of 
actors to manage complex issues over particular policy areas. 
The concept of multilevel governance can be a useful framework to exemplify the 
overlapping areas of interest between IR and PA on how international environmental 
policy can be formed, developed and implemented. Multilevel governance is defined 
as ‘political structures and processes that transgress the borders of administrative 
jurisdictions, aiming to cope with interdependencies in societal development and 
political decision-making which exist among territorial units’ (Benz, 2006: 95, 
translated and cited in Newig and Fritsch, 2008: 5). Multilevel governance comprises 
vertical modes of governance among governmental departments, non-hierarchical 
structures among independent actors at each different level of governance and 
across levels. This results in a highly complex system of decision points in the EU 
political structure and the increasing number of non-state actors participating in 
those decision-making points is one of the main focuses in multilevel governance 
studies (Newig and Fritsch, 2008: 3, 5). The concept of multilevel governance depicts 
how policies are initiated and decided from various directions: the top-down, the 
bottom-up, the two-level-game and the network structure. Although the concept of 
multilevel governance which is best applied in the EU political structure is not fully fit 
with other regional organizations, the concept helpfully identifies the political 
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activities at multiple levels that political actors have to go through. Under the 
different political context of each region, the development of international policy can 
be at the least investigated from the multiple levels of government and/or 
governance in the more participatory political system. 
Exploring the concept of governance on IR and PA reveals how the concept can be 
applied to a wide spectrum of collaborative efforts in managing their common affairs. 
Governance can refer to all encompassed activities – initiated, collaborated and 
implemented by actors – with the aim of achieving their goals in dealing with any 
particular areas. Recognizing that governance can be interpreted variously, this thesis 
demarcates the study on environmental governance. With an aim of analysing the 
roles of actors who support environmental management at different levels and 
across levels to shape international outcomes and/or actors’ behaviour, this thesis 
finds Lemos and Agrawal’s definition of environmental governance most practical 
since the definition stresses social interventions and it is specific enough to cover 
both regimes and networks, which are the focus of this thesis. Environmental 
governance can be defined as ‘the set of regulatory processes, mechanisms and 
organizations through which political actors influence environmental actions and 
outcomes’ (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006: 298). Environmental regimes are considered 
parts of environmental governance. However, what makes regimes different from 
other modes of governance interventions is the centrality of states in governing 
international affairs and policy orientation (Stokke, 1997: 27). This is evidenced by 
some definitions of regimes that refer to regimes as instruments for international 
cooperation (Zartman, 1997: 58), rules agreed by states for conduct in specific issue 
areas (Viotti and Kauppi, 2010: 131) and/or mostly formal schemes of international 
cooperation (List, 2003: 17). The distinctions between regimes and other governance 
activities are more obvious when considering whose mechanisms are included in a 
governance system in a particular issue. For example, in emphasizing actors and their 
governance mechanisms in responding to the demand for sustainable development, 
Delmas and Young (2009) identify different kinds of governance initiated by different 
groups of actors (including the public sector, civil society and the private sector) and 
their hybrid forms of collaboration among them (Delmas and Young, 2009: 8). Figure 
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2-1 illustrates international actors and their governance mechanisms for supporting 
sustainable development. 
 
Figure 2-1: Actors and their environmental mechanisms for sustainable development 
(adapted from Delmas and Young (2009: 8)) 
 
Regimes are created, maintained and developed mainly by states and/or IGOs 
formally at the international level through multilateral arrangements designed to 
solve and/or mitigate a particular problem. The definition of regimes in this thesis is 
drawn on inter-state cooperation for functionally solving specific collective 
problems. In order to clearly observe what regimes are, this thesis focuses on explicit 
properties of regimes and defines regimes as the set of states’ intervening tools – 
which include international agreements, regional action plans, procedures, 
mechanisms, policies and projects – to deal with a particular issue. Therefore, 
environmental regimes are composed of a set of those policy tools and processes 
created by state members with the mutual aim of dealing with an environmental 
issue. Regimes are authoritatively developed and mostly monopolized by states and 
IGOs through the international policy process. Regimes have two integral parts: the 
common intentions and goals addressed internationally and the states’ obligations in 
complying with those intentions and implementing what has been agreed at the 
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national level. The consequences of regimes are therefore considered and measured 
through the international and national policy process. 
The definition of regimes applied in this research differentiates between regimes 
from other kinds of governance activities. Distinct points are set out below. Firstly, 
regimes are states’ tools to manage a specific problem, while governance reflects the 
state and non-state relations interacting on specific issues. Both regimes and 
governance are ongoing processes resulting from the activities and interactions of 
organizational actors; therefore, an IGO can be considered an inter-state cooperative 
mechanism and/or an international actor which facilitates members’ goals. Secondly, 
the study of regimes focuses mainly on interactions at the international level, where 
international policy is made as agreements, declarations and action plans, for 
example; and the consequences of regimes depend on each government carrying out 
those policies as national laws, rules and enforcement activities at the national level. 
However, governance consists of interactions among various kinds of actors at the 
international, national, subnational and especially transnational level. Therefore, in a 
specific issue, regimes and governance are parallel processes. Regimes contain an 
emphasis on state relations and authority mechanisms to manage a problem, but 
governance involves all mechanisms and activities in a particular area. By the 
definition applied in this thesis, the focus of regimes is an analysis of interventions 
existing in the state-world, while governance emphasizes various kinds of social 
interventions. The governance perspective allows the investigation of international 
changes resulting from non-state actors’ mechanisms. Although there is less 
opportunity for non-state actors to take part directly in the formal policymaking 
process, non-state actors can find other opportunities to influence international 
outcomes through their governance mechanisms and activities. 
Thirdly, since regimes are state mechanisms, they often have an authoritative or 
official nature backed up by international agreements or mutual declarations. This 
aspect of regimes distinguishes them from other kinds of governance mechanisms 
initiated by non-state actors. Regimes are also different from other hybrid 
governance mechanisms between state and non-state actors because actors in the 
hybrid forms of governance are collaborate equally as partners in a form of horizontal 
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governance. Regimes also contain the horizontal mode of governance but this 
manner is reserved only for states and governmental relations. The features of 
regimes are therefore equal relations between state members and the vertical form 
of governance at the national level in implementation and enforcing policies by state 
authorities at the national, subnational and local levels. 
Finally, the modes of governance help to differentiate regimes from other kinds of 
governance. As the word ‘governance’ in PA signifies changes in process of 
government terms in incorporating more coordinated information and participation 
(Rhodes, 1996: 652–653), regimes represent conventional management among inter-
state and governmental relations interdependently at the international level but a 
hierarchically top-down approach when it comes to implementation at the national 
level. Non-state actors are rarely involved in the formal policy decision-making 
process at any level if they are not allowed to do so by their constitution. From the 
definition of regimes applied in this thesis, networks referring to connections 
between different types of actor are categorized as a kind of governance. 
Networking as a kind of governance appears in international relations. The concept 
of networks in this field has mostly been developed from the concept of social 
networks. They are used to explain a factor that causes changes in international 
politics. International actors form networks to cooperate transnationally on specific 
issues. The concept of social networks emphasizing the nodes and links as a basic 
form of network gives a guideline to identify and examine the features of networks. 
Divided by types of actor participating in networks, three categories of networks can 
be broadly categorized: government networks (Slaughter, 1997; Slaughter, 2004; 
Hooghe and Marks, 2001), state–civil society networks (Miyazaki, 2011; Gilbert and 
Behnam, 2013) and civil society networks (Reinicke, 2000; Keck and Sikkink, 1999; 
Haas, 1992). In addition, links among actors can be examined through various kinds 
of cooperative activities, for example resource sharing, trust building, implementing 
policy, monitoring and norm creating. Thus, from this IR literature, networks are a 
form of governance and the concept of networks has a strong potential to be applied 
to the study of international politics. 
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As a form of global governance which emphasizes the role of institutions in 
maintaining international order, achieving collective goals and facilitating IR 
(Rosenau, 2000; Sikkink, 2009: 241; Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 560), the concept of 
networks is fascinating for this thesis in providing an explanation for how 
collaboration in the form of networks can influence international outcomes and/or 
shape international actors’ behaviour. The network perspective allows the 
investigation of the achievement of collective action which derives from attempts 
among diverse types of actor. The network form of organization has become an 
alternative for actors who want to preserve their autonomy, not only because it is 
more flexible, adaptable and cheap than other forms of organization (Sikkink, 2009: 
231, 233; Kahler, 2009: 17) but also because collaboration in the form of networks 
also gives network actors social power, in addition to material power, within a 
structure formed by patterns of relationships among political actors (Hafner-Burton 
et al., 2009: 560; Ward et al., 2011: 246). 
Social power through a structure is an additional source of influence for networks in 
achieving their mutual goals and international outcomes. The network approach does 
not deny the actors’ attributes. However, it emphasizes the social power created by 
ties among nodes, which provides an opportunity for or constrains actors’ behaviour 
(Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2009: 29). An actor can obtain more social power, 
for example in the case of inter-state relations, by access to international institutions 
and/or associations since this creates denser ties with others (Hafner-Burton et al., 
2009: 573). Hafner-Burton and Montgomery (2009) develop Dahl’s concept of the 
three faces of power (Dahl, 1957) to clarify an application of social power through 
coercion, agenda setting and interest alteration to shape actors’ behaviour and 
international outcomes in world politics. Social power can be used as a weapon to 
impose costs on a target actor through bullying, shaming and isolating. Actors 
possessing denser ties to other states can have more influence to manipulate 
reputations and/or exercise their power by cutting ties to the target actor (Hafner-
Burton and Montgomery, 2009: 30–31). Social power can be better understood 
through a network analysis approach, which offers systemic tools to examine the 
structural properties of networks, flows of influence and network power within the 
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structure, and the effects of the network on international outcomes (Hafner-Burton 
et al., 2009: 559; Sikkink, 2009: 230). 
Analysing the structure of networks reveals the power of particular nodes obtained 
from their network positions in relations to other network actors (Hafner-Burton et 
al., 2009; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2009; Sikkink, 2009). Network power can 
be observed through structure in three different ways including access, brokerage 
and exit options (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Firstly, power of access refers to ability 
of the node, which can easily receive valued information and resources from other 
nodes. This kind of social network power belongs to the central position of the 
network, called centrality. The social power of a central node can be clearly 
exemplified in the case of a wheel network since if the node chooses to exit the 
network the whole network collapse (Sikkink, 2009: 239). Secondly, brokerage power 
is possessed by the node, which can bridge or connect to exclusive or marginalized 
nodes or clusters of nodes. The node in the bridge position may gain more influence 
or bargaining power once it provides the only link to the larger clusters of networks, 
exclusive and/or marginalized nodes. Finally, exit power is an option for marginalized 
nodes. The margins of the network often exercise this power when they are 
constrained, when they do not realize the benefits and/or when they can find better 
alternatives from other kinds of arrangements (Sikkink, 2009: 230). Although actors 
can voluntarily join the network and obtain exit options, the option is a source of 
power for marginalized nodes to bargain with the broker node, which has to secure 
its influence position by strategically trying to decrease the risk of exit either by 
making the network more attractive or by increasing the opportunity costs of exiting 
to the exclusive and/or marginalized nodes and clusters (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 
570–572). Furthermore, exiting can ruin the nature of legitimacy in advocacy 
networks, whose power as a whole comes from their claims of being the voice of the 
powerless (Sikkink, 2009: 240). While the position in the structure of network can 
give different social power to each node, the power of the structure of the network 
should be considered together with the purpose of networks to see the effects, 
influence and effectiveness of the networks to shape international politics. 
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Comparing diverse kinds of networks, Sikkink (2009) helpfully suggests two end 
points on a continuum, with fully intentional networks on one side and purely 
unintentional networks on the other. An actual network may fall at a point on the 
continuum and that results in the influence of the network on its outcomes. 
Unintentional networks may not plan to act collectively; as a result, network effects 
can instead be expected than effectiveness in terms of achieving specific goals. On 
the other hand, intentional networks designed to act collectively to meet their 
planned goals could be measured in terms of effectiveness whether they are fail or 
success in setting agenda, changing policy or shaping target actors’ behaviour 
(Sikkink, 2009: 229, 235). By examining through structure of networks together with 
their network purpose, the network approach gives a reason why some networks can 
achieve better outcomes than others. Moreover, the approach offers an explanation 
for why networks with a majority of non-state actors can strategically raise their 
social power to shape international outcomes despite their absence of material 
power to bargain with state actors. 
The network approach, which provides analytical toolkits to investigate the role of 
various kinds of network in shaping international outcomes, is very useful for 
constructing an analytical framework for examining the effects of policy networks on 
environmental governance in the region. Policy networks are the main focus of this 
thesis; therefore, the next part of this chapter discusses the concept of networks as 
well as the definition of policy networks. Since the word ‘policy networks’ is also 
applied in the field of PA, the concept of policy networks and the method of policy 
network analysis are also explored and justified whether or not they are suitable and 
applicable for my research. 
2.2.4.2 Networks: concepts, definitions and analytical tools 
This part delves into the concept of networks, which normally comes together with 
the definition of networks and the methods of network analysis. The foundation of 
what is called ‘networks’ is firstly and necessarily discussed to avoid any confusion 
from the various meanings, concepts and terms of networks which are widely applied 
in sociology, PA and IR. This part aims to settle any confusion which can arise from 
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various interpretation of the words ‘networks’ and ‘policy networks’, whose 
definitions are interrelated to their method of analysis. 
The word ‘networks’ can be seen in the social sciences literature in many forms such 
as social networks, policy networks, transgovernmental networks, transnational 
networks and transnational advocacy networks. This part firstly focuses on the notion 
of networks and the methods of social network in sociology as an initial step to 
understand the concept of network in other fields. This reveals the basic component 
of networks as well as the methods to identify and analyse a network. Secondly, this 
part illustrates the various concepts of policy networks, where the agreed definition 
is still absent. This leads to difficulties in applying the concepts and methods to my 
research. The investigation of the development of policy in the public policy process 
lead to the usage of policy networks in the meaning provided by Perkin and Court 
(2005), whose terms are defined by applying the basic concept of network. This 
makes the definition of policy network as applied in this research different from the 
general term used in the PA. 
2.2.4.2.1 The concept of social networks and the social network analysis 
In the social sciences literature, networks are generally depicted before introducing 
the network analysis method by emphasizing the components of networks or the 
features that will form a network. A good observation on what can be called ‘a 
network’ is from Knoke, who points out that ‘the two basic components of all network 
analyses are a set of objects (variously called nodes, positions, or actors) and a set of 
relations among these objects (variously called edges, ties, or links)’ (Knoke, 1990: 8). 
In addition, ‘the units of analysis are the varying interactions that link each pair (a 
dyad consisting of an ego and alter) of social actors in the system’ (Knoke, 1990: 235). 
In explaining social life, which is importantly based on actors’ relations and the 
patterns formed by their relations, a social network is defined as ‘a set of socially 
relevant nodes connected by one or more relations. Nodes, or network members, are 
the units of that are connected by the relations whose patterns we study. These units 
are most commonly persons or organizations, but in principle any units that can be 
connected to other units can be studies as nodes’ (Marin and Wellman, 2011: 11). 
Moreover, a social network can also be referred to as ‘a group of actors – people, 
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organizations, governments – who are linked together by some common actions, 
common membership, shared communication or some other form of exchange’ 
(Manheim et al., 2008: 226). Although the structure and function of each network are 
not the same, Manheim et al. (2008) propose that the common core of them is that 
they are based on patterns of exchange which can be mapped. And the social network 
analysis will provide a method to produce and analyse those patterns (Manheim et 
al., 2008: 227). 
Hanneman and Riddle (2011) introduce some simple properties that can be seen in 
most networks. From the top-down view, the whole structure of a network has 
properties including size (number of actors), density (unique ordered pairs of actors 
identifying possible relationships – both directed or undirected ties), connections 
(reachability, connectivity, distance, reciprocity, transitivity and clustering), 
connections among groups (block density, group-external and group-internal ties) 
and substructures (the dyads, triads and ego-centres that can be examined 
separately) (Hanneman and Riddle, 2011). Hanneman and Riddle (2011: 356) also 
provide another way to examine social networks from the bottom-up by focusing on 
the embedded individuals (or ego networks) to find ‘the variation across individuals 
in the way they are embedded in “local” social structure’. Ego refers to an individual 
focal node connected directly to other one-step nodes, called neighbourhoods. The 
focus of ego networks is on the quality of ties between egos and their neighbours, 
connections, structural holes, brokerage among groups, and centrality (Hanneman 
and Riddle, 2011: 354–367). It can be noticed that these network properties make a 
network different from others. Degenne and Forsé (1999: 3-4) explain that although 
two simple networks have the same number of members and densities, they can still 
be different because of the connection between links and the average path between 
actors. The analysis of the network, thus, focuses on the relations or interactions 
between two actors (or dyadic relations) and patterns of relations, while individuals 
and dyads cannot be separated from the structures (Degenne and Forsé, 1999: 3; 
Marin and Wellman, 2011: 14). Mapping the positions of nodes and links reveals a 
network’s structure, which is unique and can be helpful for exploring patterns of 
relationships actors for better understanding of social phenomena. 
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2.2.4.2.2 The concept of policy networks and the policy networks analysis 
The application of the word ‘policy network’ requires special attention since it 
connects to the development of the policy network analysis in the field of PA. Since 
the concept of policy networks is variously applied in the field to explain different 
circumstances at different stages of the public policy process within governmental 
organizations or domestic politics, it leads to ambiguity in identifying precisely what 
policy networks are. The analysis of policy network in this field, according to Rhodes 
(2008), can be separated into three main categories: policy network as description, 
policy network as theory and policy network as reform (Rhodes, 2008: 426–433). 
Rhodes (2008) defines policy networks as ‘sets of formal institutional and informal 
linkages between governmental and other actors structured around shared if 
endlessly negotiated beliefs and interests in public policymaking and 
implementation. These actors are interdependent and policy emerges from the 
interactions between them’ (Rhodes, 2008: 425). From Rhodes’s definition, the focus 
on actors is specific to political actors whose interests are in the public policy process. 
Policy network analysis can be used as methods to explain relationships among the 
central government and subsystem in the pluralist society, the structural relationship 
between political institutions, the relationship between the state and civil society, 
sets of resource-reliance organizations, the structural change of government, and 
management in the public sector (Rhodes, 2008). 
In addition, a policy network, defined as ‘a set of relatively stable relationships which 
are of non-hierarchical and interdependent nature linking a variety of actors, who 
share common interests with regard to a policy and who exchange resources to 
pursue these shared interests acknowledging that co-operation is the best way to 
achieve common goals’ (Börzel, 1998: 254), can be seen as a kind of governance 
which provides a tool to mobilize political resources dispersed between the public 
and private sectors (Börzel, 1998). Policy network analysis, therefore, analyses 
‘structural relationships, interdependencies and dynamic between actors in politics 
and policy-making’ (Schneider, 1988: 2, cited in Börzel, 1998: 258). The method 
focuses on trust and communicative interactions of separate, but interdependent 
and coordinated, horizontal organizations to investigate how a policy network can 
exercise its influence on the policy processes (Börzel, 1998). 
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Moreover, policy networks have been developed as a theory by some scholars to 
contextualize a network as a social system (Klijn, 1996; Marsh and Smith, 2000). Klijn 
(1996) defines a policy network as ‘(more or less) stable patterns of social 
relationships between interdependent actors, which take shape around policy 
problems or policy programs, and that are being formed, reproduced, and changed 
by an ecology of games between these actors’ (Klijn, 1996: 97). A network consists of 
actors, arrangements and interdependency (Klijn, 1996: 109). Thus, the method 
analyses the interdependency of actors, the actors’ different strategies and the 
consequences of interactions, leading to changes of actors’ perceptions, preferences 
and interests (Klijn, 1996: 98–100, 112). 
Various concepts of policy networks which are directly related with the policy 
network analysis method, however, bring difficulties in finding an exact model to 
apply to my research which focuses on the establishment and development of 
regional environmental policy among developing countries. Since most of the 
literature applies the policy networks concept to analyse internal politics in 
developed countries or the EU, where formal political channels are open to non-state 
actors (Dowding, 1995; Rhodes, 2008; Börzel, 1998; Klijn, 1996; Miyazaki, 2011), none 
of these concepts can fully apply as a framework for my research. Not only do the 
various aspects of the conceptual analysis pose challenges in searching for a suitable 
model to apply in my cases, the drawback of the network concept is criticized in 
Dowding’s work. Dowding (1995) is right to argue that, while the policy process can 
be learned by different types of policy network, the approach itself can be developed 
as a theory only when it follows the lines of sociological network analysis. ‘They fail 
because the driving force of explanation, the independent variables, are not network 
characteristics per se but rather characteristics of components within the networks’ 
(Dowding, 1995: 137). 
Since the concept of policy networks in PA is not suitable to be applied to Southeast 
Asia’s political context and it is difficult to utilize the concept to international politics, 
this thesis finds the concept of social networks and the methods of social network 
analysis more practical than the policy networks concept and the policy network 
analysis method. This thesis therefore adopts the fundamental basis of the social 
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networks concept and the social network analysis method. However, the term ‘policy 
network’ as used in this thesis is different from those definitions of policy networks 
in PA. This thesis uses ‘policy network’ to emphasize the networks’ activities that 
affect the policy process and international policy outcomes. Similar to Perkin and 
Court’s work, which aims to investigate how non-state actors work in the form of 
networks to influence policy processes, networks are defined as ‘formal or informal 
structures that link actors (individuals or organizations) who share a common interest 
on a specific issue or who share a general set of values’ (Perkin and Court, 2005: 2) 
and ‘policy network’ is used for any network that is relevant to the policy process 
(Perkin and Court, 2005: 8). 
2.2.4.3 Governance gaps as opportunities for policy networks 
Regimes are created at the international level when individual states are incapable 
of managing transnational issues alone; however, acting in concert in accordance 
with documents cannot guarantee success. The classical role of states is challenged 
by transnational issues and this leads to the usage of the term ‘governance gaps’ in 
the literature. Governance gaps in this thesis refer to the inner flaws of regimes 
functions. These gaps are examined if non-state actors in the form of policy networks 
can play any role in improving the quality of regimes at different levels: international, 
national and transnational. 
The application of the term ‘governance gaps’ in my thesis is connected to but slightly 
different from the term used in the literature. The concept of global governance and 
the concept of global civil society question the role of the state in dealing with global 
problems. State and civil society seem to be on different sides. Therefore, in general, 
governance gaps are opportunities for civil society actors and the private sector to 
increase their role by providing alternative mechanisms to tackle the global 
problems, which states fail to do. If we see governance as the combination of pieces 
of all cooperative problem-solving arrangements and activities exercised by states 
and non-state actors in various forms of collaboration (Karns and Mingst, 2010: 4–5), 
governance gaps can appear anywhere. Steets’s aspect helpfully defined the concept 
of governance gaps (Steets, 2009). Governance gaps are referred to as the lack of the 
state’s operational capacity to effectively address the global problems in the rapid 
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change of politics, economic liberalization and technology (Steets, 2009: 123). 
Governance gaps in Steets’s perspective are where activities initiated by non-state 
actors respond to the failure of the state’s functions in the form of networks and 
partnerships among civil society and the private sector to fill those gaps by setting 
operational governance mechanisms outside the state’s sphere of influence to 
increase the effectiveness of global governance (Steets, 2009: 123–124). This is 
where the use of the term ‘governance’ in this thesis, which is developed from 
Steets’s proposition, is needed to be clarified. Steets’s concept of governance gaps 
reveals various environmental problematic areas where non-state actors can play a 
role in shaping environmental outcomes through their governance mechanisms. It is 
also helpful and practical to identify governance gaps as the absence of the 
effectiveness of regimes’ functional mechanisms to solve problems. Governance gaps 
here do not exist outside the state’s realm but within regimes, which can be changed 
through interactions and intervention mechanisms among network actors. This thesis 
defines it in this way because, firstly, the clear-cut separation between non-state and 
state actors in dealing with environmental problems does not seem obvious. 
Secondly, this definition serves to explore the formation of policy networks among 
state and non-state actors, which is possible when considering the nature of 
transnational environmental issues, where shared goals can be identified. 
Governance gaps identified by scholars derive from several factors: the collective 
action problems in international cooperation, the lack of states’ and IGOs’ capacity 
to meet policy goals, and the complexity of the issues, where better modes of 
governance are necessary. Governance gaps occurring in international 
environmental cooperation emphasized in this thesis can be broadly perceived and 
examined in two aspects: the quality of the product in the form of documents and 
the process of implementing that product. Although these aspects of governance 
gaps can be investigated separately, they are interrelated and directly affect the 
quality of international regimes. This part explores what scholars have pointed out as 
governance gaps and explains why international environmental policy is hard to 
achieve at particular stages of implementation. 
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The first category of governance gaps is considered from the quality of international 
agreements and related documents in addressing the intentions, objectives, goals, 
obligations and compliance mechanisms for cooperation. In addressing the 
vagueness of international agreements, Sjöberg (1997) notices that, even though 
formal international organizations have been established and legal multilateral 
agreements have been signed, the improvement of environmental problems covered 
by those agreements is sluggish. She identifies the collective action problem in world 
affairs, where there is an absence of central authority, no guarantor of the agreement 
and a reluctance of state to cede control to multilateral mechanisms in sensitive 
areas. These are why multilateral agreements are often weak and vague (Sjöberg, 
1997: 13). In addition, Zartman (1997) proposes that, to obtain consensus on 
multilateral agreements, exceptions to the agreement are provided to form an issue 
coalition at the cost of temporary effectiveness (Zartman, 1997: 63). A basic 
obligation written in the international agreement at the earlier stage of the regime’s 
establishment may encourage states to join the club, which requires more actors for 
better consequences in achieving collective action, especially in the case of the 
environment; however, the vagueness of the agreement, objectives and policies 
consequently lessens the effectiveness of regimes when it comes into practice, 
particularly when policies and mechanisms related to achieving those goals are not 
further developed through the process. In addition, a number of international forums 
and international accords negotiated at the international level may cause more 
problems in implementation, which can be highlighted in the other aspect of 
governance gaps. 
The other aspect of governance gaps emphasized in this thesis can be identified 
through the international policy process, especially the process of policy 
implementation. Operational and implementation problems can be perceived by 
different groups of scholars who examine different stages of the policy development 
process: the groups whose concerns are on states’ and/or IGOs’ institutional 
mechanisms and the groups whose focuses are on the absence of non-state actors’ 
involvement on the policy development process. While the former reveals 
international and national mechanisms which make states and IGOs’ deliver poor 
functional policy and mechanisms, the latter implicitly and importantly proposes the 
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engagement of non-state actors as an option to make policy and process better 
function. 
Examining why environmental agreements are difficult to achieve, some scholars 
observe the process of policy implementation. Implementation problems are 
obviously rooted in the inability of states and IGOs to establish effective intervention 
policy and mechanisms owing to insufficient resources allocated to deal with the 
problem. At the national level, the implementation gaps derive from states’ 
incapacity to implement an agreement (Faulkner, 1997: 150; Elliott and Breslin, 2011: 
11; Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 7). Implementation gaps do not just simply arise because 
of a lack of states’ willingness to comply with the agreements. It is also caused by the 
insufficiency of institutional and financial resources (Faulkner, 1997: 150) and the lack 
of technology transfer mechanisms to developing countries (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 
7). As Faulkner (1997) points out, the increased number of agreements especially in 
developing countries shows governments’ willingness to deal with the problems but 
the major obstacles are resources to process their obligations (Faulkner, 1997: 150). 
Esty and Ivanova (2002) depict that the increasing number of treaties – even in 
developed countries – does not only cause the overload of works to national staffs in 
participating environmental activities. Activities across IGOs related to these 
agreements also make both financial and opportunity costs to already-understaffed 
environmental ministries (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 4). 
Governance gaps in the process of implementation also result from the institutional 
problems at the international level. This kind of governance gap also occurs in the 
most advanced IGOs like the EU. Implementation deficits – meaning the failure to 
identify policy goals and/or the failure to solve the initial problem – happen and have 
little consequence on the quality of the environment (Jordan, 1999, cited in Leventon 
and Antypas, 2012: 253). This occurs in the EU structure, which still lacks a supreme 
authority and causes conflicts between aims and priorities (Bache and Flinders, 2004, 
cited in Leventon and Antypas, 2012: 255). Furthermore, international bodies relating 
to environmental issues have limited jurisdictional authority in ensuring states’ 
obligations at the national level, while national legislative authorities rarely see their 
important role in addressing environmental harms (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 3). This 
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comes together with few agreements containing serious enforcement provision (Esty 
and Ivanova, 2002: 7); therefore, the compliance and implementation process of 
international agreements directly rely on states’ willingness and capacity. 
Although the governance gaps in the process of implementation are revealed by 
emphasizing states’ and IGOs’ institutional inability, some scholars propose the 
absence of non-state actors in the policy process to be a part of the governance gaps 
in implementing international environmental policy. Operational gaps, which include 
participatory and information gaps, are presented as an explanation for why the 
absence of non-state actors’ participation at different stages of the environmental 
policy process can lead to failures in policy implementation. While the different 
stages of policy are interrelated and these operational gaps can occur at any stage, 
the improvement of the process through better information and participation can 
lead to better environmental outcomes by filling the governance gaps in policy 
documents and/or strengthening institutional states’ and IGOs’ tools for better policy 
implementation. 
Information and participation are a crucial foundation in the policy formation and 
negotiation stages at different levels, especially in complex issues like the 
environment. According to Reinicke et al. (2000), operational gaps are the problems 
of states’ incapacity to effectively address the policy to respond to the growing 
number of complex issues at the national and international levels. This gap also 
results from the exclusion – both intentionally and unintentionally – of stakeholders 
in related policy areas to provide the sufficient knowledge and considerations to form 
and select policy options (Reinicke et al., 2000: viii). The participatory gaps lessen 
states’ and IGOs’ credibility and legitimacy, especially when private-sector and civil 
society actors successfully form transnational instruments to operate in a governance 
vacuum (Reinicke et al., 2000: 7–8). 
In addition, the participatory gaps can be seen in the environmental policy process in 
the absence of links between key informant sectors and policymakers. Russell-Smith 
et al. (2015) have recently urged groups of scientists – known to be honest brokers – 
to engage and take responsibility for informing, advocating, guiding and expanding 
environmental policy options to policymakers (Russell-Smith et al., 2015: 441–447). 
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In the negotiating and regulatory setting process to address the transnational 
problem, the involvement of all stakeholders has been recognized as important as it 
pools knowledge from different perspectives to manage conflicting and complex 
issues (Reinicke et al., 2000: 29). The consultation of stakeholders and public 
participation in the policy decision-making process is an instrument to achieve policy 
objectives since this process leads to the acceptance of the decision then brings about 
better compliance and implementation on the ground (EU, 2002: 6; Newig and 
Fritsch, 2008: 3). The more participatory and collaborative approach in including 
stakeholders in the policy process is a means to sustainably achieve more policies, 
political results and project outcomes (Newig and Fritsch, 2008: 2; Reinicke et al., 
2000: 39; UNDP, 2014: 8). In the policy implementation process, for instance, capacity 
building is more effective if the demand is articulated by communities and not 
imposed by states (Reinicke et al., 2000: 77). In the EU’s highly complex decision 
points at multiple levels, the involvement of actors might hamper the effectiveness 
of policy delivery in the short term; however, it would increase the effectiveness of 
environmental policy in the long run (Newig and Fritsch, 2008: 3). More crucially, 
even though participation and public engagement might not fully work in the policy 
decision-making areas, which are reserved for the state and governmental actors, the 
participatory process is still very relevant, helpful and necessary in making regimes 
more effective at other stages. For example, participation in decision-making may 
make it harder to meet mutual aims, but in the enforcement process of monitoring 
who breaks the law more participation at that level may be better. The more 
information contributed through participation, the better data can be added to the 
effectiveness of regimes. Consequently, in regimes where there is little political space 
for non-state actors, participatory gaps occur and these gaps are directly related to 
information gaps. 
Information gaps, as part of operational gaps which also result from the absence of 
participation by non-state actors and/or key stakeholders, are crucial both in the 
process of policy development and in coordination and management among 
organizations. In the international public policy process, the information or the data 
gaps is well demonstrated in Esty and Ivanova’s work (2002). Information gaps, 
according to them, are the absence of reliable information on, firstly, the explanation 
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and causal relations among environmental problems and trends. Secondly, the gaps 
refer to the lack of policy choices, consequences and compliance with commitments 
in data collection. Information gaps can derive from problems of coordination in data 
collection across boundaries, unsystematic guidelines in monitoring compliance and 
reporting data, the limitation of institutional authorities in terms of resources and 
capacity to verify data written in the national self-report, and incomplete and 
inconsistent reports because of the increasing burden on national staff to declare 
obligations which their government has met (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 6). To close 
these information gaps, they therefore propose the establishment of the data 
coordinating system in the form of network-based mechanisms among institutions 
and scientific and technical expertise as a key step to obtain higher-quality data in 
the monitoring process (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 13). 
The governance gaps stated above offer points for investigating non-state actors’ 
activities responding to ineffective of international regimes. Governance gaps 
existing in regimes are considered a political opportunity for non-state actors to 
create links to connect with states and/or IGOs to work together to close those 
existing gaps. Governance gaps referred to in this thesis are areas where the 
operations and functions of regimes – which can be changed through interactions 
among state and non-state actors at the different levels of policy development 
process – can possibly be improved if states and/or IGOs include non-state actors as 
parts of their networks. The governance gaps are seen as an opportunity for non-
state actors to engage with states and IGOs at different levels and across levels of 
governance with the aim of supporting the goals of regimes at different stages of the 
international policy process. 
To find practical options to solve environmental problems, scholars on environmental 
governance propose several approaches to deal with the complexity of 
environmental problems. Although an effective way for a government to manage an 
environmental problem within a state is for the Ministry of the Environment to 
coordinate environmental policy with other relevant policy and governmental 
departments such as the economy, agriculture, land management and enforcement, 
it is still very challenging for a state to successfully coordinate between national and 
- 53 - 
local bodies (Eckerberg, 1997: 119). While formal coordination among governmental 
divisions within a state does not provide any promises for governmental agencies to 
officially coordinate on the issue across boundaries, informal forms of cooperation 
for better coordination among organizational actors whose mutual goals can be 
identified can be a more realistic choice. To respond to the failure of international 
regimes, and to achieve environmental governance, Lemos and Agrawal (2006) 
propose that the multilevel character of environmental problems requires cross-scale 
governance mechanisms and strategies with heightened cooperation of many 
different actors across local, regional, national and international levels, and the 
economic, political, social and cultural domains (2006: 318). In addition, Peter M. 
Haas (2004) offers multilevel, non-hierarchical, information-rich, loose networks of 
institutions and actors as an alternative governance mechanism to match the nature 
of environmental problems derived from ineffective state-centric regimes and 
governance (Haas, 2004, cited in Lemos and Agrawal, 2006: 301). Network-based 
governance is appropriate for examining international cooperation on transnational 
environmental issues in the region for these reasons. 
Firstly, the network approach is flexible in analysing relationships among different 
kinds of actors in contributing to the progress of international regimes at different 
levels and across levels. The approach by itself emphasizes neither state nor non-
state actors; however, its main focus is on relationships among actual actors who are 
connected by particular defined activity. This helps to observe how international 
policy is developed, adjusted and implemented at the national and local levels. 
Although policy to tackle transnational environmental issues is initiated at the 
international level, the goal cannot be achieved if there is nothing done on the 
ground. On the other hand, it is difficult to create bottom-up policy to respond to 
transnational environmental issues. For example, policy done fragmentarily at the 
community level could manage the problem in a particular area but it is very hard to 
stop the occurrence of the issues in nearby areas. The environment can be protected 
if commitment is taken by every party from different local areas. The bottom-up 
approach may not be able to harmonize the various needs and interests of local 
communities, while the top-down approach may not guarantee the effectiveness and 
sustainability of policy on the ground owing to the absence of participation and a 
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sense of policy belonging for the community. The network perspective bridges these 
gaps by focusing on the interactions among environmental supporters at different 
levels and across levels. In addition, the network approach, which focuses on the 
connections among actors, also allows the investigation of collaboration among 
network actors as a response to states’ failure to manage environmental problems 
effectively. 
Secondly, since the approach allows an analysis of the role of non-state actors, 
collaborative connections among them to support particular international 
environmental policies can be examined across boundaries. Despite the feature of 
environmental problems being transnational by nature and fitting well with the 
characteristics of transnational actors, transnational relationships among non-state 
actors in collectively shaping and contributing to international environmental 
outcomes are not much emphasized by other IR approaches. Since coordination 
among ministries is not well established and still problematic in domestic politics, it 
seems to be more challenging to make better coordination through formal policy 
coordination across boundaries, especially among developing countries. 
Transnational characteristics of the problems may need transnational relations which 
include the non-state actor to resolve them. The network perspective offers a means 
to investigate the role of non-state actors in reducing states’ and IGOs’ obstacles 
resulting from a lack of coordination in the conventional approach. Through the 
network perspective, informal interactions among these transnational actors in the 
form of networks may lead to better outcomes on environmental cooperation on 
transnational issues in the region. 
Thirdly, cooperation in the form of networks is attractive and suitable for groups of 
developing countries since it does not require the establishment of new institutions. 
More importantly, the network approach proposes a possible option to improve 
international environmental outcomes through process orientation and 
development. The networked form of governance – emphasizing process facilitation 
and development – does not require the establishment of new institutions or new 
functional bodies. The networks should build on existing institutions, keep their 
structured informality and avoid falling into the trap of becoming another institution 
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(Reinicke et al., 2000: 64). Since the main problems of states’ incapacity to deal with 
environmental issues include a lack of personnel, material and financial resources, 
Esty and Ivanova (2002: 13) propose a network-based mechanism that builds on the 
functional elements in the existing institutions as a means to re-engineer regimes. 
‘While capitalizing on existing institutions and harnessing the power of governments 
and civil society alike, networks offer a faster, agile, problem-tailored process, 
inclusiveness on a merit basis, access to state of the art knowledge, and simultaneous 
proximity to both the local and the global scale’ (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 18). 
2.2.4.4 The concept of civil society and awareness in applying it in the 
Southeast Asian context 
The previous parts addressing the concept of governance have developed 
relationships and understanding of international regimes, governance and 
governance gaps as a necessary step before the following chapter constructs an 
analytical framework. However, terms such as non-state actors, civil society and 
NGOs are referred to but are not yet clarified. Since those words are not used 
interchangeably but have specific meaning in intentionally referring to a particular 
kind of group of actors, this part therefore serves to clarify the definitions and 
categories of actors before applying them to identify network actors. This part firstly 
explores the various terms which are categorized and analysed by scholars. To justify 
which term is the most suitable for applying in this thesis, the concept of civil society 
and some observations in applying the concept to Southeast Asia are examined. This 
part not only aims to clarify the terms used for this thesis but also to identify the role 
of civil society actors in the region in other areas aside from their prominent roles in 
struggling for development of democracy at the national level. 
The concept of civil society is still a matter of debate among scholars, particularly for 
the question of who should be considered part of civil society. Weiss (2008: 144) 
notes that the concept of civil society is a core and fascinating concept in political 
science; however, the meaning of the word is poorly defined. A first definition 
proposes that civil society is the voluntary social relationships and institutions which 
are different from market and states. Secondly, civil society encompasses all legal 
personality actors who are at least recognized by a state but are not a part of a 
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governmental body. Thus, NGOs, labour unions and charitable foundations are 
included (Steffek and Nanz, 2008, cited in Bernauer, et al. 2013: 88). The third 
perspective, which is rooted in the liberal tradition, defines civil society as a ‘domain 
of associational life situated above the individual and below the state. It is made up 
of complex networks based on interest, ideology, family and cultural affinity through 
which people pursue their various aims. Churches, unions, movements, political 
parties, and clubs of all sorts are examples of such networks, and the host of these 
together constitutes civil society’ (Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Falk, 
1992; Lipschutz, 1992, cited in Wapner 1997: 65). 
NGOs as parts of civil society play a significant role in global governance. Although 
non-governmental movements have long existed, the influence of them has 
dramatically enhanced since the end of World War II (Commission on Global 
Governance, 1995: 32). NGOs can be defined in two ways. In a broad term, an NGO 
refers to a voluntary, non-profit, non-violent and organized group pursuing shared 
public purposes and seeking political outcomes. Thus, while multinational 
corporations (MNCs) are excluded from the group by this definition, professional 
associations, charity foundations, trade unions and issue-based organizations are 
NGOs (Wapner, 1997; Evans and Newnham, 1998). Another definition of NGOs 
includes for-profit businesses because the economy is part of civil society. Therefore, 
for example, a corporation attempting to establish mechanisms to minimize 
environmental degradation can be considered an NGO (Wapner, 1997: 81–82). 
The concept of civil society is applied in both domestic and international politics. It 
can be noted that, in general, civil society is widely defined in two broad terms, which 
are differentiated by the inclusion or exclusion of the market as a group in civil 
society. On the one hand, while civil society in the analysis of domestic society can be 
defined as the ‘domain of associational life situated above the individual and below 
the state’ (Wapner, 1997: 66), Wapner sees the concept as still making sense in the 
analysis of international politics by defining the global civil society as ‘the domain that 
exists above the individual and below the state but also across state boundaries, 
where people voluntarily organize themselves to pursue various aims’ (1997: 66). On 
the other hand, Bernauer et al. (2013) notes that, while domestic and international 
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affairs discuss the increase of civil society participation in the policymaking process, 
there still exists the question of who should be considered civil society actors. They 
conclude that civil society commonly refers to voluntary social relationships and civic 
or social institutions that are distinguishable from state structure and market. Their 
legal personality is recognized by at least one state, however they are not a part of 
official governmental entities (Bernauer et al., 2013: 88). 
Although the concept and definition of civil society can provide a crucial approach in 
the observation of the role of non-state actors in effecting change in the studying of 
global affairs, a wide range of associations and groups make some difficulties in 
identifying who should be collectively called civil society, especially at the regional 
level. In addition, since the concept of civil society is rooted from the political and 
social development in Western countries, the application of the concept and 
definition in the non-Western state may not be suitable and might cause difficulty in 
the context that the public–private sphere cannot be clearly separated from each 
other. The term ‘civil society’ is always found in Southeast Asian literature that 
explores the relationships between state and civil society actors in the development 
of democracy (Guan, 2004; Weiss, 2008; Rodan, 1997; Aspinall and Weiss, 2012). 
Aspinall and Weiss (2012) propose that civil society is commonly defined by scholars 
as ‘the realm of associational life between family and state, as a site where ordinary 
Southeast Asian citizens were autonomously, carving out democratic space and 
challenging the legitimacy of authoritarian regimes’ (2012: 213). By using this 
definition, they identify many associations – based on issues including human rights, 
environmental and women’s groups, labour and farmers’ organizations – to note the 
growth of these organizations in diverse political regimes, most of which are non-
democratic. 
However, care should be taken in applying the concept of civil society in a context 
where most states are authoritarian. Guan (2004) emphasizes the importance of 
history and its effects in considering the way to see the democratic development of 
Southeast Asian civil society. While the relations between democracy and civil society 
in Eastern Europe and the United States foster the idea that the development of civil 
society will provide a positive effect in the democratic polity, this seems to be 
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different in Southeast Asia, where civil society actors were suppressed during the 
colonial period and limited in their political participation by European colonizers to 
prevent anti-colonial and nationalist movements (Guan, 2004: 11). Although this 
democratic struggle has existed since the colonial period, rapid economic 
development in the 1970s brought about the increase of educational opportunities 
that inspired citizens and the growth of social movements in a wide range to engage 
in political discourse and participation in a certain political arena (Guan, 2004: 12–
19). Thus, the study of the development of civil society and its relations with the state 
in Southeast Asia needs to recognize the context of diversity in terms of history, 
ethnicity, religion, culture, economic development and the political regimes (Guan, 
2004: 19). Similarly, Weiss (2008) also points out the problematic definition of civil 
society in applying the concept to the development of democracy in Southeast Asia. 
She agrees with Kaviraj and Khilnani that, while the actual political process in 
developing countries are mostly different from the West’s experience, the language 
used to articulate the politics are, strangely, the same (Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001: 4–
5, cited in Weiss, 2008: 145). Some key aspects that must be taken into account in 
considering the development of Southeast Asian civil society are the diverse types of 
political regime, the role of transnational and international institutions, the public 
and private spheres that are difficult to distinguish, and the clearly weaker power of 
civil society compared to the state (Weiss, 2008: 146–151). Therefore, it is suggested 
that, in the discussion about works on civil society in Southeast Asia, civil society not 
be talked about as a collective noun but as individual organizations (Alagappa, 2004: 
10, cited in Weiss, 2008: 167–168). 
This notion corresponds with Aspinall and Weiss’s work (2012) . Apart from the focus 
of the civil society model, which they have seen as a strategy to oppose 
authoritarianism by inviting external actors and international agencies to support the 
groups participating in development projects through the concept of good 
governance external actors and international agencies, they note the existence of 
political space conditioned by the variety of political regimes. Therefore, civil society 
actors may be classified as a legitimate, controlled or repressed organizations. In 
addition, since some civil society organizations support political parties and 
movements, it is difficult to draw conclusions on whether the development of civil 
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society in the region could lead to political change in a more democratic way (Aspinall 
and Weiss, 2012: 214). Moreover, an analysis of their case studies in Malaysia and 
Indonesia shows some limits of civil society such as their weak links to political parties 
and the public and their profession in lobbying (Aspinall and Weiss, 2012: 225–226). 
Thus, Aspinall and Weiss (2012) recommend that the role of the civil society in 
political engagement and policy influence should be understood differently in the 
context of different channels (Aspinall and Weiss, 2012: 215). 
While the Western definition of civil society is problematic in the study of non-
Western society since it provides the dichotomous opposition of the state and 
obscures social diversity, Rodan (1997) proposes that the definition of civil society 
should provide a consideration of the various forms of political space and the 
complexity of society. A zero-sum perception, which is usually prevalent in state–civil 
society relations, could downplay and overlook complementary and collaborative 
relations (Rodan, 1997:160–162). Chong (2011) gives useful points in mapping the 
relationships between state and civil society in each ASEAN country. Although states 
are the most crucial players in determining the conditions and agenda of civil society, 
the reality does not necessary reflect this. Aside from the apparatus in controlling 
their power, civil society actors are key facilitators especially in areas where the 
market and the state cannot provide public services (Chong, 2011: 9). Furthermore, 
under different degrees of freedom control, civil society organizations have applied 
different techniques in cooperating and engaging with the state (Chong, 2011: 10). 
Therefore, the conformity of civil society organizations to the government can be 
noticed from regulations (such as the registered CSOs’ requirement to declare the 
sources of funds to the government) and states’ recognition of CSOs (such as tax 
exemption and reductions for donors) (Chong, 2011: 11). 
Considering the political context in Southeast Asia and the power relationships 
between states and non-state actors,4 this thesis adheres to Alagappa’s suggestion 
                                                     
4 While non-state actors in international politics can always refer to diverse kinds of actors – 
including NGOs, CSOs, multinational corporations, transnational groups, think-tanks, media, 
diaspora, movement super-empowered, and/or individuals (such as celebrity activists, 
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that civil society be considered as organizations (Alagappa, 2004: 10, cited in Weiss, 
2008: 167–168). In addition, following Lim’s note (Lim, 2011) on the 
operationalization of civil society actors, CSOs are organizations beyond states, family 
networks and profit-driven entities. These organizations have to have formal 
structures such as meetings and coherent agenda. Although some organizations are 
funded from governmental or public entities, they must be primarily and naturally 
non-profit-seeking organizations and they should be able to independently self-
govern (Lim, 2011: 22). Different types of organizations can be considered parts of 
CSOs. CSOs include NGOs (non-profit organizations established for particular 
purposes and employing staff, and associations of private sectors with clear 
intentions to collectively set mechanisms to minimize environmental degradation), 
community-based organizations (established by members of a particular group in the 
community who share an interest, which are operated by voluntary staff), faith-based 
organizations (groups organizing around religious or supernatural concerns), 
foundations (charitable organizations) and professional associations (groups of 
specific professional interests) (Lim, 2011: 23; Wapner, 1997: 81–82). 
In short, concerning the unclear meanings of the civil society and limitations on the 
application of the Western term in Southeast Asian context, this thesis adopts the 
notion that it is difficult to find the whole trend of the development of civil society at 
the regional level because of the diversity in the social, political and economic 
contexts. However, the literature focusing on the development of civil society in the 
region suggests looking at the political space provided by the state, the working 
relations between the state and civil society actor, and the channels that civil society 
organizations can engage with in the policymaking process. While the study of the 
overall development of civil society is almost impossible, it is possible to investigate 
                                                     
financiers, religious leaders and terrorists) who potentially have an influence in shaping 
international outcomes (Weiss et al., 2013; NIC, 2007; Josselin and Wallace, 2001), the term 
‘non-state actors’ applied in this thesis encompasses only CSOs and businesses. Therefore, 
despite the business being a member of a private-sector association, the business is not in 
itself considered a CSO. 
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the role of CSOs in governing international concerns through a specific issue-based 
area at the regional level. 
2.3 Conclusion 
International cooperation and conflict are basic features of international politics. 
Under the state of anarchy, where supreme authority is absent, this thesis accepts 
that international cooperation can be perceived through the process of mutual policy 
adjustment and coordination to overcome conflicts and/or achieve mutual interests. 
Conflicts and cooperation in international politics have been explained and 
understood by different IR perspectives; however, the most useful and relevant ones 
are neo-liberal institutionalism and the concept of governance, both of which come 
from the liberal perspective. Neo-liberal institutionalism and the concept of 
governance are fascinating for my research because they share a common interest 
on the role of international institutions in shaping international outcomes and actors’ 
behaviour in an anarchic world. 
Although the neo-liberal institutionalist perspective is very helpful in explaining how 
regimes can foster international cooperation and shape international outcomes, the 
approach is not sufficient for investigating the issues which are not in states’ 
concerns. Cooperation will not happen if mutual interests cannot be identified; 
otherwise, inter-state mechanisms cannot be developed to effectively manage 
conflicts or solve problems in the less prioritized policy areas. While cooperation is 
pervasive in the view of neo-liberal institutionalists, the effects of regimes are 
diverse. Without states’ intention to take the regime seriously, there seems to be no 
option to enhance the effectiveness of regimes for better international outcomes. 
While neo-liberal institutionalists’ main focus is only on international regimes, which 
are states’ tools to achieve mutual goals, the concept of governance broadens the 
scope of international cooperation by including the role of non-state actors in 
constructing governance mechanisms to fulfil their collective intentions in the various 
issue areas, especially where states and IGOs fail to do so. The concept of governance 
includes regimes as parts of social institutions in governing international affairs. 
While there is no supreme authority and world government, intervening mechanisms 
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such as sanctions can be established by international actors to deal with particular 
relevant issues. Since global governance is composed of pieces of collaborative and 
cooperative arrangements established by international actors, networks can be 
considered parts of those pieces which can potentially influence international 
outcomes. The network perspective offers social power through network structure in 
analysing the role of networks as a group and the role of network actors in particular 
positions to explain the influence of networks in achieving their collective goals 
and/or to examine the role of networks in shaping political outcomes. 
The network perspective offers analytical innovation and tools for investigating 
progress in international cooperation on modern issues such as the environment. 
While there are various kinds of governance mechanisms, the network approach 
becomes the most fascinating, especially when the concept is applied in the context 
of developing countries. The approach is also suitable to be applied in areas where 
states have already initiated cooperation but still lack effectiveness. The networks 
approach allows an investigation of cooperation among different types of actors 
whose mutual goals can be identified. Collaboration in the form of networks can 
potentially close governance gaps – the ineffectiveness of international regimes 
which derive from collective action problems and the capacity of states and IGOs in 
the process of implementation – by improving the international policy process 
through connections among actors which possibly and potentially facilitate 
coordination, communication and participation. The network approach allows us to 
investigate relationships among different types of actors, connections among 
organizations at different levels and across levels, and the links across national 
boundaries. In addition, since collaboration in the form of networks does not require 
the establishment of new institutions, this form of governance can be an option for 
improving the effectiveness of international cooperation among developing 
countries.  
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 Research methodology,  
analytical framework and data collection methods 
The aim of this chapter is to make sense of the methodological choices which will 
move the thesis from the theoretical and analytical framework to the empirical case 
study. The interrelationships among the research questions, methodology, theories, 
concepts and the selection of cases for comparison are the main focus of this chapter. 
This will help position where this research is located in the field of international 
relations. The first section intends to answer why a qualitative approach is 
appropriate for this research. It also discusses why a comparative study is a proper 
way to provide a causal explanation for this research inquiry. The second section 
recalls the key terms developed in Chapter 2 and applies them for constructing an 
analytical framework to observe variables in the selected case studies. An analytical 
framework for a case study is set to demonstrate how each case answers research 
questions. Since the role of policy networks in relation to the effectiveness of regimes 
is also comparatively examined to answer the main research question, the 
international policy process for ASEAN environmental cooperation – which serves as 
a similar context for analysing those relationships in the different case studies – is 
presented in this section. The final section presents data collection methods including 
document analysis, qualitative questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. This 
section also details how validity, reliability and ethics are maintained throughout the 
whole process in conducting the research. 
3.1 Research methodology 
The effective management of transnational environmental problems is a current 
challenge for states. The difficulty and complexity of the problem requires 
international cooperation to deal with transboundary problems. States are often 
blamed for the failure to establish effective environmental regimes, while civil society 
actors (CSOs) are playing a more critical role in environmental management areas. 
However, although cooperative activities in forming environmental management 
among states and civil society actors can be obviously found in developed countries, 
especially in the EU, cooperative efforts are seldom seen in Southeast Asia, where 
resource are poorly protected and unsustainably exploited. Many studies that 
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examine environmental governance in Southeast Asia propose why environmental 
governance in the region cannot be effective in terms of problem-solving. This 
research also explores those reasons, but with the aim of finding out possible answers 
to how ineffective governance can be eased by cooperative attempts between states 
and non-state actors. To answer the question of the extent to which policy networks 
facilitate Southeast Asian states to improve the effectiveness of the environmental 
regime, this research applies a case study approach to explain the progress of the 
regime in Southeast Asia. 
The methodological choice and research design are determined by the nature of the 
research question (Van Evera, 1997: 55; Vromen, 2010: 249). Epistemological realism 
in the debates between positivism and interpretivism – which is different from the 
realism approach in the field of international relations – is an appropriate framework 
to find the answer for this research. This is because the purpose of this research is to 
find a causal explanation for the development of an international regime seen as an 
interventionist instrument of international cooperation in achieving international 
outcomes on specific issues (Krasner, 1983: 5). Marsh and Furlong (2002) note that 
realists, who see that ‘there is a real world “out there”, but [emphasize] that 
outcomes are shaped by the way in which that world is socially constructed’ (2002: 
31), seek causal relationships between social phenomena; they also recognize the 
existence of a power in the social structure that is unobservable but important for 
any explanation of social behaviour. Thus, realists provide a quantitative method for 
directly observable data and a qualitative one for unobservable data. In addition, 
influenced by interpretivist critiques, contemporary realists contend that causal 
statements and explanations of reality can be made even though not all social 
phenomena are directly observable, since the ability to observe may not always offer 
the right picture of the phenomena influenced by the unobservable structure (Marsh 
and Furlong, 2002: 20–31). The contemporary realist approach, which tends to place 
more emphasis on the qualitative method, is more in line with this research because 
the focus of the research is to find specific explanations for the relationships between 
the role of policy networks and the effectiveness of the international environmental 
regime in a specific context. The qualitative method offers a more practical means by 
providing a case study approach to form a ‘causes-of-effects’ explanation in a 
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particular context (Mahoney and Goertz, 2006: 230, cited in Vromen, 2010: 255). 
Regarding to the complexity and infrequency of the international phenomena which 
has constrained the testing of political generalization (Hopkin, 2010: 290), studies in 
political science and international relations are likely to generate particular 
explanations and understandings of how and why the outcomes and events occurred 
at particular places and times (Van Evera, 1997: 255–256). These kinds of questions 
require in-depth analysis and a holistic account to understand the complicated 
interdependencies in the issue at hand (Creswell, 2014: 186; Vromen, 2010: 257). 
Moreover, since this research attempts to find the causal relationships between the 
cooperative efforts of policy networks and their effects on the improvement of 
regimes, the realist epistemology fits with the research purpose in the sense that 
causal relations can be identified by empirical evidence by which the validity and 
reliability of obtained data can be assessed through the application of multiple 
methods including document analysis, qualitative questionnaires and interviews. The 
purpose is not to create any law-like, scientific statements for explaining social 
phenomena, but rather to find a causal relationship of those variables in a particular 
social context. Therefore, statistical evidence and quantitative analysis appearing in 
this thesis are parts of the information supporting an interpretation in observing and 
assessing those selected case studies. 
A qualitative strategy of inquiry is important in international relations research since 
this allows a case study approach, which allows researchers to examine complex 
phenomena (Bennett and Elman, 2007: 171). This notion works well with Creswell’s 
argument that the real value of the qualitative method lies in the particular 
description in a specific context (Creswell (2014: 204). Therefore, to answer the 
particular research question of how policy networks improve the effectiveness of 
regimes, the qualitative method offers a case study, which is worth examining in 
detail to demonstrate the hypothesized mechanisms (Vromen, 2010: 256; Bennett 
and Elman, 2007: 186). The case study method is useful for this research because it 
tests the explanation of how the independent variables cause the dependent 
variables (Van Evera, 1997: 54). In this thesis, cases are selected to find out whether 
collaborative efforts in the form of policy networks can make any difference for 
international cooperation on environmental issues through the improvement of the 
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effectiveness of the relevant international regimes. To identify the causal 
relationship, the comparative method is also applied in this research. 
The comparative method is about ‘observing and comparing carefully selected cases 
on the basis of some stimulus being absent or present’ (Burnham et al., 2004: 60). 
Hopkin points out that the comparative method has more of a role to play than 
creating social scientific generalizations because the approach functions to develop, 
test and refine causal relationships and other social causal claims in social research 
(2010: 286). In addition, the term ‘comparative method’ in cross-societal comparison, 
according to Warwick and Osherson (1973), is referred to ‘social scientific analyses 
involving observations in more than one social system, or in the same social system 
at more than one point in time’ (Warwick and Osherson, 1973: 8). In addition, 
according to them, since social scientists’ interest in discovering the conditions 
(independent and intervening variables) that determine certain directions of 
something (dependent variable), a hypothesis is proposed to identify the 
relationships between variables. The comparative method helps an investigator to 
test the hypothesis by suggesting holding particular conditions constant while letting 
others vary. ‘The essential analytic task is to identify similarities in the relationship 
between two variables … under different conditions … with other condition held 
constant’ (Warwick and Osherson, 1973: 7). This enables the investigator to find 
empirical relationships between two or more variables (Burnham et al., 2004: 69). A 
comparative case study is often applied to find out the relationships between an 
international institution and its consequences. For example, in finding the causal 
impacts explaining how international institutions and causal mechanisms affect 
behavioural change, Stokke (2007: 14) compares a small number of cases to trace a 
sequence of events and particular processes that mediate between an institution and 
its consequences. Therefore, comparing two case studies which possess differences 
in their network features and the effectiveness of regimes not only helps to identify 
the causal relationships between policy networks and the effectiveness of regimes; it 
also allows an examination of the conditions under which policy networks can better 
contribute to the effectiveness of regimes. 
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3.2 An analytical framework for a case study 
The concepts of the international regime, governance and regime effectiveness, 
discussed in Chapter 2, serve as a starting point to find the answer for the research 
question. The words ‘governance’, ‘regime’, ‘governance gaps’, ‘effectiveness’ and 
‘policy networks’ are variously applied in the studies of international environmental 
governance. Clarity in these key terms and definitions is necessary for setting out how 
each concept is related to the others. Young (2013) suggests that the use of key terms 
precisely and consistently can avoid researchers from undesired and problematic 
results, which derive simply from definitional imprecision (Young, 2013: 88). Mitchell 
(2013) comments that the clear definitions of words provided in Young’s work (2013) 
are from Young’s consideration of the importance of scales and that makes his 
empirical research rigorous (Mitchell, 2013: 10). Moreover, a precise definition is a 
crucial source of equivalence in the comparative analysis since it provides equivalent 
terms for identifying meaning and indicators for measurement in cross-societal 
research (Warwick and Osherson, 1973: 11–28). Therefore, for this comparative 
research, the application of consistent terms in the different cases is a means of 
protecting this research from slipping into fallacious reasoning. 
While governance can mean several cooperative efforts by different kinds of actor in 
managing their affairs in a particular collective issue, this thesis aims to examine 
environmental governance by defining it as ‘the set of regulatory processes, 
mechanisms and organizations through which political actors influence 
environmental actions and outcomes’ (Lemos and Agrawal, 2006: 298). This definition 
includes environmental regimes – which refers to the set of states’ intervening tools 
including international agreements, regional action plans, procedures, mechanisms, 
policies and projects to deal with a particular environmental issue – as parts of 
environmental governance. 
Defining regimes as an inter-state framework which includes the products of the 
formal state and government policy process in governing transnational 
environmental issues is fit and useful for setting a framework to identify the roles of 
policy networks in several ways. Firstly, the definition gives dynamic characteristics 
to the nature of regimes. Regimes can be developed through ongoing formal 
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interactions of international actors, which come in several forms of policy. They can 
be changed over time through state interactions and multilateral arrangements. 
Changes are results from key actors through the formal policy process, where 
common goals are set and documented in official forms, for example agreements, 
conventions, protocols and declarations. 
The second advantage in defining regimes in this way helps to construct criteria for 
the case study: the way to measure regime effectiveness and the distinction of actors 
which causes regimes’ effects. The consequences of regimes can be more potentially 
measured than other kinds of governance. While governance is defined as the sum 
of activities that aim to achieve different groups’ goals in dealing with environmental 
problems, attempts to assess the dynamics of environmental governance – which 
need to analyse different dimensions such as histories, goals, structures and 
processes – seem hardly achieved (Rosenau, 1997: 27). Comparing regimes to other 
kinds of governance mechanism, there is more possibility of measuring the 
effectiveness of regimes since at least the common goals agreed by actors are 
expressed. Even though the goals have been criticized as too ambitious and 
incomplete (Stokke, 1997: 34), at least some standards are initially addressed. As 
regimes are products of states’ interaction through the policy process at the 
international level, regimes can be shaped, revised, clarified and interpreted later in 
the form of documents produced under agreements and declarations. Common goals 
are set and these can be used as points of reference for the effectiveness of the 
regime in a convention or agreement where objectives, principles, rules and decision-
making procedure for state cooperation are expressed. 
In addition, state actors and intergovernmental organizations are categorized as 
different kinds of actors. This fits well with the aim of this research, which is to find 
out whether there is any causal relationship between actors and the improvement of 
regimes. The role of coordinating bodies under the secretariat’s direction for 
governing an issue is also pointed out in the convention or agreement; therefore, the 
secretariat – as a body of intergovernmental organization – is distinguished as 
another kind of actor, different from states. The effectiveness of the regime results 
not only from states’ operational and functional capacities, but also from 
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intergovernmental organizations and/or secretariats. Peterson (1997) suggests that 
intergovernmental organizations can improve compliance effectiveness by 
supporting members to monitor environmental conditions, evaluate outcomes and 
modify the regimes to achieve better results. They can act as regime process 
managers since they possess ‘a political legitimacy of representing the “international 
community,” which individual governments and nongovernmental organizations 
cannot do’ (Peterson, 1997: 116). Secretariats can also function, for instance, as a 
central point for information flows from both state and non-state actors, a focal point 
for analysing mutually acceptable aggregation, and an organizer for convening 
forums for discussion and exercises of peer pressure (Peterson, 1997: 116). Since 
intergovernmental organizations play a necessary role in the international regime 
formation phase (Breitmeier, 1997: 88) and the implementation and evaluation 
phases (Peterson, 1997: 115), the effectiveness of the regime is partly dependent on 
the ability of the secretariat to exercise its function sufficiently to facilitate state 
cooperation. 
Thirdly, focusing on process, regimes include all stages of policy: making collective 
choices, framing formal channels of communication for actors participating in the 
regime to develop policy, monitoring obligations, and implementing and complying 
with commitments. These provide stages of policy for examining the role of state 
actors directly engaging in the policy development process at the international level, 
as well as the role of non-state actors attempting to participate in those processes at 
different levels and across levels. Furthermore, this definition helps to distinguish 
regimes from other kinds of governance mechanisms, and it clearly identifies a 
regime as a state instrument and a kind of governance mechanism. Because regimes 
are states’ initiatives aiming to govern a specific collective issue, they possess 
legislative and enforcement tools which other kinds of governance cannot offer. 
Regimes are created and developed by states and intergovernmental organizations 
to deal with the problem of members’ collective action. However, since transnational 
environmental issues are hard to manage effectively, this creates governance gaps 
within regimes. Governance gaps refer to areas where members lack operational and 
functional capacity to reach their mutual environmental goal. Governance gaps are 
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perceived as opportunities for non-state actors to take complementary roles in 
improving the effectiveness of the regimes. Therefore, governance gaps are areas 
where the operations and functions of regimes – which can be changed through 
interactions among state and non-state actors at the different levels of policy 
development process – can possibly be improved if states and/or intergovernmental 
organizations include non-state actors as parts of their networks. 
The causal relationship between policy networks and the effectiveness of regimes on 
transnational environmental issues is done through the international policy 
development process at multiple levels of governance. In measuring the 
consequences of international policy on the environment, the policy must be carried 
out at the national and local levels. Therefore, points to investigate the possible role 
of policy networks in closing the governance gaps include the international 
policymaking process at the international level, implementation at the national level, 
and evaluating and monitoring the policy transnationally. 
The roles of policy networks in the international environmental policy development 
process are examined through the causal relationships between the policy networks 
and the effectiveness of regimes. It is necessary to clarify that the main focus of this 
research is to find how policy networks can contribute to the effectiveness of regimes 
rather than to assess whether regimes are effective. Therefore, the comparative 
approach is utilized to trace back whether regimes are made more effective by policy 
networks, and to answer the question on the conditions for policy networks to better 
functionally improve regimes. Figure 3-1 demonstrates how to identify the role of 
policy networks and their potential contribution to the effectiveness of regimes. 
Policy networks are an intervening factor to improve the quality of regimes, especially 
in terms of process – which probably leads to better physical environmental 
consequences. 
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Figure 3-1: Policy networks and their potential contribution to the effectiveness of 
regimes 
 
The effectiveness of regimes is an initial point to investigate the role of policy 
networks. This research identifies the role of policy networks through the 
development of regimes for these reasons. Firstly, focusing on regimes reflects the 
acceptance that states and the state system are superior to non-state actors in terms 
of powerful authority, integrity and coherence (Whitman, 2005: 26). In order to solve 
collective problems over and across territories, the most effective means can only be 
through international cooperation. Additionally, regimes address collective goals 
which can be assessed and improved from time to time. Although non-state actors 
and their relationships are recognized, though less emphasized than state actors by 
regime theorists (Stokke, 1997: 30), they still potentially have opportunities to take 
their part in the policy process at different stages and levels of environmental 
governance. 
In assessing the effectiveness of regimes, Young’s analytical terms to measure the 
simple effectiveness of the regime are adopted. The effectiveness of the regime is ‘a 
function of the extent to which these arrangements contribute to solving or 
mitigating the problems that lead to their creation’ (Young, 2011, cited in Young 
2013: 90). Three aspects that evidence the effectiveness of regimes are outputs, 
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outcomes and impacts. ‘Outputs involve the promulgation of regulations and the 
establishment of infrastructure needed to move a regime from paper to practice. 
Outcomes refer to changes in the behaviour of those subject to the rights, rules, and 
decision-making procedures of a regime. Impacts are a matter of problem-solving as 
such’ (Young, 2013: 90). Measuring the effectiveness of regimes through this method 
is useful since it offers a way to examine the process of the regimes in terms of 
process (outputs and outcomes) and in terms of product (impacts). 
Regimes initiated at the international level are useful if they are implemented and/or 
complied with by state members. It is noticed that outputs are associated with 
implementation to establish legal measures, projects and/or institutional bodies as a 
tool to achieve policy goals, while outcomes are closely related to states’ compliance. 
Jacobson and Weiss (1997) differentiate between implementation and compliance 
by pointing out that implementation refers to measures or national legislation and 
regulations made by states to make international agreements effective in domestic 
law, whereas compliance refers to ‘whether states adhere to the provisions of the 
accord and to the implementing measures that they have instituted’ (Jacobson and 
Weiss, 1997: 83). Implementation not only includes the creation of measures and 
institutions and the enforcement of rules at the domestic level; it also involves the 
establishment of specialized bodies at the international level; in this aspect, 
implementation is therefore a crucial step towards compliance (Nguitragool, 2011: 
17). Assessing compliance is harder than measuring implementation; however, it can 
look at specific obligations, procedures and other requirements stated in agreements 
(Jacobson and Weiss, 1997: 83). Peterson (1997) sees that desired environmental 
outcomes need to satisfy both compliance effectiveness (actors following 
prescriptions promoted by regimes) and result effectiveness (environmental 
improvement caused by states’ obedience to regimes) (Peterson, 1997: 116). As 
impacts are seen as the ultimate goal of regimes aiming to stop a specific problem, 
outputs and outcomes are important instruments related to the improvement of the 
relevant problems. 
Young’s method (2013) in assessing the effectiveness of regimes offers means to 
judge the success of regimes in two ways: process orientation and problem-solving 
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orientation. This research focuses more on the process because transnational 
environmental issues are currently challenging and cannot be easily solved in a short 
period. Regimes have to be developed to respond to those challenges through the 
policy process. Therefore, the success and/or failure of regimes are judged on their 
functional improvement in reacting to the issues. 
In assessing the effectiveness of the process, we turn to the concept of governance 
in terms of management. Young (2009) suggests evaluating the effectiveness of a 
governance system under the domain of ‘good governance’, which is a normative but 
not standardized list. He also notes that the notions of good governance are best 
considered as matters of process, although the success of the system in terms of 
process may not determine success in problem-solving (Young, 2009: 32). However, 
it is hoped that the basic elements of good governance, including stakeholder 
involvement and legitimacy in getting the process right, are crucial and likely to prove 
successful for problem-solvers and public policy (Young, 2009: 32-33; Reinicke et al., 
2000: 55). 
The performance of regimes in this research is judged through the criteria 
representing the concept of better governance. Ensuring the process of 
implementation and compliance is the contribution that policy networks – which 
possess transnational capability in linking policy from different levels and processes 
– can potentially make. Here, the social network analysis method can present similar 
aspects of good governance since it also focuses on the participation of actors 
(nodes), their information coordination (links) and collaborative activities (links) 
through stages of policy development to close the governance gaps in regimes. Better 
governance in the policy development process at this point means better 
communication, better coordination and better participation. 
Networks in this research are developed from the concept of the social network 
(Degenne and Forsé, 1999; Hanneman and Riddle, 2011). The components of a 
network consist of actors and links among them. Since this thesis focuses on issue-
based networks, nodes of networks – actors – are defined by applying the relation-
based approach (Marin and Wellman, 2011: 12). Beginning with a small number of 
actors of interest and then expanding to include others can identify actors as 
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representative of organizations with broader memberships and constituencies, and 
with the desire or interest in dealing with specific issues. To define links, which are 
the unit of analysis, the concept of the political network (Knoke, 1990) and the idea 
of network-based cooperation (Miyazaki, 2011) allow the observation of the basic 
nature of the links which lead to the influential role or the functional role of policy 
networks in closing governance gaps to improve the effectiveness of regimes. 
According to Knoke, ‘[i]nfluence occurs when one actor intentionally transmits 
information to another that alters the latter’s actions from what would have occurred 
without that information. Influence operates by providing information that changes 
an actor’s perception of the connection between an action and its consequences’ 
(Knoke, 1990: 3). On another aspect, functional links can be drawn from actors’ 
activities in sharing resources, exchanging knowledge, increasing capacity, 
collaborating in projects and monitoring situations (Miyazaki, 2011). Although these 
two kinds of links are formed with different purposes – to change target actors’ 
perceptions and behaviours and to contribute to problem-solving – the foundations 
of these links are flows of information within the network. Defining the links which 
are basically founded on information sharing serves this research in two main ways. 
Firstly, it allows the identification of different kinds of actors who work collectively to 
support goals of regimes at different levels of governance. The macro-structure of 
the network can be constructed to analyse communication, coordination and 
participation among network actors in each case. Secondly, it supports comparison 
between cases in analysing the components of policy networks and their ability to 
influence environmental policy and/or improve the effectiveness of regimes. 
Guided by and adjusted from Perkin and Court’s notion (as mentioned in the 
introduction), policy networks are defined as formal and/or informal structures that 
link actors (states, IGOs and/or CSOs) who share common goals on particular issues 
and operate to achieve those goals in the international policy process. The links 
between actors are constructed basically from information sharing, which can be 
empirically identified through activities (resource and information sharing, organizing 
conferences and workshops and/or project collaborations) aiming to support 
environmental policy to govern a particular issue. However, considering the 
- 75 - 
complexity of environmental problems, the transnational aspects of non-state actors 
and the works of NGOs, which are not always in opposition to states (Whitman, 2005: 
27), non-state actors should be considered crucial parts of the policy development 
process. Non-state actors, such as academic institutions, and transnational 
environmental actors play active roles in dealing with environmental problems at 
different levels and across levels (Wuori, 1997, cited in Sjöberg, 1997: 15). Figure 3-2 
shows how policy networks potentially contribute to the improvement of the 
effectiveness of regimes. 
 
Figure 3-2: Relationships between the components of policy networks and their 
potential contributions to the effectiveness of regimes 
 
Policy networks which involve non-state actors as parts of the network component 
could increase the effectiveness of regimes by improving the outputs and outcomes 
of regimes through the international policy process. The social network analysis 
method depicts similar aspects related to the notions of good governance since it 
identifies different kinds of organizational actors that participate in the process and 
the links among those actors. Policy networks can make better governance if they 
possess mixed types of node, including states, IGOs and transnational NGOs. The 
different kinds of actor present various information and expertise from various 
backgrounds, while the links support operational activities among members in 
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different stages of the policy process, which assist states and intergovernmental 
organizations to improve the process of policy compliance and implementation. 
The method of social network analysis allows an examination of components of 
networks: the number of nodes and links, the priorities and goals of networks, and 
the function of the centre in managing those relations. Since the failure or success of 
networks can be analysed through those components, the relative effectiveness of 
regimes can be partly examined by comparing the components of the policy network 
in different cases. 
Better governance in the policy process can be investigated, firstly, by identifying the 
kinds of actor participating in the policy process. The involvement of non-state and/or 
transnational actors at different stages is crucial as they are sources of perspectives, 
information and expertise. The larger the number of various kinds of participants, the 
more opportunities for networks to get the complete picture for environmental 
policy. The participation of non-state actors is the fundamental factor leading to 
further capacity of policy networks in closing other governance gaps existing in 
regimes. The number and kinds of actors are directly related to the links and the 
networks’ ability in governing the problems. 
The links of networks are the second point of examination. To improve the policy 
process, it should be possible to identify the links between NGOs and IGOs/states. 
Information sharing and communication activities can support the development of 
policy in the form of documents, policy coordination and policy monitoring, while 
functional activities emphasize the increasing of networks’ capacity in the process of 
policy implementation. 
The links of information communication are basically founded on information flows 
and the application of that information in development policy in the form of policy 
documents addressing objectives, goals, means and indicators. It includes the use of 
updated information from different sources to adjust and evaluate policy. In addition, 
Esty and Ivanova (2002) stress the importance of data collection across areas in the 
environmental policy area for better information in identifying issues, spotting 
trends, evaluating risks, setting priorities, establishing policy choices, testing 
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hypotheses and developing technologies. They suggest that the central sources for 
information coordination among organizational institutions be established to 
manage environmental policy (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 15). Ferguson (2009) offers 
three degrees of horizontal efforts to identify signs of stronger information links 
among actors, spanning information sharing, dividing tasks and responsibilities to 
avoid redundancies, and integrating resources and decision-making across 
organizations (Ferguson, 2009: 2). As a result, information sharing links are the 
foundation for policy networks, which leads to developing their coordination and 
collaboration. 
Through the informative communication links, non-state actors in policy networks 
can take their roles by framing problems, tightening international negotiations, 
proposing policy choices, suggesting policy areas to be developed, setting indicators, 
sending feedback for policy evaluation, identifying legislative loopholes, putting 
forward more details for policy guidelines and/or writing regional action plans. 
Evidence could be found by comparing the group’s statement or proposals with the 
policy formulated by governments or intergovernmental organizations. Other 
sources of documents would be non-state actors’ proposals, reports and policy 
suggestions. 
The links of functional activities help to identify how non-state actors in policy 
networks could fill the implementation gaps. They can offer material and financial 
resources to states to do projects and/or support capacity building, and technology 
transfer through workshops and forums. Furthermore, they can help to disseminate 
information and knowledge to raise awareness among people. Evidence to support 
the links can be found in the news, announcements of events, and updated activities 
appearing officially on the organizations’ websites. 
Both kinds of links support policy monitoring in the process of implementation and 
compliance. Finding out whether states comply with the agreement requires 
information from different actors across borders and levels. Transnational actors can 
take their role in providing to intergovernmental organizations the information they 
can collect. Since the performance of states’ data might be scarce, insufficient or even 
unreliable (Esty and Ivanova, 2002: 7), information provided by non-state actors can 
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be another source of reference for states and intergovernmental organizations. This 
information can be used to support the peer pressure system in official meetings or 
be utilized together with enforcement provisions. 
The centres of the networks are another important aspect for examining how well 
the nodes and links of networks are managed. Improvement in the quality of the 
process partly results from the ability of the centre, which plays a role of a broker 
unit to facilitate information, coordinate goals and priorities, and mediate and 
manage any disagreement among actors. Without a centre, the networks’ operations 
would fail. 
This research applies a comparative approach to measure the effectiveness of 
regimes. The comparative method benefits this research for the following reasons. 
Firstly, while there is no method that can be applied in all cases to measure 
effectiveness, comparing two cases helps to find out which is more or less effective 
in terms of outputs, outcomes and impacts. The measurement here is not done by 
setting standardized cardinal scores because it is hard to find a common unit of 
effectiveness which can be applied across issue areas (Underdal, 2004: 37). Instead, 
the assessment is interpreted from existing empirical data. The effectiveness of 
regimes is assessed separately to assess the extent to which each regime makes 
states comply with agreements and implements policy which results in solving the 
specific environmental problems for which it was established. Secondly, the 
comparative method reveals key variables and helps to identify causal relationships 
between independent and dependent variables. In explaining regime effectiveness, 
Underdal (2004) categorizes three main clusters of the critical determinants of 
effectiveness: the nature of the problem (focusing on what makes a problem hard to 
solve), the characteristics of groups of parties (focusing on which group 
characteristics increase the capacity of collective action) and the properties of the 
regime itself (concentrating on attributes of regimes such as incentives, procedure 
support and legitimacy) (Underdal, 2004: 40-41). The primary focus is on the 
characteristics of actors as independent variables which cause the effectiveness of 
regimes as a dependent variable. Since states and IGOs are members of regimes, the 
effectiveness of regimes can be improved if non-state actors are connected to those 
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regimes’ actors which consequently bring about better governance in 
communication, coordination and participation to the policy development process. 
Comparing the two cases aims to confirm whether policy networks do in fact 
contribute to the outputs, outcomes and impacts of regimes. 
3.2.1 ASEAN policy process and international policy context 
The international policy process provides the similar stages in analysing the 
development of international environmental policy. This research also adopts 
Mintrom’s suggestion to keep the linear model of the policymaking process to 
establish clear boundaries of the stages (Mintrom, 2012: 112-113). The linear model 
serves well for an examination of the development of policy initiated internationally 
and implemented locally. 
The international policy process for investigating the development of transnational 
environmental cooperation in Southeast Asia can be separated into two linear 
processes: policy initiated at the international level and the policy adopted at the 
national level for implementation. List proposes that, while the international context 
is composed of domestic and international settings, it is more practical to examine 
each setting separately (List, 2003: 7). This idea suits research related to Southeast 
Asian institutions because it separates the regional policy process, which is similar to 
the national policy process, which differs by member country according to their 
political system. At the international level, agreed rules and standards stated in each 
regime are set to specify states’ agreed rights and obligations to establish and sustain 
international cooperation, whereas implementation of the policy is left in states’ 
hands under international bodies’ control (Hass et al., 1993, and Krasner, 1983, cited 
in List, 2003: 17). 
ASEAN international cooperation on environmental issues is addressed in the 
sociocultural community. International policy is developed through the ASEAN 
Summit, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, the ASEAN Senior Official Meetings, and the 
Technical Working Group. At this level, international environmental policy is formed 
and set. An international environmental policy may include initiatives from 
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conferences, reports, declarations, action plans, binding treaties or combinations of 
these with the aim of solving the problem (Arts, 1998: 19). 
Since the international policy process in this research is seen as a linear combination 
between the regional policy framework and the national policy process, this is the 
state’s means to manage environmental issues. Both issues are under the ASEAN 
cooperative framework, therefore it can be expected that the development of policy 
could run in the same way. ASEAN’s structure of cooperation helps to explain the 
formal steps for states to develop their cooperation in terms of policy. 
At the national level, international environmental policy is implemented by parties 
under the principle of sovereignty. While this principle is consistently pointed out as 
a source of ineffective global environmental policy, List reminds that the legal 
principle cannot be blamed since it depends on the actors who make use of it (List, 
2003: 16). The environmental consequence of international policy, thus, results from 
each state’s responsibility within its own sovereignty. The policymaking process in 
reality consists of overlapping stages of policy in initiation, formation, 
implementation, evaluation and review (Hague and Harrop, 2010: 370). However, in 
analysing the development of international environmental policy agreed by states, 
this research focuses more on the implementation, enforcement and evaluation 
stages because the problem definition and agenda setting stages have already been 
set at the international level. 
While there is a regional policy structure to sustain international environmental 
regimes, and the involvement of various kinds of actor interacting transnationally to 
govern the issues acts in a similar way, there are also key differences serving as 
independent variables for the two cases to examine whether there are any conditions 
for policy networks to engage in the international policy development process more 
effectively. The network approach and the concept of political opportunity structure 
are helpful to comparatively analyse attempts of political forces to engage in the 
different stages of international environmental policymaking. 
The difference in political context can be a critical point in articulating the 
independent variables for the comparative study. The different degrees of politics 
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resulting from the different kinds of transnational issue provide various constraints 
and opportunities for political actors to engage with and influence the policy 
development process. Within the political context of each case, the formation of a 
policy network and its structure in linking different kinds of political actors are further 
differences in their role in governing the issue. 
The international political context provides the structural constraints and 
opportunities for political actors to secure their political goals and interests. The 
different political context can be noticed from the scope and scale of the issue (which 
can in turn be noticed from the number of political actors and the consequences of 
the activities), the control of the environmental problem (whether it is under the 
control of states or beyond states’ legal jurisdiction), the advancement of the agenda 
(which is the development of a strong or weak regime that could allow relevant 
political actors to get involved) and the level of democracy (Potter, 1995: 101–103). 
These considerations are useful for observing the political context for the case study.  
The perspective of political opportunity in this research is partly guided by the social 
movement approach. This approach allows us to examine the structural change 
caused by social movements which attempt to find a political opportunity structure 
to achieve their common goal (McAdam et al., 1996). The concept of political 
opportunity structure, according to Gamson and Meyer (1996), is widely applied in 
the study of social movement, political institutions, political alliances and political 
shifts. However, this causes difficulties for the concept since political opportunity can 
mean many things, including the openness of political strucure for actors, the 
opportunity made by political movements, the balance of struture–agency elements, 
and the group’s perception of what opportunity is in a shared situation (Gamson and 
Meyer, 1996: 275; McAdam et al., 1996: 8). Therefore, the concept is not well defined 
and it should be purposive and clear on what opportunity means (Gamson and 
Meyer, 1996: 275). 
The concept of political opportunity structure is useful in providing analytical aspects 
for studying the relations among actors in finding opportunities to engage in the 
policy development process; however, this research is far from a social movement 
study. The social movement is different from NGOs and policy networks, which are 
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the focus of this research. In addition, although there is a relationship between 
environmental NGOs and environmental movements in some countries, the 
intention for such a movement is structural change at the national level. The intention 
of using the language of political opportunity structure is to identify the degree of 
openness of institution structure for actors to become involved in the international 
policy development process. The political context can be a factor that determines 
different political opportunities for civil society organizations to participate in and 
influence the formal international policy process. 
Although the two cases studied in this thesis are both international environmental 
cooperation under the ASEAN framework, the difference of international political 
context provides different political opportunities for civil society actors to directly 
influence at different levels of ASEAN meetings. In analysing the role of NGOs in 
influencing environmental politics, Potter proposes four structures helping to identify 
why one NGO tends to be more powerful than others. The structural constraints and 
opportunities for an NGO include the existence of international agreements which 
provide a point for NGOs to leverage and engage in the issues, the character of the 
target organizations whose policies are causing the environmental issue, the 
character of the network and the possibility for an NGO to gain access to it, and the 
political structures that NGOs confront (Potter, 2003: 32–37). These points are useful 
for assessing the structural constraints and opportunities for network actors, as well 
as examining how the connections among actors can increase their channels or 
political space through cooperative interactions among actors. 
3.3 Data collection methods, validity, reliability and ethical issues 
Multiple sources of data and triangulated methods are core characteristics of 
qualitative research, applied to cross-check reliability, strive for comprehensiveness 
and overcome problems of validity as well as bias (Bennett and Elman, 2007: 185; 
Jansen, 2010; Bouteligier, 2013: 69; Creswell, 2014: 201). As a result, data used in this 
thesis was collected from different sources including documents, qualitative 
questionnaires and semi-structured interviews. Information technology devices 
usefully accommodated different stages of data gathering, whereas the Gephi 
software program assisted in drawing network graphs, which were advantageous in 
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visualizing the components of networks in each case study. Three sets of data 
gathering are set out below. 
The first set of data collected was documents. This method was crucially important 
through all stages of this research. Primary and secondary data included official 
documents, online newspapers, press releases, reports of projects and meetings, 
organizational charts, academic journals, photographs of events (workshops, 
operations on the ground) and documentary films (YouTube). This data was obtained 
from the official websites and Facebook pages of organizations, and from online 
databases. 
At an early stage, primary and secondary data helped to identify organizations 
possibly involved in policy networks. Documents revealed key organizations for 
circulating qualitative questionnaires; in addition, they presented names of key 
informants for the interview method. However, some limitations in documentary 
research could be pointed out. Firstly, it was difficult to find certain evidence and 
answers by analysing documents alone since they did not appear in certain types of 
document and some were not available to access (Creswell, 2014: 14). Secondly, 
some claims, for example by NGOs on their influence over the policy, casted doubt 
on the validity of information (Burnham et al., 2004: 190). Thus, to meet validity and 
reliability criteria, qualitative questionnaires and semi-structured interview methods 
were designed to minimize certain constraints in data insufficiency. 
The second set of information was gathered from qualitative questionnaires. This 
method was intentionally applied in this research for the following reasons. Firstly, 
the method allowed me to cross-check the information obtained from other sources. 
This was done by asking a similar set of questions applied in interviews to 
respondents who worked in organizations that were part of policy networks. It also 
included questions assessing the performance of other organizations that they were 
working with. Secondly, closed and open-ended questions were designed to gather 
information from wider samples since standardized questionnaires could be 
considered an option for semi-structured interviews by translating the research 
questions into inquiries (Jansen, 2010). The questions sought to obtain general data 
on regular activities such as sharing information and joint programmes. Participants 
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were asked straightforwardly and clearly to avoid any misunderstanding. Thirdly, 
questionnaires were designed to save participants’ time. Time spent answering the 
questions was less and it was considered more flexible than interviews. Moreover, 
this method offered a chance to recruit participants for interviews by asking at the 
end of the section if the respondent was willing to be interviewed or could suggest 
any other people who could answer these questions. 
Bryman (2012) points out the benefits of questionnaires over the structured 
interview. The questionnaire method is cheaper, quicker and more convenient for 
respondents, and is less liable to bias from an interviewer. However, researchers 
should be aware of drawbacks. Some possible problems are the lack of chance for 
respondents to ask the researcher to clarify a question, limitations in adding data, a 
limited number of questions, and lower response rates (Bryman, 2012). Fink suggests 
that, to make a good survey, researchers should ask purposeful questions that make 
it easy for respondents to identify the relationship between the intention of the 
question and the objective of the questionnaire (1995: 13). With an awareness of 
these recommendations and limitations, I used an online questionnaire in Google 
Drive to gather this data. A hyperlink to the survey website was sent to participants 
via email. Despite the questions being developed to minimize any confusion, some 
problems arose. For example, some participants had changed their jobs and/or 
organizations but were still working in the environment field. Therefore, they chose 
to clarify their answers by filling in the open-ended questions or sending an email to 
me after they had done the online survey. I could therefore adjust and develop the 
online questions before sending them to other participants. The saving in cost and 
time in circulating the survey and receiving the answers was a distinct advantage of 
using this method. In addition, compared to the semi-structured interview approach, 
the survey functions better in delivering some kinds of information, especially on the 
name of organizations they had worked with and activities their organization 
conducted, which they could select from choices, with an alternative option for them 
if they preferred. The same questions asked in the questionnaire helped to identify 
participants’ similar and different opinions on their perceptions of the cause of the 
environmental problems, the assessment of the role of the state and IGOs in 
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managing the problems, and their organizations’ approach to dealing the problem 
collectively with other organizations. 
In conducting the research, organizations’ staff involved in policy networks were 
contacted and the link to self-complete the questionnaire was sent via email. The 
online questionnaire was not distributed randomly since organizations involved in 
policy networks were specified and the participants were chosen owing to their 
experience (Jansen, 2010). The survey also requested that respondents provide their 
position in the organization. This was for checking the credibility of information if 
contradictory data appeared. Data derived from questionnaire was used for checking 
against other types of information. 
The third set of data was derived from in-depth interviews with key informants who 
worked in organizations included in policy networks. Interviews were conducted 
mainly by telephone and Skype. The advantages of elite interviewing, as pointed out 
by Richards, involve assisting the researcher in interpreting documents, explaining 
the outcomes of events, providing information not recorded, providing access to 
other interviewees, and setting the context that interested investigators (Richards, 
1996: 200). The online interview method is also practical for respondents who face 
time constraints (Burnham et al., 2004: 202). In contrast, it should be noted that 
information derived from interviews offers participants’ subjective analysis and 
interpretation (Richards, 1996: 200; Vromen, 2010: 258). Concerning the bias which 
interviewees may present, the data received from the interview method was 
analysed and interpreted together with other sources. 
Interviewees were intentionally recruited from intergovernmental organizations, 
non-governmental organizations, and governmental agencies involved in networks. 
The semi-structured questions were developed to gather certain information that 
could not be obtained by other methods such as details about actual relationships 
among organizations in networks, constraints and conflicts within networks, the role 
of organizations they were working with, the experience and strategies that actors in 
networks used to influence the regional policy process, and the actors’ perceptions 
of changes occurring from interactions and operations. Some selected questions 
were submitted to informants before carrying out the interview. Interviewees were 
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asked whether their opinions could be recorded. An interview was expected to be 
completed within 45 minutes; however, the time was quite flexible and depended on 
participants’ willingness to discuss the topic. 
To obtain empirical data gathered from online qualitative questionnaires and semi-
structured distance interviews, emails were sent to fifty people who could be 
identified as persons working with organizations. Twenty-three participants accepted 
the request to participate in my research. Four of them were willing to complete the 
survey and discuss in-depth details by interview. The number of participants in the 
wildlife case was fourteen, while there were nine informants in the haze case. 
Participants in the wildlife case consisted of IGO officials, governmental agencies and 
NGO staff. However, there was no IGO official participating in the haze case. 
Balancing the number of participants was beyond my control since this empirical data 
was based on participants’ willingness and consent. However, the data obtained from 
participants was sufficient, for example, to identify key organizations within their 
network and their opinion and assessment of other network’s actors. In addition, 
Mogalakwe and Gaborone (2006) argue that ‘documentary research in social science 
is a useful and under-utilised approach that can be adopted by researchers in the full 
confidence that it is also a scientific method that requires rigorous adherence to 
research protocol’ (Mogalakwe and Gaborone, 2006: 222). Therefore, the document 
method was applied as another source to secure and complement the reliability of 
this research. Validity and reliability was done by triangulating documentary data 
from the wide range of textual evidence produced by states, intergovernmental 
organizations, NGOs, media and companies. 
Different strategies set out to confirm validity for this research including using various 
sources of information from different groups of participants to cross-check the 
credibility of information obtained, maintain reflectivity, and willingness to present 
negative information when there was contradictory evidence. This research also set 
up a detailed protocol, document steps of the research procedure, and check the 
accuracy of transcription and codes to ensure reliability (Creswell, 2014: 203). 
To maintain ethical standards for all participants, I conformed strictly to university 
policy and procedure. The information sheet and consent form were given to all 
- 87 - 
participants. Anonymity was an option for participants. Since the nature of this 
research emphasized cooperative activities among related organizations in networks, 
it was not difficult to identify who was in position to provide the information. 
Therefore, anonymous identity was automatically set for participants answering 
sensitive questions such as their opinion of conflicts between their organization and 
others. 
Moreover, the identification of organizational representatives’ positions would 
support the credibility of the findings. Therefore, balancing reliability and 
confidentiality was an important concern. Thus, before starting the interview, 
participants were asked if they were comfortable with the disclosure of their identity. 
Interviews were recorded if the participants did not object to this. The audio file was 
coded and used only for transcription purpose. 
While the audio files were stored on a password-protected computer, anonymous 
transcription of the respondents and the identification data were kept separately in 
password-protected files stored on the main university hard drive, which provides a 
secure location. No direct quotes or any other information allowing the identification 
of the source was included in the research when informants decided to remain 
anonymous. This was to ensure that anonymized data could not be traced back to 
specific individuals. Audio files, transcriptions and participants’ identification data 
will be retained for a period of one year after the end of the project for peer review. 
After that all files will be destroyed. 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter comprises three main sections that interrelatedly explain the research 
procedure which has been developed from methodological choices to gather 
empirical evidence. The first section revealed that the nature of research questions 
were the main factor justifying methodological choice. Since the aim of this research 
was to find the causal relationships between policy networks and the effectiveness 
of regimes, a qualitative approach was suitable for answering this kind of research 
inquiry. A qualitative method allows the investigation of particular causal relations 
between independent and dependent variables observed and implied from empirical 
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evidence revealed in the case studies. A comparative method was applied to find the 
similarities and differences between the two selected case studies. Comparison 
across cases not only aimed to confirm the hypothesis of those causal relationships; 
it also revealed factors that explain – by their presence or absence – why one regime 
was more effective than the other. 
The second section clarified the definitions of the key terms – regimes, governance, 
governance gaps and policy networks – applied in this thesis. It also demonstrated 
how these concepts were interrelated. Terminologies were the foundation for 
constructing an analytical framework to be applied in the selected case studies. These 
terminologies were used in gathering and categorizing empirical evidence. Clarity in 
the terms used in different cases allowed equivalent evidence to be found for 
comparative analysis. 
The last section illustrated the data gathering methods applied in this research. Three 
sets of data – including documents, online questionnaires and distance semi-
structured interviews – were collected from various sources and different kinds of 
actors. This was strategically aimed to confirm validity and reliability in delivering 
answers to the research questions. To maintain academic integrity in doing this 
research, ethical standards and considerations conformed strictly to university policy 
and procedures. 
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 Policy networks in governing transboundary haze issue 
Transboundary haze pollution is a crucial environmental problem that has caused 
political tensions, mostly between Indonesia and her neighbouring countries. The 
haze problem in Southeast Asia attracted international attention shortly after the 
economic crisis in 1997. This led to regional cooperation and international assistance 
to deal with the haze. However, the recurrence of the problem raises the question of 
the effectiveness of ASEAN, as an important regional organization, in dealing with the 
haze issue. This chapter examines the role of policy networks in managing the haze 
problem. In order to do so, this chapter is divided into four sections. The first section 
discusses the background of the problem. It illustrates the causes of the problems 
deriving from natural and/or man-made factors. Since most of the recent recurrence 
of the annual haze is caused by human activities, the problem seems to be 
manageable. However, the returning of the haze raises questions about the state’s 
effective measurement in preventing, monitoring and mitigating the issue. 
The second section sets out the key international agreements, arrangements, 
initiatives and projects to tackle the haze, identifying the extent of states’ efforts. This 
section discusses international efforts to tackle the haze issue. Although the 
emphasis of this section is mainly based on regional cooperation, global cooperation 
on climate change is also mentioned as it is another key international attempt to 
tackle the occurrence of haze. The limitations of state cooperation are discussed in 
the third section. States’ constraints are understood as governance gaps in the anti-
haze regime. The role of policy networks is analysed in the final section to illustrate 
how the inclusion of NGOs in the networks can help states to develop policies to fight 
the issue. 
It is important to note that this thesis focuses on the investigation of haze in 
Indonesia, rather than in the Mekong region, where the emergence of cross-border 
haze is also recognized. Although the cause of haze in the Mekong region, especially 
in Thailand, Myanmar and Laos, is similar to in Indonesia, since it also comes from 
using the slash-and-burn method in the dry season (The Nation, 2015c; The Straits 
Times, 2016a), the main problem for individual countries in managing the issue is a 
lack of financial resources. The haze situation in Indonesia is a more appropriate 
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context for exploring the effectiveness of the regime and the role of policy networks. 
This is because international cooperation on the haze issue in the southern part of 
the ASEAN countries has developed over decades, while haze in the Mekong area has 
recently developed. Therefore, international cooperation on haze in the Mekong 
region can take lessons from Indonesia’s experience, where the situation is more 
severe, intense and complicate. 
4.1 Background to the problem 
The transboundary haze issue is a crucial environmental problem in Southeast Asia, 
as the occurrence of fire and smoke causes considerable harm to the environment, 
people’s lives and the national economy. While haze in the southern ASEAN countries 
still unsolvable, the smog from burning forests has recently become an annual 
phenomenon in the northern part (The Economist, 2015). In 2015, the pollutant 
standard index (PSI) reached an alarming level, 300, and led to the declaration of an 
emergency for forest fires in Riau (The Jakarta Post, 2015m). Since 1997, the haze has 
been an annual visitation during the dry season (The Straits Times, 1997d; The Straits 
Times, 2006b; Tay and Fang, 2013; The Economist, 2015). The problem is circular. 
When haze comes from the same provinces, several measures are taken to mitigate 
fires in response to complaints from people and neighbouring countries (The Jakarta 
Post, 2015j). Tay and Fang (2013) notice the less urgency and increasing fatalism on 
the part of the Indonesian government towards the issue. Gaveau et al. (2014) note 
that the haze has recently not been restricted to the severe drought years; a few 
consecutive days without rain can also start fires. Some notice that fires are recurring 
more often (Jakarta Globe, 2014b) and that it is harder to predict them (Gaveau, 
2014). The situation is getting worse (Tay, 2014). Therefore, it is necessary to address 
the problem. 
4.1.1 Impact of the issue 
There are several impacts and costs deriving from haze each year. Firstly, when 
wildfires start, they directly and immediately degrade the environment, damaging air 
quality and causing biodiversity loss. The smoke also causes harm not only to humans 
but also to vulnerable and endangered species such as sun bears, orangutans, 
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elephants and tigers in Borneo, Sumatra and Kalimantan (The Jakarta Post, 2015o; 
The Jakarta Post, 2015p; The Jakarta Post, 2015h). In addition, the annual fires cause 
a major release of huge amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases into 
the atmosphere and this contributes to the problem of global warming. In 2002, it 
was estimated that annual fires in Indonesia are damaging confidence in reaching the 
goals in the Kyoto accord on global warming (The Straits Times, 2006c). Faizal Parish, 
the director of the Global Environment Centre (GEC) in Malaysia, estimated that the 
slash-and-burn technique in Indonesia released nearly two billion tons of carbon 
dioxide into the atmosphere (The Straits Times, 2007a). In addition, the 2015 
occurrence of fires in Borneo and Sumatra made Indonesia one of the world’s largest 
carbon polluters, emitting the equivalent of a billion tons of CO2 (Mongabay, 2015b). 
Besides this, haze causes harm to people’s health and countries’ economies, and it 
disrupts normal activities in the areas affected. Furthermore, it brings about the 
irreplaceable cost of people lives from travel accidences, for instance the Garuda 
Airbus crash over Medan and the collision of two ships in 1997 (The Straits Times, 
1997d; The Straits Times, 1997a). More importantly, the haze problem leads to 
international tension among Indonesia and its neighbouring countries since it 
significantly impacts people’s lives and productivity (Contreras, 2008), especially in 
Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, depending on the severity of the 
haze in that year (The Straits Times, 2000a; The Straits Times, 2005; The Straits Times, 
2006a; The Straits Times, 2006c; The Straits Times, 2013e). The political tensions 
between Indonesia and her neighbouring countries appear in the news almost every 
year. Singapore, located upwind of the haze (ASB, 2013) during the dry season, 
suffers the worst of all the neighbouring countries. This annual harmful phenomenon 
unsurprisingly encourages Singapore to take a leading role on the international stage 
in dealing with the transboundary haze issue. 
4.1.2 Cause of the problem 
Understanding and realizing the root of the Indonesian forest fires is critical since this 
will lead to the means and solutions to tackle the problem. If the root of the fires is 
not addressed, the returning of the haze can be expected (The Straits Times, 1997d; 
The Straits Times, 2006a). Two factors that can cause fires are the natural conditions 
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(rising temperatures, which cause the ignition of the peat soils) and human activities, 
which directly and/or indirectly generate fires and haze in the region. 
The most important factor that makes Indonesia’s land very sensitive to forest fires 
is the peat soil. Indonesia possesses the largest tropical peat wetlands in the world, 
which are rich in biological diversity (Jayakumar and Koh, 2015). When peat swamps 
are drained in the dry season, dry peatlands deep underground are flammable. Once 
the dry peatlands are ignited, extinguishing them is almost impossible (Mongabay, 
2015d). Peatlands produce around 90 per cent of the haze, and ASEAN countries 
contain approximately 25 million hectares of tropical peat soils, of which about 70 
per cent are in Indonesia (Letchumanan, 2014a; ASEAN Haze Action Online, 2016a). 
The two main natural factors that directly impact the occurrence of the haze are peat 
soil and the dry weather. The warmer the weather, the easier the fires occur. The 
drought-inducing El Niño was one explanation of the fires in 1997 (The Straits Times, 
1997d). The impact of El Niño, which causes a warming trend conducive to burning 
and extends the dry spell, is always referred to by the Indonesian government as one 
reason for the difficulty in solving the problem (The Straits Times, 2015f; The Straits 
Times, 2014b). 
The second – but main – source of the fire is humans. It is believed that most wildfires 
in Indonesia are caused by humans (The Jakarta Post, 2015t; Jayakumar and Koh, 
2015). The slash-and-burn method is a traditional way for farmers to clear their land. 
It is used extensively by smallholders as well as big companies since it is cheap, it 
saves time, it reduces problems with weeds, insects and disease, and it makes the 
soil looser, allowing for easier planting (Tomich et al., 2004: 12; The Straits Times, 
2015j; The Jakarta Post, 2015t). This method is considered a direct cause of fires, 
since people intentionally light fires. 
In reality, a mixture of these factors leads to forest fires. There are several factors 
that indirectly contribute to the haze problem. Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla 
has identified as mistakes Indonesia’s national policy since the 1970s, which has given 
too many concessions to foreign companies, a poorly conceived Suharto-era project 
to develop a million hectares of peatland for farming, and a long-standing openness 
to licensing peatland development for palm oil cultivation (Mongabay, 2015k). 
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The haze issue often only appears on the news when the situation gets worse, 
alongside high indicators to point out harm to people’s health. This also raises a worry 
that people affected might get used to or grow immune to the problem instead of 
dealing with it (The Straits Times, 2006d; The Straits Times, 2013d). However, as the 
haze goes across borders and causes huge damage to others, it affects nearby 
countries. International tensions have appeared annually on the news. International 
cooperation has developed in the forms of agreements, meetings, bilateral 
arrangements and/or joint projects to manage the problem. The following section 
demonstrates the international arrangements and initiatives that have been 
established in response to the issue. 
4.2 International cooperation to tackle the haze issue 
Considering the cause of the haze, which results mostly from human activities, the 
issue should be manageable, even though the problem has not been solved 
successfully. This part of the chapter illustrates the key approaches and activities that 
states and international organizations have developed to deal with the haze problem. 
International cooperation within the ASEAN framework and bilateral initiatives 
between Indonesia and other international agencies outside ASEAN are also 
discussed as attempts that show the Indonesian central government’s intention to 
stop the problem. 
4.2.1 ASEAN cooperation on transboundary haze 
Regional cooperation on the transboundary haze issue has developed strongly since 
the 1990s. In 1997, the head of the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), Dr Syed 
Babar Ali, observed that the scale of the forest fires catastrophe was international 
and beyond the borders of Indonesia (The Straits Times, 1997e). Since then, the haze 
problem has been the concern of the international community and ASEAN as it has 
worsened and reached hazardous levels in Malaysia, Singapore and parts of 
Indonesia (The Straits Times, 1997b). Institutional arrangements, coordinating bodies 
and cooperative activities have been set up to tackle the problem. 
The ASEAN institutional framework to address the regional haze issue has been 
developed since 1995, first by setting up the Haze Technical Task Force (HTTF), which 
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comprises senior relevant officials from Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, 
to operationalize the measures suggested in the ASEAN Cooperation Plan on 
Transboundary Pollution (Sunchindah, 2002). In December 1997, after the fourth 
meeting of the HTTF, the first ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Haze (AMMH) was 
convened. This meeting discussed the haze problem at length and adopted the 
ASEAN Regional Haze Action Plan (RHAP) to address the problem (ASEAN Secretariat, 
1997). 
Before the haze crisis of 1997, the smoke haze had already affected Southeast Asian 
countries during the dry seasons in 1991 and 1994. Once agreed by the ASEAN 
environment ministers in June 1995, the RHAP was endorsed by the AMMH in 1997. 
It has three primary objectives: ‘to prevent land and forest fires through better 
management policies and enforcement; to establish operational mechanisms to 
monitor land and forest fires; and to strengthen regional land and forest fire-fighting 
capability and other mitigating measures’ (ASEAN Haze Action Online, 1997). 
Preventive measures emphasize the necessity to strengthen national policies and 
strategies to prevent and mitigate land and forest fires through the development of 
national plans, which should include policies and strategies to curb activities leading 
to fires, such as the prohibition of open burning and the strict control of slash-and-
burn during the dry season. Regional monitoring mechanisms consist of the region’s 
early warning and monitoring system to provide alerts of fires being started, to 
predict meteorological conditions, and to disseminate important data to support 
enforcement action. The ASEAN Specialised Meteorological Centre (ASMC) serves as 
a regional information centre to manage information with the aims of improving 
communication and increasing the effectiveness of the early warning and monitoring 
system. Firefighting capability is strengthened by measures including the preparation 
of resources (manpower, agencies, equipment, maps and funds), assisting 
programmes and sending regular updates to the HTTF on progress made in efforts to 
fight the fire (ASEAN Haze Action Online, 1997). The first AMMH has also recognized 
three main coordinative areas, with Malaysia taking a leading role on preventing, 
Singapore on monitoring, and Indonesia on strengthening firefighting capability 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 1997). 
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Two key monitoring systems which were developed and implemented to support the 
RHAP are the ASMC and the Fire Danger Rating System (FDRS). The ASMC, hosted by 
Singapore, was established in 1993 for the purposes of monitoring and assessing land 
and forest fires detected by the number of hotspots, providing climate predictions 
and serving as a technical support for different inter-agency committees. The 
information from the ASMC will be used by the relevant national authorities for 
issuing hazardous weather and environmental conditions in their countries (ASEAN 
Specialised Meteorological Centre, 2015). On the other hand, the Southeast Asian 
FDRS, handled by the Malaysian Meteorological Service since 2003, is a monitoring 
and warning system for forest and vegetation fire risk that aims to assist policymakers 
in fire management. The system provides maps with indicators calculated from 
temperature, relative humidity, rainfall and wind speed to assess the ignition 
potentials of the fine fuel on land surface, of the surface organic layers, and of the 
deep layer of compact organic matter (peat soils). These maps help authorities to 
identify the level of intensity of the fires and the difficulty of fire control for preparing 
firefighting capability (Malaysian Meteorological Department, 2015). The ASEAN-
wide FDRS was displayed on Google Earth in 2012 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012b). 
The RHAP was supported by the Asian Development Bank through the Regional 
Technical Task Assistance (RETA) project, which aimed to strengthen the capacity of 
ASEAN to operationalize and monitor the RHAP, to assist the development of the 
detailed implementation plans (DIPs) of each ASEAN country and subregional 
firefighting arrangements (SRFAs) for Borneo and Sumatra, and to help set up the DIP 
for the RHAP to mobilize funding and technical assistance from several financial 
sources in the operationalization of the RHAP (Sunchindah, 2002).     
In 1999, the zero-burning policy was adopted and promoted, especially in Brunei, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore (ASEAN Secretariat, 1999b). The Coordination and 
Support Unit was established within the ASEAN Secretariat to support the 
implementation of the RHAP (ASEAN Secretariat, 1999a). At the Eighth AMMH, 
Indonesia was urged to implement the law and regulations to enforce the zero-
burning policy. While the ministers welcomed a dialogue session held in July that 
involved forestry concessionaires, plantation companies and governmental officials 
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to promote zero-burning policy in Sumatra, the idea emerged not to allow the open 
burning for the conversion of large areas of land into plantations (ASEAN Secretariat, 
1999c). Recognizing the importance of preparedness in preventing haze, the zero-
burning policy was emphasized along with the strengthening of law enforcement 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2001b). However, it needs to note that ASEAN recognizes the 
difficulties of smallholders, farmers and shifting cultivators in implementing zero-
burning practices, and they are exempted from the controlled burning ban. The 
Guidelines for the Implementation of Controlled Burning Practices, the Guidelines for 
the Implementation of the ASEAN Policy on Zero Burning, and Fire, Smoke and Haze: 
the ASEAN Response Strategy are available for them (ASEAN Secretariat, 2001a; 
ASEAN Secretariat, 2015a). 
In 2000 at the Fifth Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the Environment (the 
informal AMME), the ASEAN Haze Action Online was set up to provide general 
information on the haze situation to officials and the public. With assistance from the 
UNEP, the first meeting of the Working Group of Legal and Technical experts was held 
to negotiate the possibility of the ASEAN Agreement on Haze (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2000b). The Eleventh Meeting of ASEAN Senior Officials on the Environment agreed 
to develop the Haze Agreement, which would enhance cooperation in preventing, 
controlling and mitigating the issue through efforts at the national and regional levels 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2000a). Indonesia, again, was requested at the Eighth AMME 
meeting to take more effective enforcement measures to fight the plantation and 
forest fires (ASEAN Secretariat, 2000c). 
The ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) was signed by 10 
ASEAN member countries in June 2002 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002a); however, it 
required national ratification to ensure the legal framework. The objective of the 
AATHP is stated as ‘to prevent and monitor transboundary haze pollution as a result 
of land and/or forest fires which should be mitigated, through concerted national 
efforts and intensified regional and international co-operation’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2002a: 4). Key principles include the sovereign right of nations to exploit their own 
resources, alongside the responsibility to ensure that those activities within their 
jurisdiction do not cause damage to the environment and harm to the health of 
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people of other states; precautionary measures to prevent, monitor and mitigate 
land and/or forest fires; the sustainable management of the use of natural resources; 
and the involvement of all stakeholders as appropriate. The agreement also identifies 
the ASEAN Coordinating Centre for Transboundary Haze Pollution Control, or ‘the 
ASEAN Centre’, as an organization for facilitating and coordinating among parties to 
manage activities, for example monitoring, providing necessary information such as 
a list of experts and/or a list of technical facilities and/or list of donors from within 
and outside ASEAN to national focal points upon request, and establishing and 
maintaining contact with states and organization donors to mobilize financial and 
other resources for preventive and mitigating activities. The settlement of disputes 
between parties shall be done ‘amicably by consultation or negotiation’ (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2002a). 
At the Ninth AMMH, the ministers identified regional preparedness for coordination, 
communication, and disaster relief as the crucial elements of the arrangements. The 
existing institutions and resources were operationalized while the establishment of 
the ‘ASEAN Centre’ was pending owing to the process of ratification (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2002b). The agreement entered into force in November 2003 and was 
finally ratified by all ASEAN member countries in 2014. In order to focus on the 
operationalization of several provisions and the implementation of the agreement, 
the issues discussed under the AMMH have been officially taken up by the 
Conference of the Parties (COP) to the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze 
Pollution and the AMMH has not convened since 2007 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007c; 
ASEAN Haze Action Online, 2016b).  
The preventive actions on the fire-prone areas, the peatlands, were addressed at the 
Tenth AMMH. An ASEAN Peatland Management Initiative (APMI), which was first 
proposed at the Ninth AMMH and adopted at the Twentieth Meeting of the ASOEN-
HTTF (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a: 2), had been introduced to build capacity, share best 
practices on peatland management and develop a regional strategy to sustainably 
manage the peat soils (ASEAN Secretariat, 2003). The wise use of peatland has been 
recognized by both local and international communities after the emergence of the 
threat of land and forest fires, which affect people’s health, the regional economy 
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and global warming (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a: 2). With financial support from the 
Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the EU contributing to the ASEAN Peatland 
Forest Project and associated SEApeat Project, good progress was made in fostering 
the ASEAN Peatland Management Strategy 2006–2020 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012b). 
The pilot projects were conducted at sites in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Vietnam. The Twelfth AMME sought international support from partnerships as these 
projects also address climate change and biodiversity loss through the alleviation of 
land and forest fires (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012c). Peatlands were also confirmed as a 
high priority to prevent fires and to mitigate the impact of climate change (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2013b). In addition, the importance of peatland management can be 
seen from the establishment of the ASEAN Task Force on Peatland in 2013 as an 
ASEAN institutional framework – which assists and reports the progress to the 
Committee under the COP – to oversee the implementation and the monitoring of 
the ASEAN Programme on Sustainable Management of Peatland Ecosystems (2014–
2020) (ASEAN Haze Action Online, 2016b). 
In 2006, the Sub-regional Ministerial Steering Committee (MSC) on Transboundary 
Haze Pollution was set up to address specific issues occurring in the southern ASEAN 
countries including Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2006; ASEAN Haze Action Online, 2016b). In addition, regarding the 
different dry season periods between the southern ASEAN area and the northern 
area – which comprises Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam – the Sub-
regional Ministerial Steering Committee on Transboundary Haze Pollution in Mekong 
Sub-region (MSC Mekong) was later established in 2011 to oversee programmes and 
activities related to fire and haze pollution (ASEAN Secretariat, 2011). This 
subregional group has focused more on on-the-ground, action-oriented projects, as 
well as setting specific targets (ASEAN Secretariat, 2007c). The MSC and MSC 
Mekong, supported by a Technical Working Group (TWG), have met separately once 
a year (ASEAN Haze Action Online, 2016b). 
Since the RHAP was approved at the Second AMMH, bilateral cooperation within the 
ASEAN countries of Indonesia and Singapore, as well as between Indonesia and 
Malaysia, has developed strongly in the fire-prone areas (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998c). 
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Indonesian provincial authorities agreed, following the signing of bilateral 
memoranda of understanding (MOU), to work with Singapore and Malaysia to 
prevent fires in Jambi and Riau, respectively (The Straits Times, 2007b). Under the 
Jambi master plan, Singapore implemented several action programmes, such as 
capacity building for aquaculture industry, a sustainable peatland management 
project, efforts to teach zero-burning practices to farmers, installing tree air and 
weather monitoring stations, and training local officials to interpret satellite images 
to monitor hotspots (ASEAN Secretariat, 2008; The Straits Times, 2009). These 
attempts were highlighted as an achievement for the bottom-up approach (ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2009b; Ibrahim, 2009; Today Online, 2010), which contributed to a 
decrease in the number of hotspots in the assisted fire-prone areas between 2006 
and 2009 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009b). Therefore, a long-term preventive measure on 
peatland management was agreed (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009b). According to the 
previous achievement, bilateral collaboration between Indonesia and Malaysia, and 
between Indonesia and Singapore, through the MOU was undertaken again in 2014 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2014b). 
As the ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution (AATHP) was finally 
ratified by all ASEAN member countries in 2014, it is used as a critical point to 
examine the aims, key activities and achievements of the agreement. Indonesia’s 
ratification of the Haze Agreement on 14 October 2014,5 followed by Indonesia’s 
deposit of the Instrument of Ratification with the Secretary-General of ASEAN on 20 
January 2015 (ASEAN Haze Action Online, 2016c; ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b), is an 
important milestone for ASEAN cooperation to tackle the haze issue. With approval 
from Indonesia’s House of Representatives, the ratification forms a legal basis for 
Indonesia’s neighbours to assist Indonesia to fight the haze by supporting on-the-
ground activities and responsible agencies in the form of financial resources, 
                                                     
5 Participant J (2015) notes that the delay in Indonesia’s ratification was because of two main 
reasons. Firstly, the haze issue was under the control of ministries including the Ministry of 
Forest and Environment, the Ministry of Agriculture and National Land Agencies. Consent 
from all of them was required before seeking approval from parliament. Secondly, the 
process was also delayed and even restarted when the newly elected government came into 
power. 
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personnel and equipment (Jakarta Globe, 2014b; Chua and Cheong, 2014b; The 
Jakarta Post, 2014; The Straits Times, 2014c). In addition, the ratification also signals 
that Indonesia is ready to work collectively with its neighbours. For example, 
Indonesia may be less reluctant to share land use data, which helps to accelerate the 
ASEAN joint haze monitoring system to be able to function (Chua and Cheong, 
2014b). Moreover, the ratification of the agreement also sheds light on the hopes of 
Singapore (The Straits Times, 2014c; Jayakumar and Koh, 2015) and Malaysia (Tan, 
2015b; The Malaymail Online, 2015; The Straits Times, 2015l) of the renewal of 
bilateral MOUs with Indonesia on on-the-ground operations in fire-prone areas such 
as Riau and Jambi provinces, where successful outcomes in reducing the number of 
hotspots have been recognized (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b; Jayakumar and Koh, 
2015). 
4.2.1.1 Monitoring measures 
The critical role of the digital geo-referenced concession maps as a tool to deal with 
the plantation companies and land owners responsible for using slash-and-burn 
methods was discussed at the Fourteenth MSC. More transparency and 
accountability were required; therefore, the sharing of concession maps among the 
southern ASEAN governments was proposed (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012a). Singapore 
– affected severely from the haze occurring in Riau province – began acting actively 
to seek concrete outcomes, for example by getting official and accurate land 
concession maps, as this would help Singapore to collect substantial evidence to 
authoritatively identify guilty parties who are contributing to the peatland fires 
(Kassim, 2013a). The ASEAN Sub-Regional Haze Monitoring System (HMS), developed 
by Singapore, was recommended to be adopted as a joint haze monitoring system 
among ASEAN countries, with the digitized land use maps and concession maps of 
fire-prone areas shared on a government-to-government basis (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2013b; ASEAN Secretariat, 2013a). In order to operationalize the HMS to track down 
culprits, according to Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, cooperation on information 
and coordination was necessary for ASEAN countries to collectively address the issue 
(The Straits Times, 2013b; The Straits Times, 2013a). However, while Singapore 
wanted the maps to be publicly shared as a to signal to firms that states were keeping 
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an eye on them, Malaysia and Indonesia disagreed on making the maps available on 
public owing to their legal concerns (The Straits Times, 2013a). Thus, the HMS has 
not yet been operationalized as the maps are not provided because of the difficulties 
of some southern ASEAN countries (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014b). Realizing the 
difficulty in sharing the concession maps, the MSC supported member countries to 
take the action necessary to operationalize the HMS, including sharing hotspot areas 
on a government-to-government basis (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015c).     
Indonesia’s objections to revealing the official concession maps to its neighbours 
could be seen before Indonesia ratified the agreement. It should be an obligation for 
Indonesia to provide relevant information sought by any affected states to mitigate 
and minimize the impact of the haze (Jakarta Globe, 2014b). Singapore repeatedly 
urges Indonesia to provide plantation maps in order to operationalize the HMS 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2014c), to hold companies accountable for their actions (The 
Jakarta Post, 2015v), to provide authorities with the evidence necessary to enhance 
enforcement of the law (Tan, 2015a) and to punish parties who apply irresponsible 
and unsustainable practices (Mongabay, 2015c); however, Indonesia cannot fulfil the 
request because of domestic laws on public information access, which limit the 
disclosure of national assets to the public (The Nation, 2015a; The Jakarta Post, 
2015v; The Jakarta Post, 2015u), as well as the separate regulatory and legislative 
systems in Malaysia and Indonesia (The Jakarta Post, 2015v), the technical constraints 
of the information that can be shared (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b), and even the 
absence of an accurate and comprehensive map to begin with (The Nation, 2015a). 
The problem of information sharing is not limited only to the public space. Sharing 
information on a government-to-government basis on the hotspot areas is also 
constrained (ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b). The director general of climate change at 
the Indonesian Environment and Forestry Ministry, Nur Masripatin, gave an interview 
to the Strait Times that, even on the government-to-government basis, the 
Indonesian government cannot reveal on whose land a certain hotspot is, as this will 
disclose the concession map, which is classified information (The Jakarta Post, 
2015u). The problem of sharing information causes tension between Indonesia and 
Singapore. While ASEAN aims to achieve its vision of a haze-free ASEAN by 2020 
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(ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b), Singapore Environment and Water Resources Minister 
Vivian Balakrishnan became frustrated and impatient with the timeframe and slow 
progress as the pollution has been too long (The Jakarta Post, 2015v). Indonesia’s 
minister of environment and forestry, Siti Nurbaya, responded to Singapore that 
Indonesia would fulfil Singapore’s demand for the list of companies, which could be 
verified and published; however, a multilateral approach was not applied for this case 
(The Jakarta Post, 2015v). She also reaffirmed during an interview that, although 
Singapore needed information to prosecute its citizens or other nationals who were 
proven to cause fires when they were in Singapore, Indonesia’s position on the 
request depended on Indonesia’s law, in particular the Act on Public Information 
Disclosure, which mandates that certain information not be shared publicly or 
handed to other countries (The Batam Post, 2015). The strict requirements applied 
to the sharing of Indonesian maps to the public can be exemplified in the case of an 
ASEAN application – Air4ASEAN – that provides people with general air quality 
information (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014c); however, the Indonesia page has recently 
(April 2016) been unavailable. Since Singapore wants to prosecute guilty parties on 
Indonesia’s land using Singaporean legislation, this is a sensitive issue for Indonesia 
(The Jakarta Post, 2015v). Minister Siti rejected that claim, on the grounds that the 
Indonesian state has to protect its citizens and the whole nation from being 
prosecuted in other countries (The Batam Post, 2015).          
Besides Indonesia’s domestic law on the public access to information, a more critical 
question is the absence of an authoritative map for national governments to refer to. 
In 2011, President Susilo Bambang started the One Map Initiative to create an all-
encompassing map for all its lands and concessions through the President’s 
Instruction (Inpres) No. 10/2011 (Samadhi, 2013). As there is conflicting data at the 
different levels of government, as well as private sectors, the initiative aims to 
compile land use, land tenure and other spatial data into a single database (Spatial 
Informatics Group, 2016). However, as the project is still incomplete, the 
operationalization of the HMS has been delayed (Tay and Lau, 2015a). 
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4.2.1.2 Preventive measures 
According to Article 9 of the Haze Agreement, the prevention and control of haze are 
taken by member parties through developing and implementing laws and regulations 
to promote zero-burning and other appropriate policies to control activities causing 
land and forest fires. Preventive measures also include the strengthening of local 
firefighting capacity, the promotion of public awareness and participation in fire 
management, the supporting of indigenous knowledge and practices in fire 
prevention, and the setting of legal measures to control open burning to prevent land 
clearing by fire (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002a: 8). Regional cooperation in preventing 
haze is instead developed through the peatland forest management activities at the 
community level, rather than legal mechanisms. A variety of different policies, laws 
and regulations in ASEAN countries related to peatland management, the 
inappropriate or conflicting policies affecting peatland, and problems of poor law 
enforcement are recognized as challenges for regional cooperation on sustainable 
peatland management (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a: 4–6). However, it should be noted 
that, under the framework for the sustainable management of peatland forest in 
Southeast Asia, which has been seen as a long-term effort in addressing the haze 
problem, individual national action plans are encouraged to naturally link with and 
complement the regional strategy (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a: 11).           
Since it is estimated that 90 per cent of the haze comes from peatlands, which are 
important to the natural ecosystem but little recognized, minimizing peatland fires 
could significantly reduce haze pollution (Letchumanan, 2014a; National 
Environment Agency, 2015). The burning of organic peat releases huge amount of 
smoke (Parish, 2013). Southeast Asia contains around 60 per cent of the world’s 
tropical peatlands, and over 70 per cent of Southeast Asian peat soil is in Indonesia. 
Other major areas of peatlands are found in Malaysia, Brunei and Thailand; however, 
smaller areas of peatlands are in Vietnam, the Philippines, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar 
and Singapore (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a: 4). Because of the meagre understanding 
of the peatland ecosystem, peat swamps were seen as useless and waste wetlands, 
which were then dried and over-exploited for economic development activities such 
as plantation, agro-forests, cash crops and peat-mining (ASEANPeatProject, 2011; 
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Letchumanan, 2014a; Ma, 2011). As water was drained from the peat areas, it 
created the perfect conditions for fires and smoke haze (Letchumanan, 2014a).     
In order to prevent and minimize the haze and fire, the APMI was established under 
the framework of RHAP and the Haze Agreement to address the issues of peatland 
management on a sustainable basis (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005a: 1, 3). The initiative 
aims to reduce fire, especially in the peatland (Letchumanan, 2014b). The lack of 
understanding of the unique ecosystem of peatland and the continuity of turning the 
peat swamp to agricultural land make the land vulnerable to fire when water is dried 
from the peat soils (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005a: 3). Therefore, the objectives of this 
initiative are increasing understanding and capacity building in regional peatland 
management; reducing the incidence of peatland fires and haze; encouraging 
national and local activities on peatland management and fire prevention; and 
developing regional strategy and cooperation mechanisms to support sustainable 
peatland management (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005a: 1). The ASEAN Peatland 
Management Strategy (APMS) 2006–2020 was developed under the framework of 
APMI and the Haze Agreement to set out the operational objectives of delivering one 
or more of the areas of enhanced awareness and knowledge on peatland; addressing 
haze pollution and environmental degradation; promoting sustainable peatland 
management; and enhancing collaborative regional cooperation on peatland issues 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a). The APMS also aims to overcome common problems 
related to peatlands – including fires, drainage, inappropriate management practices, 
livelihood options and sustainability – which are found among ASEAN members 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a: 6).    
Two key projects that complement each other to support the implementation of the 
APMS at the regional and national levels are the ASEAN Peatland Forests Project 
(APFP) and the Sustainable Management of Peatland Forests in Southeast Asia 
(SEApeat) (ASEAN Peatland Forests Project, 2016a). Additionally, the projects provide 
guidance to ASEAN member states to use climate change funding mechanisms to 
benefit local communities from climate mitigation and adaption funds, REDD 
mechanism and voluntary carbon funds by finalizing national action plans for 
peatland forests, which relate to the cross-sectoral and integrated approach to tackle 
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deforestation and forest degradation (ASEAN Peatland Forests Project, 2016a). 
Under the APFP-SEApeat Project, which focuses on peatland management issues 
including the inappropriate drainage of peatlands, the over-exploitation of peatland 
resources, peatland fires and haze, illegal logging, loss of carbon storage, and the loss 
of biodiversity (ASEAN Peatland Forests Project, 2016b), activities aiming to avoid 
new emissions from land use change, to restore peatlands, and to re-wet drained 
peatlands (ASEAN Peatland Forests Project, 2016c) implemented at the community 
level are crucial for preventing and controlling peat fires. Best management practices 
for communities living on peatlands supported by the APFP-SEAPeat Project in 
several ASEAN peatland areas include the Buying Living Tree System (in Indonesia and 
the Philippines), seedling buyback (in Malaysia), the Green Contract (in Vietnam), 
Sorjan farming (in Indonesia and the Philippines), Floating Gardens (in the 
Philippines), peer learning (in Vietnam, Malaysia, Thailand and Indonesia), 
community fire prevention and control (in Indonesia), water management (in 
Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia), research and development (in Vietnam and 
Indonesia) and ecotourism (in Cambodia, the Philippines, Thailand and Indonesia) 
(ASEAN Peatland Forests Project, 2015).    
The peatland management projects under the ASEAN framework are also received 
operational and technical supports from the Global Environment Centre (GEC), which 
is a non-profit organization based in Malaysia (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005a: 7; ASEAN 
Secretariat, 2014a: 2). Since the APFP comprises different components – including 
regional projects led by the GEC, country projects led by respective national executing 
agencies, and other non-profit organizations participating in the country project 
(Parish, 2014) – the GEC plays a critical role in implementing and coordinating the 
project to ensure an integrated approach with the government focal point. 
Moreover, it also works with the plantation sector and communities to provide and 
document the guidance adopted by the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) 
and sharing the best practices through transferred projects such as Sorjan farming 
(Parish, 2014) – farming in the swampy peat areas – which helps the Philippines site 
gain better crops by learning best practice from the method from Indonesia (Andres, 
2014). This is the strength of the regional project that has been shared from one to 
another countries (Parish, 2014). The APFP, funded by the Global Environment 
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Facility (2009–2014) through the International Fund for Agricultural Development 
(IFAD), and the SEApeat Project, supported by the EU, were considered an ASEAN 
achievements and substantive progress in promoting sustainable management of the 
peatland, sustaining local livelihoods and minimizing the risk of fires and smoke haze 
(ASEAN Secretariat, 2015b; ASEAN Secretariat, 2015c).    
However, there are some problems limiting these efforts, such as the returning of the 
haze. To reduce the risk of the peatland and forest fires effectively, preventive 
measures – such as flooding the peatlands to reduce fire ignitions, and building canal 
blocking to stop the draining of peat areas – need to be prepared and done before 
the dry season. Even though prevention through hydrological management of peat 
areas is more cost-effective and less difficult than extinguishing the fires (ASEAN 
Peatland Forests Project, 2016c; Parish, 2013), these measures are still inadequate 
because of the limited resources (selective efforts can only be implemented at some 
prioritized areas) (ASEAN Secretariat, 2014a: 9), the existence of liberal burning 
(Parish, 2013) and/or even the Indonesian government’s technical and administrative 
gaps, where the provincial governments were reluctant to take preventive measures 
without official letters and technical instruction from the Indonesian central 
government (The Batam Post, 2015).    
4.2.1.3 Mitigating measures 
Mitigating measures were initially developed under the RHAP with the purpose of 
strengthening firefighting capacity at the national and regional levels (ASEAN Haze 
Action Online, 1997). Each country is encouraged to prepare firefighting resources 
(such as agencies, manpower, equipment and hazard maps), to compile a list of 
equipment and technical expertise to coordinate with the regional body, to identify 
the sources of technical assistance for firefighting (such as aircraft and water 
bombers in operations) within and outside the region, and to establish a mechanism 
to provide regular updates – including on the number of hotspots, their locations, the 
types of fires, the adequacy of deployed resources, the effectiveness of enforcement, 
and ground operations – to the HTTF when the fire breaks out (ASEAN Haze Action 
Online, 1997). According to Florano (2004), the RHAP was a soft norm initiated from 
executive agreement, which saved a lot of time from the progress of treaty 
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ratification that was under way (Florano, 2004: 5). Therefore, even though Indonesia 
– which takes a leading role in the area of firefighting (ASEAN Secretariat, 1997) – did 
not ratified the agreement until 2014, the guidelines for firefighting cooperation had 
been set in the RHAP with unwritten pillars of volunteerism, a no-fault rule and an 
expertise-based offer of assistance (Florano, 2004: 5–7).    
However, as the agreement on haze is legally binding, it clarifies details on 
procedures in the case of land and forest fires. Before the fire occurs, each party 
should firstly individually or jointly prepare for response strategies and plan to 
manage and control the risks of fires to people and the environment. Each party is 
obliged to set up its own designated and authorized focal point(s) to receive and 
transmit communications and data with the ASEAN coordinating centre and other 
parties. When the fire originates in its own soil, each party should ensure that there 
are sufficient and appropriate resources to mitigate the impacts of such fires and 
immediately inform other parties and the ASEAN coordinating centre. International 
assistance to fight the fire can be requested from other parties, the ASEAN centre 
and/or external entities. The joint emergency response and assistance, according to 
Article 12 of the agreement, ‘can only be employed at the request of and with the 
consent of the requesting Party, or, when offered by another Party or Parties, with 
the consent of the receiving Party’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2002a: 9). This clause 
represents the principle of sovereignty, which is of strong concern for parties even in 
context of cooperative response to transnational environmental disaster. In addition, 
under Article 27 of the Haze Agreement, any dispute between parties, whether on 
the interpretation, application or compliance of the agreement, will be amicably 
settled through consultation and negotiation in the ASEAN Secretariat (2002a: 17). 
Therefore, the agreement cannot do much more than the RHAP, except for being as 
a source of legal reference to the parties in the cooperation against haze with the 
absence of international sanction; on the other hand, the non-interference and 
sovereignty issue is settled by Article 12 of the Haze Agreement.  
Indonesia, as the main source of the haze pollution, has put in a great deal of national 
effort in terms of manpower and resources to extinguish land and forest fires. Since 
1997, it can be seen that the Indonesian government has allocated manpower and 
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financial and other necessary resources to combat land and forest fires. For example, 
in 1997 the government spent around 3.1 billion rupiah, with 50,000 units of 
territorial personnel (The Straits Times, 1997c) and over 8,400 firefighters in the 
affected area (The Straits Times, 1997e), whereas, in 2014, the spending on putting 
out wildfires in Kalimantan and Sumatra was more than 300 billion rupiah, which was 
used for weather modification and operational funds (Jakarta Globe, 2014a). An 
action plan at the provincial level in the prioritized fire-prone areas, including Jambi, 
Riau, South Sumatra and West and Central Kalimantan, has been created to prevent 
and prepare for the occurrence of the fire (The Jakarta Post, 2015m). However, the 
preventive measures could not stop the fire in 2015. In September of that year, the 
PSI reached 463, causing poor visibility and the closure of airports and schools, while 
more than 1,000 soldiers were deployed to fight fires (The Economist, 2015). Officials 
used 13 helicopters for water-bombing efforts and three Casa 212 aircraft for cloud-
seeding across affected areas (The Straits Times, 2015g). To improve coordination 
and effective operations on fire extinguishing, the haze emergency task force was set 
up, consisting of the Indonesian Environment and Forestry Ministry (who was the 
main coordinator), the National Police and the Indonesian Army and the National 
Disaster Mitigation Agency (The Jakarta Post, 2015l). In the meeting of the task force, 
governors of the fire-prone provinces and environmental authorities were involved 
(The Straits Times, 2015g; The Jakarta Post, 2015l). In addition, Indonesian President 
Joko Widodo has indicated a firm intention to take the harshest sanctions against 
anyone involved in starting illegal fires (The Straits Times, 2015f).    
However, those preventive and mitigation efforts of the Indonesian government 
alone were not sufficient to stop the severe haze situation. Multilateral emergency 
cooperation on forest fire mitigation from Indonesia’s neighbouring countries was 
finally launched in October 2015 (The Jakarta Post, 2015c), followed by the order of 
the Indonesian president to immediately evacuate babies, children and vulnerable 
people from areas with worsening air quality (The Jakarta Post, 2015g). The 
Indonesian minister of environment and forestry explained that, in dealing with fires 
in 2015, Indonesia deployed soldiers, conducted water-bombing (with 18 million 
litres of water in Riau and 12 million litres of water in South Sumatra and Jambi), as 
well as operating cloud-seeding (with 120 tonnes of salt in Riau and 56 tonnes of salt 
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in South Sumatra) to emphasize that Indonesia was serious in putting out the fires 
(Channel NewsAsia, 2015a).    
It was noticed that, when the haze came, the Indonesian government reacted to its 
neighbours’ complaints on the situation differently. At the international level, former 
Indonesian presidents often delivered apologies to their neighbours affected by the 
crisis (The Straits Times, 1997d; The Straits Times, 2000b; The Straits Times, 2013f). 
In contrast, the president’s apology faced criticisms for dragging down national pride 
and his position seemed to stand alone (Kassim, 2013b). Some politicians reacted to 
the complaints with harsh words. For instance, Indonesian Coordinating Minister of 
People’s Welfare Agung Laksono said that Singapore should not have behaved like a 
child in making so much noise (The Straits Times, 2013e). Indonesian Vice President 
Jusuf Kalla said that Indonesia was sorry as it could not control the wind and recalled 
that it never asked neighbours to pay for 11 months of good weather (Mongabay, 
2015n; The Straits Times, 2015e; The Economist, 2015).   
Nationalism, national pride and the principle of non-interference still played 
significant roles in the progress of international cooperation. Although transnational 
haze pollution affected the people of Indonesia and other nearby countries, the 
assistance offered by neighbouring countries was not easily accepted by Indonesia. 
As Singapore demanded and expected Indonesia to act fast, this caused an adverse 
reaction to Jakarta, which felt that Singapore was telling it what to do about its own 
backyard (The Straits Times, 2006e). Indonesia made it clear that it alone would 
determine when and how it would to tackle the haze problem (The Straits Times, 
2013e). The uneasy acceptance of the international offer of joint emergency 
assistance to tackle the haze could be observed from the previous haze fires. In 2006, 
Singapore diplomat Kevin Cheok found that it was difficult to persuade the 
Indonesian authorities to accept international help to tackle the haze, while the 
Indonesian representative at the UN, Adiyatwidi Adiwoso Asmady, saw Singapore’s 
call for international assistance as an interference in Indonesia’s domestic affairs (The 
Straits Times, 2006c). Similarly, when the haze was worsening, Indonesian 
Environment Minister Balthasar Kambuaya affirmed that Indonesia could handle the 
haze problem on its own and would not accept help from Singapore and Malaysia 
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since it had given Indonesia a bad image when the two countries called for 
substandard equipment to be given to Indonesia as part of the assistance (Jakarta 
Globe, 2014c). Since 2005, Singapore has consistently offered Indonesia a package 
consisting of ‘one C-130 aircraft for cloud seeding operations, up to two C-130 aircraft 
to ferry a fire-fighting assistance team from the Singapore Civil Defence Force (SCDF), 
an SCDF team to provide assessment and planning assistance in fire-fighting efforts 
to their Indonesian counterparts, high-resolution satellite pictures and hotspot 
coordinates and a Chinook helicopter with one SCDF water bucket for aerial fire-
fighting’ (The Straits Times, 2015o). However, while Singapore had offered the 
package to Indonesia several times since the haze began in June 2015 (The Straits 
Times, 2015o; The Straits Times, 2015m), Indonesian Environment and Forestry 
Minister Siti Nurbaya Bakar declined the offer as Indonesia still had sufficient 
resources (The Jakarta Post, 2015u). Furthermore, she commented that one more 
water-bombing unit from Singapore would not make much difference, and ‘Unless if 
it’s, say, 20 units ... then that would be good’ (The Straits Times, 2015j). On 7 October 
Indonesian government finally accepted foreign help to fight the forest fires after 
facing pressure at home as well as abroad to end the haze crisis (The Straits Times, 
2015h). 
4.2.2 Indonesia’s global cooperation 
Another attempt that focuses on air pollution is the Indonesia–Norway cooperation 
on reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation 
(REDD). According to the letter of intent signed in 2010, Indonesia and Norway, as 
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), 
the Kyoto Protocol and the Convention on Biological Diversity, agreed to achieve the 
goal of reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation, forest degradation 
and peatland conversion through policy dialogue on international climate change 
policy and through collaboration in the development and implementation of 
Indonesia’s REDD+ strategy (The Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the 
Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010). The basic concept of REDD and 
REDD+ is that the governments, companies or forest owners in the south should be 
rewarded for maintaining the forests instead of cutting them down (REDD Monitor, 
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2011). While REDD emphasizes only reducing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation, REDD+ involves the conservation of forest carbon stocks, the 
sustainable management of forests and the enhancement of forest carbon stock 
(REDD Monitor, 2011). The project does not aim to stop deforestation but it intends 
to slow down the rate of deforestation and environmental degradation. However, 
since Indonesia has voluntarily committed to reduce CO2 by 26 per cent by 2020 and 
41 per cent by 2050, avoiding fires from the forest and peatland sectors could, 
importantly, help Indonesia to reach its targets (Velde, 2014). Therefore, the REDD+ 
programme examined in this research is considered a way to deal with the haze 
problem under the global cooperation on climate change. 
The Indonesia–Norway cooperation on REDD+ can be considered a sustainable 
development programme as it clearly recognizes the necessity of economic 
development and poverty reduction as goals for human welfare (The Government of 
the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010). 
According to President Yudhoyono (2011), while economic development and the 
eradication of poverty have been prioritized, the government also intensified its 
efforts to cut down emissions from land use, land change and forest exploitation. 
Several policies were formulated, with the aim of achieving sustainable forests in 
Indonesia within the REDD+ framework. Government initiatives carried out to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 by 26 per cent from business-as-usual levels are 
included the moratorium on new licences to exploit the natural primary forest and 
all peatlands, the creating of indicative maps for implementing REDD+ and for 
formulating better policy related to forests, and other initiatives in the provision of 
funding run by forest-edge inhabitants and local villages at the grassroots level 
(Yudhoyono, 2011). In order to support these programmes, Norway has provided 
financial support to Indonesia to set up the REDD+ mechanisms (the national REDD 
strategy, the REDD agency, an independent national monitoring body, a transparent 
instrument for financial funding and a selected province-wide REDD+ pilot) and to 
assist Indonesia’s capacity building at the national level, policy development and 
implementation, as well as legal reform and law enforcement (The Government of 
the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010). To 
complete the second phase, Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No. 10/2011 on the 
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Suspension of Granting of New Licenses and Improvement of Governance of Natural 
Primary Forest was released as a policy instrument to impose a two-year moratorium 
on new forest concession licences, as well as establishing the Indicative Moratorium 
Map (IMM) for the suspension of new permits in the primary forest area and 
peatlands (The President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2011). Indonesia would 
receive annual contributions from Norway of up to USD 1 billion for independently 
verified national emission reductions relative to a UNFCC reference level (and other 
potential partners) for Indonesia’s REDD+ efforts in the third phase (The Government 
of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010).  
However, although Inpres was the president’s attempt to maintain a balance 
between the development of national economic growth and the conservation of 
forests, it was criticized by the business and environmental communities. For the 
palm oil companies, the moratorium went too far as it included peatlands less than 
three metres deep, which were allowed by the Ministry of Agriculture; on the other 
hand, the environmental groups point out the difficulty in implementing the 
moratorium as the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Energy – having a 
crucial role in deforestation practices – were not involved in the policy (Jakarta Globe, 
2011). Despite the president facing lobbies from major logging, palm oil and mining 
companies (who saw the ban as causing lower profits, hurting their ability to expand 
and hindering national economic growth) (Eco-Business, 2013), the moratorium on 
new forest concessions was extended twice, by President Yudhoyono in 2013 and by 
President Jokowi in 2015 (The President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2013; The 
President of the Republic of Indonesia, 2015). In April 2016, President Jokowi’s 
announcement that new concessions for palm oil plantations and land for mining 
activities would no longer overlap with conservation land was pointed out by industry 
analysists as an indication that the government was listening to green groups (The 
Straits Times, 2016b). 
However, Murdiyarso et al. (2011) point out critical loopholes in implementing the 
moratorium. Firstly, Inpres is a non-legislative document. Legal consequences come 
when presidential instructions are implemented by relevant ministries and other 
governmental agencies. Since the Ministries of Agriculture and of Energy and Mineral 
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Resources – which is also concerned with deforestation and the associated land-
based emissions – are not involved in Inpres, the application of the moratorium is 
limited to the activity in those sectors. Inpres exempts the land needed for national 
development projects, such as geothermal energy, oil and natural gas, and sugar 
cane, even though those areas are close to conservation areas. For instance, before 
President Jokowi extended the moratorium, he announced a plan to achieve 1.2 
million hectares of new rice field in Papua within three years as part of the Merauke 
Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) Project (REDD Monitor, 2015). Therefore, 
even though Papua harbours the largest areas of shallow peat soils, this development 
area would not be included in the moratorium. Secondly, because the moratorium 
uses the term ‘primary natural forest’, instead of ‘natural forest’ as stated in the letter 
of intent, the problem of terminology arises. The moratorium covers only untouched, 
unmanaged and undisturbed forests. The secondary natural forests (or the logged-
over forests, which are also rich in biomass) are excluded despite being part of the 
‘natural forest’. The difference between the extent of the ‘natural forest’ and that of 
the ‘primary forest’ is substantial. Thirdly, the moratorium excludes the existing 
concession licences and those that had already been approved before the 
announcement of Inpres. Therefore, there is the possibility that the approved 
concession areas could overlap with those included in the moratorium. Finally, while 
the moratorium gives special attention to peatlands, it does not protect all peatlands. 
It does not cover non-forested peatland, which is especially prevalent in Sumatra and 
Central Kalimantan, where the deep peats are harboured (Murdiyarso et al., 2011). 
4.3 Governance gaps in dealing with the haze issue 
The previous sections describe the existence of international cooperation on the haze 
problem; however, several challenges limit its success. This section attempts to 
examine the underlying causes of failures in monitoring, preventing and mitigating 
the fires and haze. This section aims to identify governance gaps caused by the 
limitation of international institutions and Indonesia’s internal difficulties in pursuing 
international demands for fighting haze. These limitations are identified to consider 
how policy networks can find any possible opportunities to fill those gaps. To avoid 
redundancy in understanding the gaps, particular issues underlying the problems in 
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tackling fires and haze are explained by how they obscure the achievement in 
delivering an effective mechanism. The challenge in getting maps to monitor the haze 
is illustrated by the investigation of the land rights and responsibility over the land. 
The problem in identifying conservation areas is understood by the questions on 
balancing the desire to increase economic growth and the ambition to maximize the 
protected areas of natural forest. The difficulties of on-the-ground firefighting 
operations are revealed by investigating the constraints in coordinating between the 
central and local authorities. 
4.3.1 Governance gaps in the regional monitoring system 
The big challenge for implementing the HMS is the absence of authoritative maps 
shared by Indonesia. This is an information gap for achieving the monitoring system. 
To understand why it is difficult for Indonesia to share the maps with its partners, it 
is necessary to investigate Indonesia’s internal administrative structure, which leads 
to the overlapped authority and responsibility for issuing licences for land rights 
between the central government and local authorities. In addition, this is more 
complicated when the traditional law (adat law) is also recognized by the state and 
applied by local communities. This results in various maps being issued by different 
governmental bodies. The lack of a referable, authoritative map also bring about the 
problem of enforcement and the state’s inability to punish any transgressor despite 
there being laws and regulations banning open burning. 
The land management problem in Indonesia is the basis for the difficulty in getting 
maps for monitoring the haze issue. Poor governance over land is also widely 
acknowledged as sources of conflicts among stakeholders who claim their right over 
overlapping lands (USAID, 2010: 1). Ambiguities of laws and regulations play a crucial 
part in explaining this poor management issue. Before Indonesia achieved 
independence, traditional informal, or adat, systems persisted across the 
archipelago. Adat is the customary law of the indigenous peoples. According to 
Tyson, adat refers to ‘a fluid, contingent concept encompassing a wide range of 
customs and traditions unique to each of Indonesia’s major ethic groups’ (Tyson, 
2010: 1). Therefore, adat practices and principles in any particular issues can be 
diverse as they are community-based applications and interpretations. 
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In the process of nation-building after becoming independent, Indonesia was 
governed by President Suharto, who centralized the military and bureaucratic system 
highly under his New Order regime. During this period, the traditional sources of 
authority and local diversity were suppressed and weakened as the national 
government tried to standardize village and regional affairs (Tyson, 2010: 10). On 
land matters, the national government attempted to replace a diverse land 
management system and the local system of regulating property rights with uniform 
rules by simplifying, ignoring or eradicating them (Suartika, 2007: 168; Moeliono and 
Limberg, 2013: 221). Two key national agencies directly related to land management 
policy were the Ministry of Forestry (MOF) and the National Land Agency (Badan 
Pertanahan National: BPN). While the MOF was in charge of forest zones, the BPN 
took responsibility for national land policy and non-forest areas. All land was 
administered through their branch offices at the province and district levels 
(Moeliono and Limberg, 2013: 222). It should be noted that, while the national 
government attempted to unify laws and regulations, the adat law was functioning 
on the ground. The first layer of land overlapping issue arose, for instance, in the 
forest areas, where concession licences for plantations and mining were issued by 
the MOF without considering the indigenous community and the people living and 
depending on forests. 
The second source of the overlapped land problem is the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), 
or Law No. 5 of 1960. The BAL was based on Dutch concepts that ‘land is either private 
individual property or belongs to the state’ (Moeliono and Limberg, 2013: 221). The 
BAL defines the fundamental types of rights holding by individuals, the role of the 
state in its direct use of land, and the regulation of private rights and uses of land 
(Mitchell et al., 2004, cited in USAID, 2010: 6). The BAL was applied to the entirety of 
Indonesia’s land during 1960–1967; however, the BAL ceased to be used to forests 
when the Basic Forestry Law (Law No. 5 of 1967) and the 1967 Law on Mining were 
adopted (USAID, 2010: 6). Since 1967, the tenure system has been under the BAL. It 
was believed that the drafters of the BAL anticipated that the official legal system 
would gradually replace the adat system (Moeliono and Limberg, 2013: 222; USAID, 
2010: 6). Article 5 of the BAL recognizes the adat law as long as it does not contradict 
national interests or other regulations set out in the BAL (USAID, 2010: 6); therefore, 
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there are two systems of land tenure and rights run in parallel. Private ownership can 
be recognized by the state when it is registered under the BAL in the form of the right 
of ownership, the use right, the right to exploit and the right to build; in other words, 
unregistered land is owned by the state for the sake of the people (USAID, 2010: 7). 
Although the land registration system was set under the control of BPN to record 
private land ownership, progress has been slow. At an annual rate of one million 
parcels being registered (2004), it would take around 60 years to complete the 
remaining approximately 60 million unregistered cases (USAID, 2010: 8). This is partly 
because the cost of registration is considered expensive for people who hold the land 
under the adat law. Therefore, although the law recognizes the continuation of rights 
derived by customary practice, the right can be fully recognized by the state only 
when a holder purchases a stipulation from the BPN (USAID, 2010: 8). Besides, while 
land leasing is illegal under the BAL, the lease of land is common owing to the failure 
of bureaucrats to enforce the law. This has led to informal leases of land, where actual 
land ownership is under the control of village officials not the BPN (USAID, 2010: 8). 
In short, the absence of private land registration records, the technical land leases, 
and the limitation of the BPN to access the actual landholders present complexities 
in Indonesian land governance. 
The third layer of confusion in land management in Indonesia came in the period of 
decentralization, when power was devolved from national government to local 
authorities. Although this can be considered a higher stage of democracy, 
accountability and participation, as the interests and demands of constituents could 
be greater articulated in policies and decision-making at the local level (Tyson, 2010: 
10), this seriously weakened the centralized national legal system for land. More 
complicated functions among the national government, local authorities and local 
communities have increased conflict over tenure as each body seeks revenue and the 
shared benefits of the land by issuing concessions on unregistered lands that are 
claimed or owned by local people under the adat law (Sudana, 2013: 207; Moeliono 
and Limberg, 2013: 222). Political and financial devolution was implemented under 
Laws No. 22 and 25, which transferred financial management and responsibility from 
central government to regional authorities (UNDP, 2014: 7). Land conflicts in Malinau 
can well illustrate the ineffective nature of national policies relating to land 
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(Moeliono and Limberg, 2013). Although the MOF and the BPN branches at the 
province and district levels were liquidated or taken into the control of an 
autonomous district, local government also established forestry offices as well as 
land offices as part of their district structure (Moeliono and Limberg, 2013: 222). 
However, the MOF and the BPN continually attempted to regain and keep control 
over forest and land resources by claiming that a strategic national resource was not 
included in the general decentralization system (Moeliono and Limberg, 2013: 222). 
While customary laws have persisted with the contradictory legal system, local 
people and communities have to seek solutions for dealing with land conflict by 
themselves (Moeliono and Limberg, 2013: 222, 229). 
Poor land management in Indonesia after decentralization did not only bring about 
higher tensions among stakeholders at different levels; it also led to less effectiveness 
in enforcing tougher laws relating to dealing with the land and forest fires. It seems 
that concessions could be granted to companies without consulting with local 
communities governed by traditional law. Legal loopholes on land governance offer 
the possibility of rampant corruption in the forestry sector (Gill and Bin, 2013; Eco-
Business, 2013; Kassim, 2013b; Greenpeace, 2015). It is noted that while concessions 
were given to President Suharto’s cronies to back his regime, decentralization makes 
corruption fragmented and more pervasive (Eco-Business, 2013). Conflicts over land 
claims have increased as local elites could make profit from natural resources through 
the allocation of concessions at the expense of smallholders (Gill and Bin, 2013). Fire 
may be used as weapon by both companies and smallholders to challenge opponents 
to land rights (Gill and Bin, 2013; Neo, 2013). 
 Ambiguous land rights and ownership also result in difficulties in enforcing the law 
on burning as it is hard to identify and prosecute the transgressor. Although the law 
states explicitly that burning to clear land is prohibited under Indonesian law (No. 
32/2009 Article 108 of the Plantation Law), and that those who found guilty could 
face up to 10 years in jail as well as a maximum fine of 10 million Indonesian Rupiah 
(Neo, 2013; Velde, 2014; The Jakarta Post, 2015f; The Jakarta Post, 2015w; The 
Jakarta Post, 2015x), implementation has proved difficult. In order to enforce law 
effectively, sufficient evidence and reliable data are required. Some difficulties in 
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implementing and enforcing the law are set out below. The first challenge is diffused 
responsibility across different levels of government (Velde, 2014). For example, even 
though the forest minister knew the list of companies proven to be involved in setting 
forest fires, the minister confirmed that his role was responsible only for 
extinguishing fires, not for arresting and investigating wrongdoers, which should be 
done by the police (The Straits Times, 2006f). The second complication is the political 
will to enforce laws. This is also due to the existence of legal loopholes in land 
management, which help to sustain corruption between officials and lawbreakers. 
Corruption at the local level causes less incentive for authorities to find evidence to 
prosecute perpetrators (The Straits Times, 2009). The third difficulty is the 
insufficient resources and capacity in policing and gathering evidence to prosecute. 
Many areas in Sumatra and Kalimantan are hard to access and inspect (The Straits 
Times, 2007b); in addition, financial resources and manpower to trace responsibility 
are limited (PM.Haze, 2014). The fourth difficulty is the application of obtaining 
substantial evidence to prosecute culprits. This difficulty is partly derived from 
inadequate resources in the long legal processes. Since a fire starter can be 
prosecuted only when there is clear evidence that the fire was intentionally set by a 
landowner (The Straits Times, 2002a), it is not easy to get strong evidence to bring 
the cases into court. Although there are high-resolution images taken by satellites 
that could claim about 80 per cent accuracy, collecting evidence on the ground by 
authorities is still necessary to validate information (Letchumanan, 2015). Since many 
accusations can be made by different actors, and since law enforcement is weak, 
some people are more willing to take a risk by burning as it is the cheapest and 
quickest way compared to other land clearing methods. 
The land tenure chaos has been recognized and key attempts to handle it can be 
pointed out. Previously, the Highest House of the Legislature imposed MPR Degree 
No. IX of 2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resources Management, instructing 
the House of Representatives and the president to reconcile laws related to the use 
of land and natural resources; however, most parts of the instruction have been 
barely implemented (USAID, 2010: 6). In addressing the haze and the greenhouse gas 
emission problem, the absence of accurate information and maps was first reported 
by the REDD+ Task Force to President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who then 
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responded to the report by launching the One Map Initiative (Chua and Tseng, 2013). 
Although this initiative intends to resolve overlapping land claims, progress in 
consolidating data and maps is slow. The project is quite ambitious and sensitive as 
it goes to the heart of land conflicts, where all levels of governments relating to lands 
and stakeholders are involved (Spatial Informatics Group, 2016). The slow move of 
the initiative is partly from obstacles in cutting through red tape and laws preventing 
map-sharing across different agencies, as well as between central and local 
authorities (Chua and Tseng, 2013). In late 2014, it was reported that a standard land 
cover map from 13 governmental agencies had been made; however, much work has 
to be done on overlapping land boundaries (The Nation, 2015a). In addition, while 
the project was planned to start by harmonizing overlapping land claims province by 
province, the consolidated map in fire-prone areas such as Sumatra and Riau have 
not been achieved yet (Tan, 2015a). In 2014–2015, an estimate of two to three years 
to complete the Indonesian authoritative map was made by the Indonesian 
government (The Straits Times, 2014c; Tan, 2015a; The Straits Times, 2015i; The 
Straits Times, 2015f). The project is obviously time-consuming and labour-intensive; 
but, if it is completed, it will bring considerable benefits for solving long-standing land 
conflicts among stakeholders, improving instruments for Indonesian government 
agencies, and assisting the monitoring systems to prevent illegal activities (The 
Nation, 2015a). 
However, as the One Map Initiative is still not complete, it frustrates people and 
neighbouring countries taking negative impacts from the fires and transboundary 
haze. Singapore has been clearly frustrated at the slow pace of progress (The Nation, 
2015a; The Straits Times, 2014c). As the map is not finished, Indonesia can only 
provide the information to parties on a case-by-case basis at the government-to-
government level (Chua and Tseng, 2013; The Straits Times, 2014c; Tan, 2015a). 
Suffering from haze pollution for decades, Singapore actively supports any means to 
enable HMS. Indonesia points to the Act on Public Information Disclosure, which 
specifies that data that could disclose the country’s wealth of natural resources 
cannot be made public (The Straits Times, 2013h; Tan, 2015a). This therefore 
prevents sharing maps or even offering information on hotspot locations as 
ownerships can be traced; however, some Indonesian law experts take the view that 
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such regulations that discourage transparency is questionable (Tay and Lau, 2015a). 
Moreover, as the HMS has not been functioned, several efforts from Singapore and 
non-state actors have been made to get around the problem. 
4.3.2 Governance gaps in peatland conservation efforts 
Although prevention of the fire is much better than stopping it, policy on peatland 
management is not strictly for implementation. While it is recognized that conserving 
peatlands is crucial for preventing land and forest fires, Indonesia has to develop its 
economy, which based primarily on natural resources. This section highlights key 
obstacles in establishing peatland conservation areas. Conserving peat soils is 
prioritized as a key policy for supporting both ASEAN regional peatland management 
projects and the REDD programme. 
Several efforts have been made to conserve the peatlands as a means to reducing 
transboundary haze and the greenhouse gas emission. At the international level, 
President Jokowi discussed with Prime Minister Najib Rasak of Malaysia successful 
preventive measures and techniques and the idea of building a network of canals 
(The Jakarta Post, 2015r). At the national level, a ministerial coordination meeting 
was set by the president’s instructions to work in unison to prevent peat fires; in 
addition, the instructions include the need to review all concession licences especially 
on peat areas (The Jakarta Post, 2015a). Moreover, the president also suggested that 
the environment minister work with environmental experts from at the Gadjah Mada 
University (UGM) in drawing the topographic mapping of peatland, which will help 
identify which lands should be in protected zones or be used productively 
(Mongabay, 2015f; The Jakarta Post, 2015a). The president’s announcement and 
attempts to protect the peat swamps by banning the further expansion into peat 
soils, and to restore millions of hectares of drained peat by re-wetting or blocking the 
drainage canals, are welcomed by green groups, even though these efforts are not 
yet codified in law (Mongabay, 2015g). According to Vice President Jusuf Kalla, 
Indonesia has planned to restore two to three million hectares of peatland; this will 
reduce forest fires, although the end of the problem cannot be guaranteed 
(Mongabay, 2015l). 
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However, the conservation of peatlands faces many critical challenges from 
supporters of economic development. Indonesia is a developing country and its 
economic growth relies heavily on industries based on exporting natural resources – 
such as palm oil, pulp and paper – which are still promising and lucrative (The Nation, 
2015b; The Economist, 2015). In addition, since these industries are labour-intensive, 
they can help reduce the Indonesian unemployment rate (The Nation, 2015b; The 
Jakarta Post, 2015n). For instance, Cargill Tropical Palm Holdings Pte Ltd, possessing 
80,000 hectares of planted land, provides employment for close to 18,000 people and 
works with more than 21,000 farmers in producing crude palm oil (The Borneo Post 
Online, 2015). The haze seems to be a test case for the government in balancing 
economic development, social issues and the environment (The Nation, 2015b). 
Therefore, while the president encourages the protection of peatland, the policy 
does not receive support from the Ministry of Agriculture and/or local government, 
which back economic growth through allocating concessions with less consideration 
of whether those areas include peat or not (Forests News, 2014; Mongabay, 2014b). 
Indonesia has struggled in land use governance, and it was found that approximately 
5.5 million hectares of concession areas overlapped with the moratorium zone 
(Today Online, 2013b). Moreover, despite there being a plan to reform Indonesia’s 
peatland, in order to achieve the food security goal targeting self-sufficiency by 2019 
the agricultural minister still promotes the conversion of burned peat soils into 
agriculture land (Mongabay, 2015n). Further, some dissent against the president’s 
moratorium initiative can be pointed out. For example, the Ministry of Forestry 
resisted President Yodhoyono in setting up a REDD Taskforce (The Financial Times, 
2013a), and companies protested against the moratorium banning expending new 
peat areas (Letchumanan, 2014a). Since the Ministry of Agriculture, which is a key 
player, is not included in the presidential instruction – despite its important 
responsibility in the conservation of peatlands – the absence of integrated and 
coherent plans discourages the success of the project. 
Furthermore, legal loopholes in terms of prevention can be pointed out. Two laws 
distorting the success of preventive measures are the Agriculture Regulation of 2009 
on Guidelines for Peatland Utilization for Oil Palm Cultivation (Tempo.co, 2015) and 
Article 69 of the 209 Environmental Law, or Law 32 (The Jakarta Post, 2015a; The 
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Straits Times, 2015k). While the first regulation offers the possibility of cultivation on 
peatland, the second allows smallholders with two hectares of land or less to conduct 
controlled burning as part of the rotational agricultural system (The Straits Times, 
2006d; The Straits Times, 2015k). These two laws can increasingly cause harm to 
preventive efforts in the dry season. In the overlapped boundaries, in particular, it is 
very difficult to prove whether fires are set by smallholders or companies. As a result, 
there was a movement to repeal the Agriculture Regulation (Tempo.co, 2015), 
though there is no legal instruction yet to end these two laws. 
It is noted that the issues of interest behind the fires are very complicated, so the 
Indonesian president’s attempts alone would not be sufficient to resolve the fires 
(Tay, 2015). Increasing the effectiveness of peatland conservation policy depends on 
how far Indonesian leaders want to go, as well as how much the Indonesian people 
support the policy. 
4.4 Seeking solutions and the role of policy networks 
This section reveals the suggested means to tackle the haze problem, attempts that 
have been initiated and made by actors within the restriction of intergovernmental 
cooperation on haze, and the connection of actors in creating networks for closing 
the existence of governance gaps. 
4.4.1 Suggested means for better results 
While poor land management in Indonesia is a critical source underlying the problem, 
it cannot be addressed precisely at ASEAN meetings. Therefore, policy responses to 
the issue are likely to deal with the symptoms rather than tackling the underlying 
cause (ASB, 2013). 
 Several approaches have been suggested to governments in order to gain better 
results. The first recommendation emphasizes the prevention of land and forest fires 
by imposing a ban on illegal logging and encroachment (The Straits Times, 2002a), 
protecting the remaining peatland and forest areas (Mongabay, 2014a; PM.Haze, 
2014), improving irrigation methods and ceasing further drainage of peat soils 
(Gaveau et al., 2014; The Straits Times, 2002a), expanding water-catchment areas 
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(The Straits Times, 2002a), re-wetting and reforesting drained and unused peatlands 
(PM.Haze, 2014), building canals to engulf fire-prone peat zones (The Jakarta Post, 
2015k) and ensuring zero-burning by plantations (PM.Haze, 2014). These 
recommendations mostly prioritize sustainable management (Letchumanan, 2015) 
and the improvement of spatial planning of fire-prone peatlands (Mongabay, 2015o) 
as critical means to prevent the recurrence of forest fires. 
The second suggestion aims to improve the monitoring system by identifying the 
importance of authoritative maps, especially in the concession areas. However, to 
get an up-to-date concession map or Indonesia’s One Map Initiative, good 
governance on land management between different levels of governments and 
agencies on matters including tax collection, permit auditing and spatial planning 
needs to be established to end the conflict over overlapping land claims (Mongabay, 
2015d). Local institutions relating to palm oil expansion should also be included in 
government planning and control (ASB, 2013; The Straits Times, 2013c). While an 
authoritative map has not been completely drawn, a company may present its 
concession map in order to be more transparent about its landholding and practice 
to guard against causing fires (Tay and Chua, 2014). An up-to-date map will benefit 
firefighting efforts and law enforcement, prevent fire before it starts and improve 
accountability among stakeholders (Mongabay, 2015d). 
The third piece of advice is incentive orientation. Government policy to deal with the 
haze issue should be focused on stakeholders’ motivations. Government should 
create policy offering opportunities for people living on peat areas to move off for a 
better way of living (Forest News, 2015b). Where forests are protected by 
communities, government should recognize their rights (Mongabay, 2015d). Local 
governments should gain benefits from fiscal policy if they practise low-carbon 
sustainable programmes (Mongabay, 2015d). Since obtaining permits on land 
concessions seems to be easier than increasing yields, and bank loans are provided 
without checking the situation on the ground, companies tend to expand their 
cultivating areas (PM.Haze, 2014). Therefore, tax breaks should be applied to 
companies that encourage sustainable management and focus on improving 
productivity (Mongabay, 2015d). In addition, affected countries and the international 
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community may play a greater role in increasing Indonesia’s incentive to preserve 
forests by supporting capital incentive programmes similar to REDD+ (Ewing, 2013) 
and/or by offering financial incentives for ecosystem restoration projects on 
degraded areas (Mongabay, 2015d). Moreover, increasing the role of Southeast Asian 
customers to boycott products that cause fires may be a potential means to create a 
powerful economic incentive for companies to cease their burning practices (The 
Straits Times, 2015q). Boycotts could be more effective than legal action when 
various sectors (such as the media, NGOs, activists, the government and academic 
institutions) work together to raise people’s awareness, which would cause a huge 
impact on offending business (The Straits Times, 2013i; Gill and Bin, 2013). A 
certification system is another attempt for consumers to check whether producers’ 
products are made under sustainable standard. 
The fourth opinion on how to tackle the haze problem suggests looking at the issue 
as beyond an environmental problem. The haze should be related to the economic 
cost as well as the impact on people’s health (The Straits Times, 2007b). This 
prioritizes people’s interests in finding solutions to fight forest fires (Jakarta Globe, 
2014d; Tsjeng and Fang, 2011; The Straits Times, 2015r). In order to achieve this, 
robust evidence on environment, economic and health impacts should be gathered, 
and then the incontrovertible scientific findings should be explained in an easily 
understandable way for dissemination to the public via the media and/or through 
advocacy groups (The Straits Times, 2015r; The Straits Times, 2013i). The example of 
connecting the haze issue to other problems can be seen in the protest led by activists 
and environmentalists in Riau against the government and their demands that the 
environment and forestry minister and their acting governor be dismissed because 
they had not been able to provide their people with a healthy environment (The 
Jakarta Post, 2015j). 
4.4.2 Looking beyond intergovernmental frameworks 
Although the increasing role of relevant stakeholders, especially private sectors and 
NGOs, were addressed and welcomed in ASEAN documents as parts of a holistic 
approach to fostering regional cooperation on the transboundary haze problem and 
other environmental concerns (ASEAN Secretariat, 1998b; ASEAN Secretariat, 1998a; 
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ASEAN Secretariat, 2007b; ASEAN Secretariat, 2014b), the involvement of these non-
state actors was very limited. For example, in 2009 the MSC agreed to hold an annual 
MSC forum on the prevention and mitigation of land and forest fires – which brought 
together representatives from governmental agencies in different levels, 
international organizations, NGOs and the private sector to share their experience 
and promote collaboration on the haze issue (ASEAN Secretariat, 2009a); however, 
the second forum was held only in 2012, followed by the key outcome recognizing 
the critical role that plantation companies can play in achieving the vision of a haze-
free ASEAN (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012a). 
4.4.2.1 Singapore’s role in combating haze pollution 
Singapore is a critically proactive actor in tackling the annual haze problem. While 
intergovernmental and bilateral cooperation on the haze has relied mostly on 
Indonesia’s approval of Singapore’s offers, Singapore applies various means to 
reduce the severity of transboundary pollution. Despite cooperating directly with 
Indonesia during the haze crisis (Lee, 2013; Balakrishnan, 2013), the Singapore 
government has pursued a multipronged approach to dealing with the complex haze 
issue of engaging stakeholders and interest groups (including NGOs, think tanks and 
the private sector) to tackle the problem together (Govsingapore, 2013; Ibrahim, 
2009). The Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), one of the leading think 
tanks in the Southeast Asian region, has responded to this effort actively by 
organizing several key regional dialogues – which can be considered long-term 
advocacy to maintain the haze problem at the top of the agenda – including relevant 
stakeholders to address the haze problem since 1997 (Lee and Lau, 2015; Tay, 2014). 
As the problem is complicated, Singapore also needs to bring together the private 
sector, NGOs and local communities for more effective results especially on the 
ground (Tay, 2014; Tay and Cheong, 2015; Tay and Fang, 2012). By engaging non-
state actors (such as the private sector, the investment and financial sectors, citizens, 
environmental NGOs, and activists), Singapore can go beyond foreign policy and 
diplomacy, which currently restrict the progress of environmental cooperation (Tay 
and Cheong, 2015). 
- 126 - 
Singapore has played a critical role in establishing several mechanisms to tackle with 
haze pollution. At the international and ASEAN levels, Singapore has visibly applied 
pressure on Indonesia to quickly address the underlying causes of annual fires, as well 
as pushing Indonesia to reveal the concession map for launching the HMS (Today 
Online, 2013a; Chua and Cheong, 2014a; Mongabay, 2015h). At the national level, 
Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution Act was passed as an attempt to punish 
errant companies that contribute to haze pollution. Furthermore, there is a consumer 
movement to boycott businesses proven to be behaving in an unsustainable way by 
clearing lands. 
The role of customers is part of a means to act against companies causing haze 
pollution. A civil society group called the Haze Elimination Action Team has prepared 
itself as an information hub for the boycotting of any companies identified to cause 
haze pollution (The Straits Times, 2013g). However, some consider that a boycott in 
Singapore would send a signal to businesses to be more accountable, rather than 
make a huge impact on them, owing to the small size of the Singapore market (Tay 
and Lau, 2015b) and the demand on palm oil in bigger markets such as India and 
China (The Jakarta Post, 2015t). In addition, as palm oil provides the highest-yielding 
edible oilseed crop, to replace palm oil with other crops would lead to further 
deforestation because it requires at least nine times as much as land to grow them 
(Mongabay, 2015i; The Straits Times, 2015b). It is almost impossible to be in a palm 
oil-free world; therefore, a boycott is not a long-term solution (The Straits Times, 
2015b). Instead of banning palm oil products, the CEO of WWF Singapore, Elaine Tan, 
suggests promoting a sustainable direction to avoid the occurrence of haze 
(Mongabay, 2015i). The Singapore Environment Council (SEC), an independent NGO 
and a member of the Global Ecolabelling Network (GEN), has launched the Singapore 
Green Labelling Scheme (SGLS) to notify customers if products are produced in an 
environmentally friendly way (Singapore Environment Council, 2016). The SEC has 
also attempted to take all members of the Singapore Manufacturing Federation on 
board to apply green practices; it also worked to raise the number of products 
certified by the RSPO or the Singapore Green Labelling scheme (The Straits Times, 
2015n). These are examples of Singaporean civil society groups’ efforts to apply 
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economic pressure to errant businesses where the legal penalty cannot be effectively 
imposed. 
Singapore’s Transboundary Haze Pollution is a recently crucial attempt to deal with 
the haze issue. Ewing notes that this effort obviously presents Singapore’s inclination 
towards further internationalization through its response options (Ewing, 2014). It 
was developed from the principle of state responsibility in international law, which 
ensures that the state’s right to exploit the natural resources of states does not 
damage its neighbour. This Singapore legal innovation aims at battling the haze since 
international law has proved ineffective in further addressing it (Ewing, 2014). 
Letchumanan notes that the Singapore Bill complements the provision of the Haze 
Agreement, which Indonesia has already ratified, since the agreement calls for 
measures that oblige parties to prevent, monitor and respond to the problem 
promptly through sharing information and consultation sought by an affected state 
(Letchumanan, 2015). The Bill, according to Singapore’s environment minister, was 
drafted to be a tool to make Singaporean or Singapore-linked companies involved in 
illegal burning face criminal penalties in Singaporean courts; the legislation is also an 
attempt to deter errant companies (The Financial Times, 2014). However, Alan Boyle 
sees the Bill as unusual because national courts have to work on the transboundary 
pollution issue (The Financial Times, 2014). The Bill is seen as ‘the most ambitious 
domestic effort to date for address Singapore’s haze problem’ as it seeks to increase 
companies’ accountability, deters them by employing financial penalty (Ewing, 2014) 
and creates ‘extra‐territorial liability for entities engaging in setting fires abroad that 
cause transboundary smoke’ in Singapore (Tan, 2015a). Companies can face the 
maximum fine of SGD 100,000 per day if they are found guilty, though this is limited 
to a total fine of SGD 2 million (SIIA, 2015b). The fine may be another channel to 
mobilize the ASEAN Transboundary Haze Pollution Control Fund to assist efforts in 
firefighting in ASEAN countries (Chua and Cheong, 2014a). It is a means to encourage 
business transparency and accountability, even if the activities causing fires are 
outside Singapore (Tay, 2014). 
There are potential mechanisms that Singapore may apply to enforce the Bill. While 
Singapore is indirectly linked to deforestation – it is a major palm oil trading hub and 
- 128 - 
a major financier providing loans for plantation companies (The Straits Times, 2015k) 
– the Singapore government could cooperate with those banks and key retailers to 
impose financial sanctions such as withdrawing loans and banning products. The 
Malaysian natural resources and environment minister, Datuk Seri Dr Wan Junaidi 
Tuanku Jaafar, revealed that the Malaysian New Law, which is similar to Singapore’s 
Bill, was also being drafted as a strategy to act in law against those responsibility for 
causing haze (The Jakarta Post, 2015q). Therefore, when Indonesia claims that 
Singaporean and Malaysian firms are also connected to the haze crisis, there is a legal 
tool to punish them. On the other hand, when Indonesia has not given detailed 
information on suspected companies, Singapore has launched financial sanctions by 
removing products supplied by those firms and ordering retailers to clean up their 
supply chains (Mongabay, 2015k). Singapore’s National Environment Agency (NEA) 
was responsible for gathering evidence by investigating information on hotspots, 
maps, meteorological data and satellite images; suspected companies were then sent 
notices (The Straits Times, 2015m). 
However, some challenges in enforcing the Bill can be pointed out. In order to enforce 
penalties on transgressors, Singapore has to collect concrete evidence to determine 
the origins of fires and the actions behind them (Ewing, 2014). This would be very 
difficult if Singapore acts unilaterally as most fires occur outside its territory. To make 
the law more effective, Singapore has to cooperate closely with the Indonesian 
government and/or collaborate with non-state actors working on the ground in 
Indonesia. On the one hand, Singaporean cooperation with Indonesia to prosecute 
firms is very limited. This is because Indonesia often refuses to share information on 
maps, or the names of companies causing fires (Mongabay, 2015k); in addition, 
Indonesian Vice President Jusuf Kalla insists that the government will not allow its 
citizens and companies to be prosecuted under Singaporean laws (Channel NewsAsia, 
2016; The Straits Times, 2016c). On the other hand, realizing that the prosecution 
cannot be successful without eyes and ears on the ground, the Singaporean 
government can work with the SIIA, which works with environmentalists and land 
rights lawyers in Indonesia and Malaysia who are willing to help by finding robust 
evidence, to form a reliable network of verifiers on the ground (Chua and Cheong, 
2014b). 
- 129 - 
4.4.2.2 The role of non-state actors in dealing with the haze pollution 
While the progress of intergovernmental cooperation on transboundary haze has 
been limited by Indonesia’s indecision and unwillingness – based on the principle of 
sovereignty and non-intervention, not that of responsibility, even though the 
pollution affects its people and those of neighbouring countries – non-state actors 
including civil society organizations, NGOs and regional think tanks seek alternative 
means to overcome such deadlocks by working individually as well as mutually to 
achieve particular outcomes. This section illustrates crucial activities that 
organizations have done to ensure better governance. The first way has been to 
organize dialogues to create networks of key stakeholders in order to seek solutions, 
share opinions and find common directions to combat haze pollution together. The 
second effort has been to draw maps to improve the monitoring system and finding 
evidence to support law enforcement. The third highlights the importance of 
conservation of the remaining peat ecological system, non-deforestation and/or 
reforestation in ending the haze episodes. Activities include conducting research to 
apply empirical evidence and best practices recommended to stakeholders, 
overseeing policy and licences issued by government agencies permitting 
concessions over forest areas, and implementing activities promoting peat and forest 
conservation and rehabilitation. The final approach is activities to support green 
products through the notion of sustainability. 
4.4.2.2.1 Dialogues focusing on the regional haze issue 
Organizing dialogues among stakeholders is an important platform for mobilizing and 
seeking alternative solutions in combating the haze issue. This research looks at three 
key organizations that often arrange a forum focusing on regional haze concerns. 
They are the SIIA, the Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) and the 
RSPO. Without emphasizing the principle of sovereignty and non-intervention in 
domestic affairs, the non-state actors’ discussion can address directly, for example, 
poor land management, the slow progress of Indonesia’s authoritative maps, and the 
lack of law enforcement in Indonesia. Additionally, the forum may help initiate 
and/or sustain networks of organizations whose works relate to tackling forest fires 
and haze at different levels and/or across levels. Organizers and participants can have 
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two-way communication that facilitates the exchanging of data, facts, evidence, best 
practices and/or new scientific findings. Forums serve as a stage for different interest 
groups to share their various perspectives; this can help actors to find practical 
solutions, adjust their strategies and/or work collectively for any specific 
compromised goals in a more powerful direction. 
The first important organization is the SIIA. The SIIA has played a crucial and active 
role in seeking solutions to deal with the haze problem since 1998, when the first 
regional dialogue about the transboundary haze was held. At this event, participants 
also included Malaysian and Indonesian experts, as well as NGOs (Tay, 2014). In 2002, 
the dialogue programme also included public lectures delivered by intellectuals from 
Indonesia’s think tanks and the coordinator of Project FireFight Southeast Asia (The 
Straits Times, 2002b). The 2006 dialogue gathered at the period of the haze crisis. 
The cost of the loss to Indonesia’s economy was estimated by the members of the 
forum at more than USD 9 billion (The Straits Times, 2006e). The forum went further 
by saying that the Indonesian government should not be the only one to take 
responsibility for the smoke haze; collective action among NGOs, think tanks and 
companies was necessary (The Straits Times, 2006a). 
In 2014, the first Singapore Dialogue on Sustainable World Resources (SDSWR) was 
launched, with a main focus on the annual haze and the role of the palm oil industries. 
This time, representatives from multinational firms were also invited, as the chairman 
of the SIIA, Simon Tay, pointed out the role of producers, traders, banks and 
consumers in the globally connected world to prevent fires and the haze (The Straits 
Times, 2014a). By looking beyond the blame game and the poor enforcement to 
punish wrongdoers, the forum shifted to a focus on an approach to incentivizing 
stakeholders to take the right path (Today Online, 2013a). At the SDSWR dialogue, 
Indonesia’s deputy minister for environment degradation control and climate 
change, Arief Yuwono, proposed that, while Indonesia’s economic development 
relied on natural resources, and while investment in plantation-based industries was 
good for employment in Indonesia, the sustainability of the environment was central 
for encouraging social welfare. He also said that land expansion for palm oil 
plantation and the use of the slash-and-burn method would cause negative effects 
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on the environment (The Nation, 2015b). Singapore’s minister of environment and 
water resources, Dr Vivian Balakrishnan, presented at the dialogue that the use of 
technology (such as good branding and marketing, supporting sustainably sourced 
products, and offering better opportunities for businesses that demonstrate good 
records on sustainable governance) in the environment and sustainability sector 
would be a powerful game changer for better monitoring, as well as reducing cost in 
the long term (The Borneo Post Online, 2015). Importantly, the delay in delivering the 
Indonesian authoritative map was also addressed in the forum. The World Resources 
Institute’s (WRI) Indonesia country director, Nirarta ‘Koni’ Samadhi, recommended a 
forward step for the Indonesian government to take on the ground and that 
coordination among different governmental agencies for drawing maps should be 
improved, which would help end the question of land claims. The government could 
start from Riau, where the forest fires and land conflicts obviously persisted. Further, 
he proposed that companies release their concession map for better accountability 
(The Nation, 2015a; Cheong, 2015). There was a closed-door workshop among 
experts considering issues including the accuracy of concession maps available on 
public domains, the advantage of community maps and the legality of publishing 
unofficial maps (Cheong, 2015). 
The second SDSWR was held in 2015. Arief Yuwono also attended in the dialogue and 
shared Indonesia’s news on the extending the moratorium (Lee and Lau, 2015). Best 
practices in green production, procurement and financing in ASEAN’s resource 
sectors were the highlight of the forum (Cheong, 2015). The dialogue was followed 
by the round table, which was a smaller scale to specifically focus on the role and 
effectiveness of innovations and technologies. Both SDSWR and its following round 
table were aimed particularly at ‘fostering cooperation NGOs and civil society across 
borders’ who ‘deserve credit, particularly in cases where the authorities or 
companies may be slow or unwilling to act’ (Lee and Lau, 2015). 
Further, the SIIA also organizes seminars for public knowledge relevant to the haze. 
The SIIA seminar on the topic of ‘Fighting The Haze – Insights From Indonesia’s Worst-
Hit Provinces’ invited Indonesian representatives of the areas that suffered the most 
from the fires to share their experiences and problems (SIIA, 2015c). Simon Tay 
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affirmed that their perspectives and recommendations were included in the 
policymaking process (Cheong, 2015). This is an example to illustrate that the SIIA has 
engaged with the Singaporean government as well as working in parallel with civil 
society organizations at and across different levels to tackle the transnational haze 
problem. 
Furthermore, the SIIA has launched the Haze Tracker, a web portal that is open access 
for the public on the latest development of the regional haze issue. Information, 
news, articles, analysis and/or reports on dialogues, for instance, from Singapore, 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand can be found on the website (Cheong, 2015; Today 
Online, 2015). This user-friendly tool not only helps facilitating people who are 
interested but is also a platform for circulating associated information to all 
stakeholders. 
The Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) is another key actor with 
particular concerns in conserving forests and peatland as a means to solve forest fires 
and smoke haze. In January 2014, the CIFOR co-organized a workshop that included 
more than 50 participants, including government officials, leaders of communities, 
civil society organizations and the private sector to address the problem of land use 
and fire in Indonesia (Forests News, 2014); this was followed by the Forest Asia 
Summit in May under the theme of ‘Sustainable Landscapes for Green Growth in 
Southeast Asia’, which was attended by more than 2,200 representatives from 
government, intergovernmental organizations, civil society and the private sector 
(CIFOR, 2014). In addition, in a high-level policy dialogue held by the Ministry of 
Environment and Forestry and the CIFOR, David Gaveau, a landscape scientist from 
the CIFOR, suggested that the government allocate a large part of the national budget 
– which might come from rehabilitation funds or the commodity export tax – to 
restore peat lands to hydrological equilibrium, since research finds that the 70 per 
cent of fires in 2014 and 2015 were from draining peat for cultivation (The Jakarta 
Post, 2015t). 
The third key organization in governing the haze issue by controlling oil palm 
producers to practise in a sustainable way is the RSPO. Members of the RSPO are 
NGOs and financial and private-sector institutions and are voluntarily involved. 
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Members of the RSPO are governed by the principles and criteria (P&C), or the 
guidelines on how to produce sustainably, which are reviewed once every five years 
(Eco-Business, 2014). 
4.4.2.2.2 Efforts to draw maps 
The referable, authoritative Indonesia map under the One Map Initiative is currently 
developing. If the project is completed, great benefits can be expected. It will feed 
the existing monitoring tools with data identifying where the fires occur and who 
should take responsibility for them. When the monitoring systems are fed with 
accurate land owners, it will help governmental agencies as well as companies to 
apply measures to control the fire before it starts or becomes uncontrollable. In 
addition, information on the matching hotspots and the maps can be used by 
authorities as evidence in court against any offender under Indonesian or 
Singaporean laws. This will help to enforcing the laws (Tan, 2015a; The Nation, 
2015a). In addition, while small-scale landholders and plantation companies always 
point their fingers at each other as being the source of fires, the map will help to end 
the blame game as evidence can be shown of who actually lit the fire or whether the 
fire was set intentionally. However, achieving a complete version of authoritative 
Indonesian concession maps is a long and arduous process because Indonesia needs 
to resolve conflicts over land disputes (SIIA, 2015a), which could be done by dealing 
with ‘inter-ministerial competition, divergent local claims and corruption in the land-
allocation space’ (Ewing, 2014). 
In the absence of the authoritative map to feed into the satellite and monitoring 
systems, non-state actors have attempted to draw concession maps to operationalize 
the existing monitoring systems as a method to combat the issue. On the one hand, 
as some companies realize the benefits of reducing the reputational and operational 
risks derived from undisclosed information, they decide to be more transparent and 
accountable (Chua and Tseng, 2013; Tay and Lau, 2015b; Letchumanan, 2015). 
Revealing all their concession areas and geographical coordinates and then making 
such information available for the public to access have been requested by NGOs and 
think tanks (Neo, 2013). While Greenpeace’s demands for the Indonesian 
government to publish detailed digital maps in the public domain have not been met 
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(Greenpeace, 2015), campaigns launched by Greenpeace and Forest Hero pressuring 
big companies and traders such as Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) and Wilmar to release 
maps of their suppliers’ concessions (The Straits Times, 2015k) can be an example of 
success in this movement. Many member companies have submitted their 
concession maps to the RSPO secretariat, even though ‘there have been reports that 
the Indonesian authorities have instructed companies and the RSPO not to publish 
the maps and to restrict the maps already in circulation’ (Tay and Lau, 2015a). By 
setting a certain transparency standard to its members, the RSPO can therefore 
provide a chunk of concession maps to other organizations via the Global Forest 
Watch website (RSPO, 2015), even though missing data exists and some companies 
cannot fulfil their obligations (Mongabay, 2015o). Under the Global Forest Watch 
(GFW) programme developed by the WRI, the GFW-Fires platform was launched in 
2014 to monitor forest loss, hotspots, active fires and air quality in the ASEAN 
countries. The concession maps hosted on the GFW are based on data derived from 
the Indonesian Ministry of Forestry in 2010 and the RSPO (Global Forest Watch, no 
date). However, these maps are not definitive, firstly because the concession maps 
from Indonesian Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and the Ministry of Agriculture are not 
included (Mongabay, 2015o) and, secondly, the concession maps derived from the 
Ministry of Forestry are not up to date. WRI filled these information gaps by using 
satellite imagery and ground checks on mapped plantations (Mongabay, 2015o). 
Although the process is not complete, the existing data is useful for the WRI to 
categorize the types of fires, which helps to identify what sort of actors tend to light 
fires (Mongabay, 2015o). 
The SIIA also has an attempt to develop an accurate map to feed them into the 
satellite monitoring tool, called the SIIA’s Haze Tracker. The absence of the 
authoritative concession maps causes difficulties for the organization in establishing 
accountability for the fires (Channel NewsAsia, 2015b). In 2015, the assistant director 
of sustainability at the SIIA, Cheong Poh Kwan, went to Jakarta and Bogor in Indonesia 
and pointed out that the challenges in mapping are not so much technical, as civil 
society in Indonesia had already mapped around five million hectares of land, which 
were usually disputed. The greater challenge was how to ‘get the government to 
recognise these maps, and also reconcile the differences between these community 
- 135 - 
maps and the ones that the government has in their possession’ (Channel NewsAsia, 
2015b). The SIIA Haze Tracker portal, the site aiming to close the information gap, 
provides a platform to link users to other international organizations tools and maps 
derived from the National University of Singapore’s Centre for Remote Imaging, 
Sensing and Processing, provided by companies and/or developed by mapping 
experts, whose works have already been made with the collaboration of local 
communities (Yang, 2015; The Straits Times, 2015c; Mongabay, 2015k). There is a link 
from the SIIA to the Eyes on the Forest (EoF)’s website. The EoF is an NGO coalition 
involving the WWF-Indonesia, Jikalahari (Forest Rescue Network-Riau), WALHI 
(Friends of the Earth-Indonesia) and KKI WARSI (Indonesian Conservation 
Community) that aims to publish information on the issue relevant to forests in Riau. 
Beside the provision of interactive concession maps (based on the Ministry of 
Forestry), the group has also established on its website a database of information on 
forest cover, carbon stock, biodiversity and fire alerts (Eyes on the Forest, 2011). 
4.4.2.2.3 Strengthening law enforcement 
The role of non-state actors in facilitating law enforcement through gathering 
evidence can be seen in two broader ways. The first is through analysing scientific 
data obtained from their satellite tools; the other is their activities in collecting robust 
evidence on the ground. Evidence is used in court not only for proving that offenders 
intentionally set the fire for land clearing but also for getting compensation from the 
wrongdoer. 
NGOs have utilized the best available data by superimposing hotspot maps on their 
available concession maps to find out whether the fires occurred within or outside 
companies’ responsible areas. The WRI, Greenpeace, the EoF and WALHI-Riau have 
made this kind of evidence and then circulated it via media to point out that most of 
the many fire hotspots occur on lands allocated to big agribusiness companies such 
as the Singapore-based Asia Pacific Resources International Ltd (APRIL) and Wilmar, 
the Indonesia-based Asia Pulp and Paper (APP) and Malaysia’s Sime Darby (Neo, 
2013; The Financial Times, 2013b; Gill and Bin, 2013; Mongabay, 2014b; Chua and 
Cheong, 2014b; The Jakarta Post, 2015b; The Jakarta Post, 2015i; Mongabay, 2015j; 
Velde, 2014; The Straits Times, 2015d; Mongabay, 2015e). However, the outdated 
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concession maps hinder the prosecution of the transgressor, allowing them to refute 
the allegation. Moreover, some have observed that the law seems to be more 
effective in dealing with small-scale landowners rather than larger land concessions 
and few companies were prosecuted, owing to the absence of evidence (The Straits 
Times, 2009; PM.Haze, 2014). In contrast, it is more reasonable to say that small 
farmers, local companies or big firms that intentionally set fires on the overlapping 
claim areas take advantage of the doubt (Mongabay, 2015o). Therefore, high-
resolution images from above may not be sufficient for law enforcement. Chua and 
Cheong (2014b) noted that, while the SIIA was informed by the WRI’s satellite images 
confirming that hotspots were detected in the pulpwood supplier’s concession areas, 
they found only palm oil cover on those locations. Therefore, robust evidence 
conferred by ‘a reliable network of verifiers on the ground’ was necessary for the law 
to be applied (Chua and Cheong, 2014b). 
There are local NGOs collecting fieldwork evidences. The EoF and Greenpeace 
Indonesia are key watchdog groups that monitor on-the-ground violations as well as 
keeping an eye on legal prosecution. Aditya Bayunanda from WWF-Indonesia 
revealed that the WWF and other NGOs in the EoF commit to support the 
government moratorium by monitoring its implementation in the field (Mongabay, 
2015g). Additionally, Indonesian NGOs formed the EoF to make use of their proximity 
on the ground in order to follow up the work of the authorities (Lee and Lau, 2015). 
The groups have worked by going to parts of the concession areas to observe and 
then report to the media if a company encroaches on the protected forests and drains 
the peat; it observes whether a company encroaches on the conserved peat area, 
uses fires to clear land and/or uses fires to clear the land. The dispute between 
Kusnan and the EoF in Riau was an example of the NGO’s work (Jakarta Globe, 2014d). 
Further, the WALHI has gone further by working with other local NGOs and seeking 
public support to sue the government (Mongabay, 2015o) and companies (The 
Jakarta Post, 2015d). 
4.5 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the environmental governance in the haze case. In the first 
part, the impacts and causes of the problem illustrate why international cooperation 
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is necessary to resolve the issue. Despite peatlands being naturally sensitive, fires are 
lit on peat mainly for land clearing. Recognizing the unmeasurable costs, ASEAN has 
addressed the issue and created a regime. A set of regulatory mechanisms – including 
institutional meetings (HTTF, AMMH, MSC, TWG and COP), regional monitoring 
mechanisms (HMS, FDRS), zero-burning and controlled burning policies, the ASEAN 
Haze Agreement, and peatland management strategies, for example – was initiated 
under cooperative ASEAN efforts to deal with the issue. In addition, Indonesia also 
cooperates with Norway under the REDD programme. However, key challenges for 
the effectiveness of the regime are fundamentally based on the absence of an 
authoritative Indonesia map and the need to use the peatlands for economic 
development purposes. Although Indonesia’s Plantation Law prohibits the use of the 
slash-and-burn method, poor land management and overlapping lands claimed by 
stakeholders have resulted in the failure of deterrence and law enforcement to 
prosecute culprits. To respond to the ineffectiveness of regional and national 
mechanisms, policy networks were formed to improve the poor function of the 
regime. 
As the most affected neighbour, Singapore has taken a proactive role in applying 
various means and has worked with non-state actors. To deter the business from 
setting fires on peats, the Singapore Transboundary Haze Act was enacted. Along 
with the Act, consumer boycotts of businesses proven to be applying unsustainable 
methods in draining peatland or clearing lands were introduced. Moreover, there 
have also been attempts to control palm oil producers through a certificate system. 
To make these mechanisms function, collaborations in the form of networks reveal 
the sharing of information among network actors through organized dialogues and 
other activities. While there is still an absence of an authoritative map, concession 
maps were published and shared on the websites of the RSPO, Haze Tracker and the 
EoF. To identify transgressors, high-resolution satellite pictures have to be matched 
with on-the-ground evidence, which is gathered by local and national NGOs. These 
actors are not working alone; they collectively work in the form of networks to 
support better policy monitoring and enforcement complementing inter-state 
cooperation in governing the haze issue.  
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 Policy networks in governing  
the illegal wildlife trade and smuggling issue 
The illegal trade and smuggling of wildlife are two of the most important international 
crimes threatening biodiversity in Southeast Asia and the world. The issue does not 
directly affect people and states in the sense that it results in a concrete impact on 
the state’s economy and/or people’s health, like was the case with transboundary 
haze. However, the issue has an international and transnational dimension in two 
aspects. Firstly, the issue is one of transnational environmental crime since the trade 
of wildlife and its derivatives is an activity contravening international law (the 
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora: 
CITES); and, secondly, goods that are sourced illegally are then smuggled across 
borders (Elliott, 2007: 1). The first aspect brings about the second, and international 
cooperation is necessary to deal with that illegal activity more effectively. To identify 
the of role of policy networks in governing the transnational illegal wildlife trade, this 
chapter attempts to explore the opportunity for non-state actors, especially NGOs, 
in engaging states and intergovernmental organizations at the international, regional, 
and national levels in policy processes. 
Four sections on how NGOs and networks can improve the effectiveness of regime 
and governance are structured as follows. The first section explores the background 
of the issue to answer why this kind of transnational environmental issue is crucial 
for Southeast Asia; in addition, it examines how the effectiveness of regional 
cooperation is important to other states in the broader context of the global illegal 
wildlife trade in relation to security issues. Difficulties in controlling the illegal wildlife 
trade in the region are also dealt with in this section. The second section reveals the 
main aspects of international cooperation in the Southeast Asian region, which is part 
of global cooperation on CITES, and the development of regional mechanisms to 
support the convention within the ASEAN framework, such as the establishment of 
the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement Network (ASEAN-WEN); the role of NGOs can be 
most obviously noticed here, in the formation and development of this 
intergovernmental network. The United States Agency for International 
Development’s (USAID) contribution to funding the establishment of ASEAN-WEN 
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through Freeland, an NGO, seems to be significant to the sustainability of the 
network. This has been particularly noticeable since the support programme was 
terminated. Therefore, the role of NGOs in ASEAN-WEN can be comparatively 
investigated in two periods. The first is their roles in the establishment of the ASEAN-
WEN network. The other is when the support project ended. NGOs have less 
resources owing to the limits of funding; however, they are still important in 
supporting activities for achieving the purposes of ASEAN-WEN. The third section 
identifies the governance gaps at the international and national levels, where 
difficulties in coordination and the capacity of state authority occur at both levels. In 
addition, translating and adopting international obligations into national law is not 
an easy procedure and seems to be states’ greatest challenge, partly owing to certain 
traditional factors and beliefs. In consequence, better enforcement cannot happen 
instantly and it needs time for adjustment. The last section considers those 
governance gaps to examine how individual NGOs, on the one hand, can work with 
the government to develop and carry out national policy on endangered wildlife 
conservation and protection and, on the other hand, these NGOs internationally and 
transnationally form networks among each other to support both CITES and ASEAN 
to achieve their mutual goal of protecting endangered species. 
It should be noted that, although combating the transnational illegal wildlife trade 
seems to be focused on the cooperative enforcement of international law, the large 
number of species protected by the law are, conversely, diversifying efforts owing to 
different operations conserving specific species prioritized by different states and 
NGOs. Therefore, the roles of NGOs in filling governance gaps at the international 
levels are firstly focused on coordination and capacity building activities, whereas the 
regional mutual goal of ASEAN countries can be identified as achieving better 
monitoring and implementation of CITES. This mutual goal can be seen from the 
increasing numbers of seizures of illegal transportation at transit ports and routes. 
On the other hand, at the national level, the roles of the NGOs are observed from the 
engagement of NGOs in the law and policy development process to deter 
lawbreakers from illegal wildlife trade activities. However, since the aim of CITES is to 
protect wild fauna and flora from over exploitation and to ensure that international 
trade on wildlife will not lead to the extinction of  certain species, conservation should 
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be considered another international goal. Thus, the second emphasis of international 
cooperation involves conservation activities to balance the trade on wildlife. The role 
of NGOs and their networks in protecting endangered wildlife species can be also 
observed through their mutual conservation activities. Since global demand is 
threatening endangered species that live in different geographical areas, NGOs in 
each country may have different focuses in monitoring and conserving particular 
endangered species, depending on each organization’s mandate and the endangered 
wildlife situation in that country. 
5.1 Background to the problem 
Southeast Asia is ‘home to some of the world’s greatest biological diversity’ (ASEAN-
WEN, 2015b). This high level of biodiversity makes the region attractive as a source 
of desirable specimens for trade in the global market. However, the region also has 
the undesirable status of being a hub of illegal activities (Rosen and Smith, 2010: 29), 
a hotspot for wildlife crime (Schaedla, 2007: 42) and a centre for shipping illegal 
goods (Maneesai, 2007: 37) because of several key factors. The first and most 
important factor is the increasing consumer demand for illegal wildlife commodities, 
which are used for several purposes, such as symbols of success and social status or 
decoration (e.g. ivory), food, clothing items, pets, traditional medicine, and even 
good luck charms; they also provide a source of livelihood and a means of biopiracy 
(DSWF, 2012: 77; The Guardian, 2013a; WWF-Thailand, 2016; Rosen and Smith, 2010; 
ASEAN-WEN, 2015b; Shepherd et al., 2007: 3–4; Thanh Nien News, 2015c; Van Asch, 
2013; Thanh Nien News, 2015b; Wilson-Wilde, 2010: 211; WWF, 2002: 2). The 
countries in the region are not only key exporters of illegal wildlife but also major 
importers as well (WantChinaTimes, 2015). The increasing demand for wildlife 
products in China (Shepherd et al., 2007: 5; Cyranoski, 2015; Gabriel et al., 2012), 
Vietnam (Van Asch, 2013: 77; Thanh Nien News, 2015d) and other destinations is a 
driving force for poaching and illegal wildlife trade and smuggling. Some notice that 
the increasing consumption of illegal wildlife products is related to the growing 
middle class and its burgeoning affluence, and the rising purchasing power of the 
Asian population (UNODC, 2013: vii–viii; Van Asch, 2013; Shepherd et al., 2007; IFAW, 
2006). 
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The second factor is the insufficient resources allocated to dealing with the illegal 
trade issue (Schaedla, 2007: 42). For instance, limited financial resources and 
equipment constrain the authorities’ capacity in patrolling operations (Channel 
NewsAsia, 2015c). Moreover, some countries have large territories that are difficult 
to patrol adequately (Wilson-Wilde, 2010: 222). This allows the illegal trade to go on 
unimpeded. Considered from the supplier side, the illegal wildlife trade is a lucrative 
business because it potentially generates high income at relatively low risk of 
detection (Gabriel et al., 2012) with a ‘minimal disincentive in terms of the 
punishment associated with wildlife crime’ (Shepherd et al., 2007: 5). 
The third factor facilitating the boom in the illegal wildlife trade in the region is well-
established transportation routes and limited state capacity to detect the illegal 
activity. Shipments across borders, whether by air, land or sea, enjoy a well-
connected transport infrastructure as part of the regional economic development 
policy, especially the road infrastructure in the East–West corridor linking nodal 
points across countries in mainland Southeast Asia (Shepherd et al., 2007: 2). In 
addition, considering the location of the region between Africa (a huge source of 
wildlife goods) and China (a big wildlife consumption market), Southeast Asian 
countries can potentially be major trans-shipment routes. Illegal traffickers have 
more options for transporting wildlife products. Along with the authorities’ limited 
capacity to control the trade and smuggling of illegal wildlife, these transportation 
infrastructure and open borders not only makes remote areas more easily accessible 
for poachers and traders (Van Asch, 2013: 80) but also provide illegal business with 
‘wildlife trade superhighways’ (Shepherd et al., 2007: 1), especially when considering 
the poor level of law enforcement on major road connections (Shepherd et al., 2007: 
5). 
The fourth factor is poor public awareness of the importance of the illegal wildlife 
trade problem. While there has been a dramatic decline of many wildlife species, 
most people have a very limited awareness of it (Van Asch, 2013: 78). Moreover, in 
some cases, wild animals seem to be a threat to people and their communities, 
especially in the rural areas of some developing countries. Humans encroach on 
forests for land use, which destroys wildlife habitat; for instance, the expansion of 
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palm oil plantations in Indonesia has destroyed forests, which caused human–animal 
conflict when elephants entered local villages, trampled villagers and caused financial 
loss (The Jakarta Post, 2015e). Furthermore, animals have been targeted to satisfy 
cultural beliefs for their medicinal benefits, even though these benefits have been 
scientifically refuted (Van Asch, 2013: 77). For example, some Vietnamese believe in 
the use of ground rhino horn to treat and prevent cancer (Wilson-Wilde, 2010: 221; 
Van Asch, 2013: 77), and some people in both China and Vietnam consume pangolins’ 
blood as a tonic (Thanh Nien News, 2015c; Shepherd et al., 2007: 4). 
Combating illegal wildlife trade and smuggling is important not only for preventing 
the loss of biodiversity and the extinction of species, which are irreversible, in 
Southeast Asia and the world. The illegal trans-shipment of wildlife can also led to 
transboundary security problems such as pathogen transmission from wild animals 
to humans and/or domestic animals (Rosen and Smith, 2010: 30). The movement of 
the monkeypox virus from Africa to the USA, the SARS virus from bats, and severe 
pneumonia in humans from a zoonotic respiratory infection called psittacosis are 
good examples of this kind of threat originating from the smuggling of illegal wildlife, 
causing harm to people and states (Wyler and Sheikh, 2008; Rosen and Smith, 2010; 
The Straits Times, 2015p). Additionally, the illegal wildlife crime issue can also be 
linked to national security problems. High profits from the illegal trade can be sources 
of funds for terrorist activities, rebel movements and other armed groups in Africa 
(The Straits Times, 2015p; Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). These factors make the issue 
important not only to the region but also to other external actors who consider their 
interests to be potentially affected if the issue is not managed effectively. One of the 
key external states contributing to combating illegal wildlife activities in the region is 
the United States. 
Some difficulties in dealing with the transnational illegal wildlife trade should be 
pointed out. Firstly, while the illegal wildlife trade is valued at around US$5 billion to 
US$20 billion a year, the actual scale and scope are extremely difficult to identify 
(Rosen and Smith, 2010; Shepherd et al., 2007: 4). This is not only owing to the 
number of species involved in this business that are openly sold in the market, but 
also the illicit trade that has been growing online (UNODC, 2013). Further, the data 
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sources are highly diverse, while the available data such as market surveys and 
seizure data is very limited (Van Asch, 2013: 84). More importantly, professional 
criminals control much of the illegal trade (Ives, 2015). Secondly, illegal wildlife 
businesses apply numerous different tactics to avoid detection while trafficking their 
trade. These include importing ‘legally’ by falsifying certificates, obtaining genuine 
documents corruptly, intentionally mislabelling goods, making false declarations and 
concealing illegal goods among other legal products (Van Asch, 2013; Rosen and 
Smith, 2010: 27; Ives, 2015). To deal with these difficulties in detection, relevant 
authorities require specific skills and capacity. However, the limit on resources in 
developing countries is generally the main obstacle for tackling this problem. Thirdly, 
it is not easy to stop poachers when the demand for wildlife increases. This seems to 
be a dilemma. When some rare wildlife species decrease, the price in the increases. 
This creates more incentive to poach. Otherwise, poachers would find other wild 
species to substitute for those animals (The Jakarta Post, 2015s). 
5.2 International cooperation to combat illegal wildlife trade and 
trafficking 
The increasing illegal wildlife trade across borders has been an important challenge 
for Southeast Asian countries. To stop the transnational illegal wildlife trade, 
international cooperation among countries is necessary. 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and 
Flora (CITES) is an important international agreement, aiming to ensure that 
‘international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their 
survival’ (CITES Secretariat, 2015). In order to protect certain species of wildlife 
against over-exploitation through international trade, ‘species are classed as 
Appendix I (trade permitted only under exceptional circumstances), Appendix II (non-
detriment finding and export permit are required for trade), Appendix III (one 
member country has asked other CITES Parties for assistance in controlling trade), or 
non-CITES’ (Rosen and Smith, 2010: 25). Parties to the agreement have an obligation 
to monitor, control and take action on the trade of wildlife listed in Appendices I, II 
and III (CITES Secretariat, 1983). TRAFFIC, an NGO, works closely with the CITES 
Secretariat to assist in investigating illegal wildlife trade, conducting research about 
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the true scale of illegal trade and providing available data (Rosen and Smith, 2010: 
25). Another key role of TRAFFIC is to gather information on the illegal trade in each 
country and submit it independently to the CITES Secretariat alongside reports 
presented by countries (Participant D, 2015). 
All members of ASEAN are parties to CITES. In order to fulfil the objective of the 
convention, the ASEAN Experts Group on CITES (AEG-CITES) adopted an ASEAN 
Regional Action Plan on Trade in Wild Fauna and Flora (2005–2010). The Regional 
Action Plan received full support from the ASEAN senior officials on forestry and the 
ASEAN ministers of agriculture and forestry (AMAF). Objective 2 of the plan, which is 
to ‘promote networking among relevant law enforcement authorities in ASEAN 
countries to curb illegal trade in wild fauna and flora’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005b), 
designates the activities of network development for wildlife law enforcement. As a 
result, ASEAN-WEN was launched by the ASEAN ministers responsible for the 
implementation of CITES (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005c). ASEAN-WEN is a regional 
intergovernmental law enforcement network that involves police, customs and 
environment agencies of all 10 ASEAN member countries (ASEAN-WEN, 2015b). 
Membership of the network is also open to officials from CITES, prosecutors, 
specialized governmental wildlife law enforcement organizations and other relevant 
national law enforcement agencies (ASEAN Secretariat, 2005c). Partners of ASEAN-
WEN include the United States, the CITES Secretariat, Interpol, the UN and NGOs, 
which include Freeland, TRAFFIC and Wildlife Alliance (ASEAN-WEN, 2015a). An inter-
agency task force, comprised of police, customs and environmental officers, is the 
backbone of a regional network operating on national and regional levels to combat 
transnational wildlife crime (ASEAN-WEN, 2015a). It is noted that ASEAN-WEN is a 
platform for bringing governmental agencies responsible for dealing with wildlife 
crime into a more structured collaboration, which would be the building block for 
bilateral and regional cooperation (Shepherd et al., 2007: 3). 
ASEAN-WEN was established to support CITES; however, the network functions 
independently from the CITES body. The network is formed without a legally binding 
agreement, and thus is operated voluntarily by its members. The objectives of the 
network are to enhance the efficiency of intelligence exchange and enforcement 
- 145 - 
action and to increase deterrents, while better cooperation, coordination and 
communication are also crucial intentions underlying those objectives (Maneesai, 
2007: 38). Participant E (2015), who has work experience from when ASEAN-WEN 
was being formed, explains that ASEAN-WEN was initiated by discussion among 
ASEAN countries on the problem of coordination across border crossings. Each 
country individually implemented CITES; however, attempts at protecting specific 
species became unsuccessful at those crossings owing to insufficient cooperation 
among governmental agencies. As a result, the goal of ASEAN-WEN was set broadly 
as being better implementation of CITES by improving international communication 
among ASEAN member countries. The network has applied the existing mechanisms 
of CITES as ASEAN-WEN’s mechanism. Each country has to establish a national task 
force and a national focus point. National task forces serve as an internal network 
that includes, for example, the police, customs and relevant environmental agencies. 
National focus points, which are in the main the national CITES management 
authorities, function as national coordination centres to accommodate 
communication at the regional level. The ASEAN-WEN working group meets annually 
to discuss policy directions, regional planning and other key issues (Participant E, 
2015). The creation of a wildlife enforcement network should facilitate effective 
enforcement action through better coordination among different countries and 
agencies through information sharing, capacity building and the sharing of resources 
(TRAFFIC, 2016a). 
ASEAN-WEN was supported by the US under the ASEAN-WEN support programme to 
provide capacity building for task forces and to develop collaboration in the law 
enforcement community (Wyler and Sheikh, 2008: 30). Although the primary state–
NGO partnership in the support programme is between USAID and an NGO called 
Wildlife Alliance, the actual activities are implemented by WildAid Foundation 
Thailand (which later change its name to the Freeland Foundation) and TRAFFIC 
Southeast Asia. The support programme is a five-year cooperative attempt between 
NGOs and donors agencies designed to assure the successful implementation of the 
network; however, it is not considered part of ASEAN-WEN (Schaedla, 2007: 44). Key 
areas of the support programme include facilitating ASEAN-WEN meetings, 
improving task force capacity, creating a legal climate conducive to successful 
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prosecution and sentencing, raising public awareness and transferring activities to 
the ASEAN-WEN Program Coordinating Unit (Schaedla, 2007: 44). According to 
(Participant E, 2015), the support programme is very significant for establishing key 
elements of the network. Without support from the programme, ASEAN-WEN would 
not be as well developed owing to insufficient resources for governmental agencies 
to gather in meetings for discussion on the protocols, rules and procedures applied 
to members (Participant E, 2015). The creation of an ASEAN-WEN programme 
coordination unit (PCU) was endorsed at the first ASEAN-WEN official meeting. The 
PCU serves as an official coordinating body to ensure the continuity of the network’s 
activities after the support programme phases out. 
Freeland and TRAFFIC are partners of ASEAN-WEN. According to Participant D (2015), 
both organizations support ASEAN-WEN agencies in enhancing capacity building 
through workshops, sharing information, and coordinating with agencies if there are 
any law enforcement issues. Freeland works closely with police on trafficking and 
public relations, while TRAFFIC works closely with customs authorities to provide 
technical assistance in identifying wildlife species (Participant D, 2015). Having a 
leading role in the USAID-supported coalition, called Asia’s Regional Response to 
Endangered Species Trafficking (ARREST), Freeland has provided direct support to 
ASEAN-WEN (Gonzales, 2015). At annual meetings of ASEAN-WEN, representatives 
from Freeland, TRAFFIC and TRACE Wildlife Forensic Networks engage in an open 
session to report on the progress of activities that they have implemented in 
supporting ASEAN-WEN on capacity building, communications and fundraising 
(ASEAN-WEN, 2010). TRAFFIC and Freeland are regular participants, and other 
national NGOs in different countries can also take part in the session as well 
(Participant G, 2015). According to Participant E (2015), in this open session NGOs 
play a key role by raising important issues around their concerns, discussing what 
they can do to support the network, what kind of workshops could be set up to 
enhance skills, and who can support those workshops. Although the support 
programme has already terminated and the network now has to find financial 
support to organize workshops by themselves, NGOs still have an important role in 
supporting capacity building activities for the networks (Participant E, 2015). 
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The progress of law enforcement can be noted from some indicators. Firstly, the 
seizures resulting from improved networking under ASEAN-WEN could be considered 
progress in international cooperation. After the establishment of ASEAN-WEN, 
several high-profile wildlife seizures of illegal products such as pangolins, ivory, forest 
turtle and tigers in individual countries within the network were noticed (Maneesai, 
2007: 39; TRAFFIC, 2016a; DSWF, 2012; The Bangkok Post, 2015a; TNA, 2015; AFP, 
2015; RFA, 2015; Thanh Nien News, 2015c; TRAFFIC, 2015c; ASEAN-WEN, 2012). 
Secondly, compared to other developing regions, ASEAN-WEN has had better 
progress than others in terms of the development of regional mechanisms (meeting, 
focal points, task forces), enforcement agencies’ capacity, and the intention to 
achieve a common goal among members, even though the network has not yet 
reached its goal (Participant E, 2015). ASEAN-WEN is currently recognized as a 
precedent-setting model for promoting cross-border collaboration to combat 
transnational organized crime involving the illegal wildlife trade, and it has been 
replicated in South America, China, South Asia (South Asia WEN), Western Asia and 
Africa (e.g. the emerging ‘Horn of Africa WEN’) (Gonzales, 2015; ARREST, 2013b; 
Freeland, 2016c). Moreover, as ASEAN-WEN meetings convene annually, this leads 
to closer cooperation among members as they can meet regularly to discuss 
particularly the enforcement issue (Participant G, 2015). 
5.3 Governance gaps 
Governance gaps in preventing wildlife from over-exploitation in Asia can be 
generally identified in two broad aspects. The first one is the absence of 
environmental policy and law that effectively contributes to balance the economic 
incentives and the conservation of biodiversity. This can result from a lack of focused 
effort and collaboratively international control, backed by political support and 
resource allocation, to implement environmental conservation activities, such as 
training (ARREST, 2013c), which is inadequate to curb wildlife crime (Wilson-Wilde, 
2010: 221). The second aspect of governance gaps present in operational activities, 
especially on coordination between agencies including intra-agencies at the national 
level and inter-agencies at the international and cross-border levels. Schaedla (2007), 
for example, points out the absence of authority and capacity of environmental 
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agencies, which are largely responsible for combating regional wildlife offenders and 
stopping professional criminals and syndicates (Schaedla, 2007: 42). Even though the 
main focus of this thesis is on the regional level, it is necessary to refer to CITES as a 
global regime that ASEAN member countries mutually aim for better implementation 
of at the regional level (ASEAN Secretariat, 2004). Governance gaps demonstrated in 
this section are placed into three categories: governance gaps in CITES at the global 
level, governance gaps in ASEAN-WEN and governance gaps in implementation and 
enforcement by ASEAN countries in general at the national level. It should be noted 
that the governance gaps existing at the national level of ASEAN countries are parts 
of the challenges for effective cooperation at both CITES and ASEAN-WEN on wildlife 
conservation. Therefore, classifying it as a separate category helps to avoid repetition 
in explaining those shared obstacles. 
5.3.1 Governance gaps in CITES 
Several gaps can be identified in the international cooperation on CITES. The first 
governance gap is the difficulty in gathering and sharing information on illegal wildlife 
trade monitored by intergovernmental organizations. According to Chandran et al. 
(2015), CITES has a sanction mechanism handled by resolutions and decisions of the 
Conference of the Parties (COPs), which attempts to ensure that parties align their 
national laws to the regulations of the Convention through annual and biannual 
reports about species status, export–import statistics of CITES listed species, and the 
effectiveness of internal laws. However, the Trade Infraction and Global Enforcement 
Recording System (TIGERS), by CITES, and other systems operated and managed by 
the EU, ICPO–Interpol and the World Customs Organization (WCO), have failed in 
their information sharing on monitoring and enforcement; the submission of data has 
been haphazard and incomplete (Chandran et al., 2015: 448-449). Even though NGOs 
and/or institutions have conducted their own information and then submitted it to 
the CITES Secretariat, this data is from alternative sources whereas ‘the data validity 
is decided by CITES Secretariat, CITES CoPs, and CITES standing committee’ (Chandran 
et al., 2015: 449). While those international bodies receive incomplete information, 
legitimate sanctions cannot be imposed on states that cannot comply with the 
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agreement. Incomplete and invalid data, therefore, weakens CITES’s enforcement 
ability. 
Another governance gap occurring in operations of law enforcement globally is the 
problem of coordination and communication. In order to increase capacity on the law 
enforcement, the International Consortium on Combating Wildlife Crime (ICCWC), 
the collaborative effort of five intergovernmental organizations including the CITES 
Secretariat, Interpol, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the World Bank 
and the WCO, was established in 2010 to ‘bring coordinated support to the national 
wildlife law enforcement agencies and to the subregional and regional networks that, 
on a daily basis, act in defense of natural resources’ (CITES Secretariat, 2016b). The 
ICCWC meeting, which also aims to strengthen the wildlife enforcement networks 
and encouraged member states to ‘facilitate the creation and coordination of the 
“network of the wildlife enforcement networks”’, identified ‘a general lack of inter-
agency cooperation at the national and international levels’ as one of the key gaps 
challenging cooperation among these WENs (ICCWC, 2013). Further, the problem of 
communication (such as language and information sharing) was differentiated from 
difficulties in sharing real-time intelligence (such as the need for secure 
communication channels to share intelligence) (ICCWC, 2013). 
5.3.2 Governance gaps in ASEAN-WEN 
ASEAN-WEN is also a regional attempt to cooperate in stopping the trade in illegal 
wildlife since existing coordination, such as the CITES authorities, may not be enough 
to control it (Maneesai, 2007: 41). Although several environmental outcomes and 
better cooperation among ASEAN countries can be pointed out after the 
establishment of ASEAN-WEN, several challenges can be considered governance gaps 
that need to be improved for better cooperation. 
The first important challenge among others is the lack of funding. This challenge is 
very obvious especially since the support programme has been phased out. Even 
though Freeland is still supporting the network, support has decreased because the 
organization has new obligations to work with other regions. According to Participant 
E (2015), ASEAN-WEN is facing a financial problem because the network is not a legal 
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entity; as such, it is not easy for the network to start fundraising. Donors cannot 
provide funds directly to ASEAN-WEN because it is an unofficial entity (Participant E, 
2015). Consequently, other difficulties such as in capacity building or the 
investigation of cases can occur. Since training can be more effective if ‘training is a 
regularized process that requires the same officers to attend over time’ (Elliott, 2007: 
8), the absence of funding to organize those workshops and/or the absence of the 
same person attending the workshops can together result in training to increase 
officials’ capacity being fruitless. In addition, inadequate financial support also causes 
problems in deterrence since kingpins are not caught. Galster (2015) points out the 
lack of money, along with a lack of capacity on the part of officials to carry out 
complicated inquiries as the source of ‘zero apparent progress in finding the kingpins’ 
when big seizures such as of illegal ivory occur but nobody is arrested (Galster, 2015). 
The second governance gap is regional coordination and communication among 
agencies at both national and international levels. In order to effectively cut the illegal 
wildlife trade chains, Schaedla (2011) points out several coordination links, which can 
close institutional gaps among organizational agencies. These include the link 
between national and provincial coordination in information sharing and 
enforcement network within park protection areas, the links between customs 
border authorities and provincial and national wildlife enforcement authorities 
around protected areas, the strong coordinating link among national WEN and 
border liaison offices, the strong coordinating link of the ASEAN-WEN PCU and local 
and national enforcement authorities, and the firm links among the ASEAN-WEN PCU 
and other key international bodies such as Interpol, national central bureaux and the 
WCO Green Customs Initiative (Schaedla, 2011). However, the governance gap in 
coordination and communication manifests as difficulties and challenges of ASEAN-
WEN member countries. The first is information and intelligence management, even 
in the ASEAN-WEN implementation period (Maneesai, 2007: 41). Inadequate 
information for the successful interception of illegal wildlife shipments was reported 
as a challenge by Myanmar and Singapore (ASEAN-WEN, 2010). The lack of 
equipment and access to necessary resource materials was also part of the failure in 
cooperation (Shepherd et al., 2007: 5-6), while self-reporting completed by 
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enforcement agencies also revealed the lack of legal agreements facilitating data 
sharing as well as cooperative investigations (Schaedla, 2007: 43). 
The second difficulty in coordination among agencies at both national and 
international levels derives from ‘jurisdictional and institutional complexity over who 
can act and who should act’ (Elliott, 2007: 3). Elliott (2007) sets out three layers of 
this difficulty: the problem of determining jurisdiction to implement national 
legislation and international law; the jurisdictional confrontation among 
governmental agencies, i.e. environmental agencies and enforcement agencies; and 
the question of the jurisdictional role of the private-sector agents such as financial 
institutions in engaging and tracing suspicious transactions that might be linked to 
environmental crime activities (Elliott, 2007: 3). Minimal levels of intra- and inter-
agency cooperation can be seen as an aspect of the problem in dealing with the illegal 
wildlife trade in the region (Shepherd et al., 2007: 5-6). Within each country, 
according to Chrisgel Ryan Ang Cruz, who was an assistant senior officer of the 
ASEAN-WEN PCU, there are gaps in coordination and communication (GMA News 
Online, 2014). For instance, there was a challenge for Indonesia in establishing joint 
inspections at ports and airports among the CITES Management Authority, customs 
and quarantine; on the other hand, Vietnam identified inter-agency cooperation and 
the language barrier as the areas that needed to be improved (ASEAN-WEN, 2010). 
Moreover, according to Participant E, if the aim of ASEAN-WEN is to stop or reduce 
illegal wildlife trade in Southeast Asia, the effectiveness of this effort depends on two 
variables: international cooperation and the role of the leading country in prioritizing 
and monitoring species for regional attention. International communication is very 
important in making the members of network become closer if countries actively 
communicate. Since currently we have several wildlife species that are highly 
smuggled, ASEAN-WEN should raise these as issues to cooperate internationally on, 
for instance, the illegal trade in pangolins, which include several countries on the 
trade route. Pangolins are exported from Indonesia and Malaysia, from where they 
are transported through Thailand for consumption in Laos and China. Therefore, if 
ASEAN-WEN can take particular species as its priority issue, international cooperation 
in terms of information sharing for forensic investigation starting from exporting 
countries to destination countries can be potentially developed. This can at least 
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make illegal wildlife traders aware that there are enforcement authorities taking 
responsibility on the issue seriously. But this kind of coordination among state 
authorities does not presently happen within the ASEAN-WEN framework 
(Participant E, 2015). 
The lack of regional focus in setting priorities in controlling particular endangered 
species can be considered a challenge for regional cooperation and coordination. 
Although there are huge number of species that are listed in the CITES appendices, 
particular wildlife species in Southeast Asia – those that are highly demanded include 
pangolins, Siamese rosewood, tigers, ivory and turtles (Participant E, 2015) – should 
be prioritized as common concerns for regional cooperation. However, since each 
country has different priorities and agenda (GMA News Online, 2014; Participant C, 
2015), reaching consensus on the major problems is very difficult at the regional level 
(Participant C, 2015). Further, despite considerable numbers of wild species having 
to be protected and controlled by states, it is noted that wild plants such as rare 
orchids are overlooked in favour of endangered wild animals (TRAFFIC, 2015d; Forest 
News, 2015a). The lack of regional priorities in conserving particular endangered 
species may not be obvious as a factor that directly affects the difficulty of 
coordination; however, specific policies and initiatives such as training programmes 
for increasing authorities’ skills and specialization or activities to raise public 
awareness on the current situation of species in focus are not likely to be developed. 
The final governance gap of ASEAN-WEN is the role of the ASEAN-WEN PCU after the 
support programme has phased out. Sustainability seems to be a critical challenge of 
the network (Participant H, 2015; Participant E, 2015; Participant D, 2015). Two 
factors contributing together to the gap are the lack of sustainable financial support 
and the inactive function of the ASEAN-WEN PCU. When the support programme was 
running, almost all regional planned activities, including meetings, training 
programmes and the establishment of the ASEAN-WEN PCU, were supported by 
USAID (Participant D, 2015; Participant E, 2015). Further, while Thailand allocated 
office space and support officers to set up the ASEAN-WEN PCU, Freeland supported 
it by hiring three to five international staff members facilitating the PCU, giving office 
equipment and developing the ASEAN-WEN website (Participant E, 2015). A 
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competent secretariat or coordinator is important to effectively facilitate and 
coordinate activities in the region (Participant H, 2015). During the five-year support 
programme, the ASEAN-WEN PCU worked independently to facilitate 10 member 
countries equally without preference to particular countries. However, Participant D 
(2015) noted that, before the support programme terminated, an agenda on the 
regional budget to support programmes after the USAID phased out had been raised 
several times, but there was no conclusion on how members would contribute to the 
network. In addition, since there was no budget to hire the ASEAN-WEN PCU staff, 
the PCU is instead run by Thai-WEN. Since the financial support to run the PCU is 
currently from the Thai government, the budget set for regional activities is weighted 
towards supporting bilateral cooperation between Thailand and its neighbouring 
countries rather than ASEAN-WEN ones (Participant D, 2015). Fundraising is needed, 
but this cannot be an option for ASEAN-WEN owing to its lack of legal entity; support 
from member countries is needed to sustain the basic function of the PCU. Even 
though ASEAN-WEN is not dying, it is becoming quieter. This suggests a problem for 
the sustainability of the programme, which partly derives from the decreased role of 
the PCU. 
5.3.3 Governance gaps at the national level 
While the two categories set out above emphasize cooperation at the international 
level, this kind of governance gap results from individual ASEAN countries’ capacities 
and abilities in translating international obligations into their national policy and laws. 
These gaps can be grouped and exemplified as follows. 
The first gap is insufficient legal laws and penalties to effectively stop the illegal 
wildlife trade at the national level. Shepherd (2007) observes that, even though Sun 
Bears and Asiatic Bears are listed in Appendix I of CITES, domestic legislation 
protecting bears in each ASEAN country varies. Many cannot meet this obligation 
owing to inadequate legislation and insufficient enforcement. This weakens the 
effectiveness of CITES since the illegal trade in bears, often carried out across borders, 
is still going on (Shepherd, 2007: 22-3). 
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The second one is the presence of national law loopholes. Parties attempt to make 
their national laws comply with international agreements; however, the compromise 
between the need to totally protecting particular species from the illegal wildlife 
trade and the fact that wildlife products are part of their culture and society make it 
difficult for governments to find a decent solution. This gap can be obviously seen in 
the case of combating the illegal ivory trade in Thailand. Thailand is one of the eight 
countries of ‘primary concern’, needing to develop its national ivory action plan to 
strengthen the control of trade in ivory and ivory products (CITES Secretariat, 2016a), 
such as where illegal ivory from Africa is being transported to China, or laundered 
and carved to sell in the legal market. Threatened by the CITES sanction (The 
Guardian, 2013b; TRAFFIC, 2014b), Thailand has to take adequate measures to tackle 
the illegal ivory trade by submitting national plans demonstrating urgent measures – 
including legislative, enforcement and public awareness actions along with specific 
timeframes and milestones for implementation (CITES Secretariat, 2016a). However, 
it is noted that Thailand cannot effectively regulate trade in domestic elephant ivory, 
and this is considered the legal loophole that thwarts attempts to stop the sale of 
illegally imported African elephant ivory (WWF-Thailand, 2016). As a result, Thailand 
has enacted legislation and regulations for better control of the domestic ivory trade 
and launched the national ivory registration system to monitor the ivory market (DNP 
Thailand, 2015). However, this seems not to be enough, especially for those who 
support the total ban of the ivory trade, to prevent the laundering of African ivory. 
According to Naomi Doak – an expert on the global wildlife trade – although Thailand 
has passed regulations to stop ivory smuggling and filled loopholes in its respective 
legal ivory markets, the absence of independent monitoring and a clear, workable 
enforcement mechanism makes the system pointless (Ives, 2015). 
Another example of the governance gap resulted from the national law loophole is 
the illegal wildlife trade at the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone (GT SEZ). 
According to a recent report conducted by the Environmental Investigation Agency 
(EIA) and Education for Nature-Vietnam (ENV), geographically the GT SEZ is a part of 
Laos. Despite Laos having a Wildlife and Aquatic Law 2007 and a Penal Law 2005, 
enabling authorities to investigate and prosecute wildlife crime (EIA, 2015c: 11-13), 
the area ‘has become a lawless playground, catering to the desires of visiting Chinese 
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gamblers and tourists who can openly purchase and consume illegal wildlife products 
and parts’, including those of endangered tigers, leopards, elephants, rhinos, 
pangolins, helmeted hornbills, snakes and bears (EIA, 2015c: 2). The trade in the 
prohibited category of wildlife specimens needs government permission; however, 
Article 40 of the 2007 Wildlife Law allows the trade from breeding activities of the 
second generation of prohibited specimens. Therefore, this is a legal loophole that 
smugglers can use to sell wildlife products (EIA, 2015c: 11-13). Moreover, the legal 
loophole in Vietnam reveals different aspects of national legislation in combating 
illegal wildlife trade. More severe penalties are imposed to an offender who smuggles 
local wildlife than one who smuggles the same species of foreign origin (Thanh Nien 
News, 2015b). More importantly, a Vietnamese officer from the Central Environment 
Police Department described how the law prohibits only smuggling of animals found 
locally; it is hard to deal with the smuggling of species not on the list. Vietnam can 
easily deal with the smuggling of Javan rhino horns and Asian elephant tusks but finds 
it difficult to do so with their African equivalents (Thanh Nien News, 2015b). 
A third gap is difficulties in enforcing law. Insufficient law enforcement to effectively 
control the illegal wildlife trade at the national level is often pointed to by scholars 
(Rosen and Smith, 2010: 24; Schaedla, 2007: 42; Shepherd, 2007: 22; Van Asch, 2013: 
80). Many combined factors can be identified as the cause of this kind of governance 
gap: a lack of political will, insufficient financial and human resources, and poor 
capacity of authorities in investigating the wildlife crime. In addition, as the ultimate 
purpose of the convention is to prevent the extinction of endangered species, the 
protection of wildlife in the field should also be included in implementing law 
enforcement for stopping the illegal trade (Participant C, 2015). Law enforcement, 
therefore, covers several procedures, from maintaining the law in the protected 
areas to sentencing wrongdoers in court; these processes involve different 
government sectors cooperating and coordinating with each other. Effective law 
enforcement would be the best tool to deter illegal wildlife trade; unfortunately, this 
sort of deterrence measure has not been promising in the region recently. Since even 
a single problem could undermine the effectiveness of law enforcement, the 
combating of the illegal wildlife trade cannot achieve its results in terms of problem-
solving in the near future. On the other hand, gradual improvement can be expected 
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if the gaps in the law enforcement are closed little by little. Some examples of this 
kind of governance gap at the national level follow. 
In order to conserve endangered species from over-exploitation by trade, 
enforcement on the field has been constrained by insufficient officers operating to 
safeguard wildlife from poachers in the protected and/or remote areas. For example, 
while there was 40 rhino protection units to secure the rhino in Indonesia and 
Malaysia, twice that number was needed (WWF, 2002). Similarly, the lack of officers 
to protect wild animals has also been identified as a cause of failure in protecting wild 
elephants from killing for ivory smuggling in Laos (RFA, 2015). Further, ranger squads 
are experiencing a general lack of equipment to patrol and are often outgunned by 
poachers (Channel NewsAsia, 2015c). Inadequate government budgets allocating for 
field conservation and relatively small amounts of contribution from international 
community are sources of difficulty in anti-poaching patrols (WWF, 2002: 12). 
Moreover, in some countries, some domestic laws run contrary to the conservation 
of threatened species. For instance, although Southeast Asian countries have 
legislation protecting bears, there are some exemptions. Sun bears can be hunted 
under licence in the state of Sarawak in Malaysia; Asiatic bears can also be captured 
by permit in Myanmar (Shepherd, 2007: 22). These factors are challenges for 
effective enforcement on conserving endangered wildlife on the field. 
Insufficient monitoring and regulation of domestic wildlife markets also contribute to 
ineffective enforcement. Despite there being a law prohibiting the trade of protected 
species, there are markets across Southeast Asia along international borders, such as 
the Three Pagodas Pass (the Myanmar–Thailand border), Tachilek (the Myanmar–
Thailand border), Mong La (the Myanmar–China border) and Golden Rock (inside 
Myanmar), that openly sell illegal wildlife and wildlife products in an otherwise legal 
market context (Van Asch, 2013: 82). For instance, bear parts are illegally sold at 
markets along Myanmar’s borders (Shepherd, 2007: 24) and wild orchids have also 
been traded illegally without domestic harvest permits at Bangkok’s Chatuchak 
market in Thailand and the Thai borders with Myanmar and Laos (TRAFFIC, 2015d). 
Furthermore, insufficient monitoring of domestic markets also raises difficulties in 
proving whether traders have obtained genuine licences. The problem of controlling 
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the ivory trade in Thailand can be used to explain this obstacle. Thailand is considered 
to be ‘the world’s largest unregulated ivory market’ and ‘home to one of the world’s 
largest and most active ivory carving industries’ (WWF-Thailand, 2016). It is also a key 
place for laundering illegal ivory from Africa into products destined for China (The 
Guardian, 2013b). Currently, Thailand allows the sale of ivory from Thai domesticated 
elephants, whereas the sale of ivory from wild elephants is illegal. However, 
differentiating the ivory of wild elephants from that of domesticated ones is very 
difficult for enforcement agencies (WWF-Thailand, 2016). As they are unable to 
detect them, the domestic ivory trade is not properly regulated. This creates a chance 
for illegal ivory imported from Africa to be traded in legal markets. Therefore, even 
though the Thai government has a new policy to register existing ivory stocks owned 
by Thai citizens to better control the ivory trade, how ‘to prove a piece is different 
from the last piece, or where it’s from’ is still a challenge for law enforcement 
agencies, according to Naomi Doak (Ives, 2015). 
Another problem for law enforcement is also manifested in the process of 
investigating and pursuing legal action in wildlife crime cases. For example, the 
involvement of Laos politicians in the illegal ivory trade and other wildlife parts not 
only proves a hindrance to the progress of legislation on wildlife protection; it also 
leads to interference by those politicians and high-ranking officials in the 
investigation. This factor comes together with a deficient investigation of illegal 
wildlife smuggling cases by customs officials, causing lax law enforcement in Laos 
(RFA, 2015). In order to deter offenders, investigation should not end with the 
confiscation of wildlife; legal action should be taken to punish wrongdoers (Reuters, 
2015). Moreover, the absence of standard sentencing guidelines for punishment and 
different penalties across Southeast Asian countries also go against deterring 
offenders. For instance, Thai national Chumlong Lemthongthai, who was caught and 
sentenced in 2012 to 40 years’ imprisonment for smuggling South African rhino horns 
into Asia’s black markets, had his penalty reduced to 13 years with a fine of around 
US$90,000 after bringing the case to the Supreme Court in 2014 (EIA, 2015b: 3). 
Furthermore, different punishments appear even in the same country. In the case of 
hunting pangolins in Indonesia, whereas prosecutors demand the maximum of five 
years imprisonment and a fines of RP500 million to punish offenders in Jambi, 
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perpetrators get only an average of eight months in prison and fines of only RP10 
million in Medan. Comparing the fine with the price of pangolins – each can be valued 
at around RP500,000–800,000 – some people are induced to go into forests to hunt 
them (Mongabay, 2015a). As a result, according to Irma Hermawati, a legal advisor 
from the Wildlife Conservation Society, this failure in deterring violators could be a 
factor that explains why the network of illegal wildlife business survives in Medan 
(Mongabay, 2015a). 
The governance gap in the process of law enforcement exemplified above shows that 
the existence of national laws on wildlife protection cannot guarantee the decrease 
of the illegal wildlife trade if countries do not implement them seriously. Many 
countries have adequate laws, but they are unimplemented (EIA, 2015b: 3). In 
contrast, the statistics show the increasing numbers of wildlife confiscated from 
hunters in the Philippines, which rocketed by 1,600 per cent over the 2010–2013 
period, even though the Republic Act 9147, enacted in 2010, criminalized activities 
involved in the endangered wildlife business (GMA News Online, 2014). 
The fourth gap is insufficient resources, as shown below, to support the 
implementation of national policy and/or laws. Firstly, the lack of financial support is 
always the most frequent answer explaining why protecting wildlife is far from 
successful. Governments do not have enough funds, or an adequate legal framework, 
to combat wildlife crime (Channel NewsAsia, 2015c). In the Fifth Meeting of the 
ASEAN-WEN in 2010, Brunei, Cambodia. Laos and Myanmar identified funds as one 
of their key challenges and problems in progressing their activities to better control 
the illegal wildlife trade and trafficking to achieve their obligations under CITES 
(ASEAN-WEN, 2010). The scarcity of financial resources usually puts agencies in a 
hard position in selecting choices ‘based on the likely chances of success not just of 
interdiction but that seizures will proceed to legal action’ (Elliott, 2007: 7). Secondly, 
the lack of necessary equipment and overall human resources to support the 
operations related to protecting wildlife is also a key constraint for countries (ASEAN-
WEN, 2010; Shepherd et al., 2007: 5-6). 
The fifth governance gap is authorities’ inadequate capacity and/or ability in different 
processes of wildlife conservation. Good understanding of national wildlife laws, 
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international conventions and procedures relevant to wildlife cases is crucial for 
operational activities to combating illegal wildlife trade and trafficking; however, law 
enforcement authorities lack this (Schaedla, 2007: 43; Shepherd et al., 2007: 5-6). In 
addition, although particular professional skills are necessary to monitor and 
investigate wildlife cases, authorities working in Cambodia, Laos, the Philippines and 
Brunei have limited technical capacity and expertise (ASEAN-WEN, 2010). Further, 
officials’ poor skills in identifying species and differentiating between protected and 
non-protected specimens are also an important challenge for some Southeast Asian 
countries such as Myanmar and Singapore (Shepherd et al., 2007: 5-6; ASEAN-WEN, 
2010). Moreover, the lack of forensic skills and facilities challenges the national ability 
to act effectively against the illegal wildlife cases (Maneesai, 2007: 41; ICCWC, 2013). 
Therefore, specialized training to improve authorities’ capacity – such as 
DNA/forensics training and sample collection and strengthening of existing facilities 
– is necessary for better management of illegal wildlife crime issue (ICCWC, 2013). 
Several difficulties in enforcing and implementing environmental laws in Southeast 
Asia can be simply seen in the lack of political will among governments to give priority 
to environmental issues. In many cases, governments are not willing to act since they 
do not consider wildlife conservation to be important; thus, the issue is not prioritized 
and this results in weak enforcement (Suksuwan, 2015). Further, some countries 
consider wildlife and forests to be state commodities and politically connected to 
elite interests (The Straits Times, 2015p). However, despite these challenges, there 
are NGOs and policy networks that operate to improve the effectiveness of the CITES 
agreement and to change the environmental situation and outcomes in the region. 
5.4 The role of NGOs and their networks in governing illegal wildlife 
trade issue 
While the role of individual NGOs in environmental governance is obvious, their 
networks among them have not been much emphasized for international 
environmental outcomes in Southeast Asia. This section firstly investigates the role 
of NGOs at the national and international levels. Exploring the role of NGOs in closing 
governance gaps, some key NGOs can find political opportunities to work with 
governmental departments and agencies and/or intergovernmental organizations. 
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Secondly, examining those key NGOs in closing governance gaps at the different 
levels of governance reveals their connections with other actors in collectively 
working to support environmental policy and laws. Policy networks are formed 
among these actors, who collectively operate to achieving the CITES goals. It should 
be noted that the main focus of this chapter is the policy networks in governing 
transnational illegal wildlife trade in ASEAN countries. However, since ASEAN 
cooperation aims at better implementation of CITES, examining the key NGOs’ 
connections with other intergovernmental bodies (such as UNODC Southeast Asia, 
and Interpol) – and/or the subregional cooperation initiatives (Heart of Borneo, for 
example) that they have engaged outside the ASEAN cooperative framework – 
cannot be avoided. Moreover, the purpose of CITES is to balance the conservation of 
biodiversity and the economic benefits from the wildlife trade; therefore, policy 
networks in governing transnational illegal wildlife trade have to include actors 
whose work is dedicated to the conservation of endangered wildlife species in 
Southeast Asia such as elephants, tigers and pangolins. These actors, focused on 
particular at-risk species, also create information sharing links among them and can 
be considered parts of policy networks in governing transnational illegal wildlife trade 
issues. 
5.4.1 The role of NGOs in supporting IGOs and states to meet the CITES 
obligations 
In order to support CITES, NGOs are working at different levels of governance to 
prevent the unsustainable exploitation of biodiversity. This part reveals the critical 
roles of individual NGOs in closing governance gaps at the global, regional and 
national levels. This allows us to see the links between NGOs, states and/or IGOs in 
operations to achieve better environmental outcomes at different levels. 
5.4.1.1 The role of NGOs in supporting CITES 
At the global level, TRAFFIC is the most important international NGO that directly 
engages with the CITES Secretariat in monitoring wildlife trade. TRAFFIC is the wildlife 
trade monitoring programme of WWF and IUCN and works closely but independently 
with them and the CITES Secretariat to ensure that the trade in wildlife is not a threat 
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to conservation (Rosen and Smith, 2010: 25; Schaedla, 2011). Since the key role of 
TRAFFIC is to monitor wildlife trade, its works consist of field monitoring, desktop 
research, advocacy works, enhancing capacity building and assisting enforcement 
(Schaedla, 2011). TRAFFIC helps the CITES Secretariat in activities including 
investigating illegal trade, conducting studies of trade, and suggesting plans of action 
for sustainable and responsible management on wildlife trade (Rosen and Smith, 
2010: 25). According to Participant D (2015), the main obligation of TRAFFIC for the 
CITES Secretariat is to submit independent reports about the illegal wildlife trade in 
countries in parallel to national reports done by member countries. Report 
conducted by TRAFFIC does not only include government seizures; it also provides 
information derived from its fieldwork in black markets, a kind of information that 
may not be included in reports done by governments (Participant D, 2015). 
Therefore, reports done by TRAFFIC provide the CITES Secretariat with a set of data 
complementary to the one conducted by states, which might contain more bias in 
the interpretation of their own progress of law enforcement. This creates a more 
realistic picture of the global illegal wildlife trade situation; the better understanding 
of the problem would bring about a better solution for cooperation. 
Further, TRAFFIC serves as important information databases for the conservation 
community. For example, TRAFFIC’s seizures records are used for analysing trade 
routes and aid countries in reducing demand on particular endangered species 
(WWF, 2002: 9). In addition, the data gathered by TRAFFIC is a foundation for further 
studies. For instance, it helps to identify where the hotspots for illegal wildlife trade 
are and what needs to be done to prevent transboundary infectious diseases (Rosen 
and Smith, 2010: 24). Furthermore, information that TRAFFIC staff collects from 
markets has been reported to wildlife authorities and the public. This sometimes 
leads to seizures after reports highlight the issue and raise the issue to be prioritized 
at the national level. For example, birds were seized from East Java ports after 
TRAFFIC revealed the unsustainable trade of songbirds during the Asia Song Bird 
Trade Crisis Summit (TRAFFIC, 2015a). 
TRAFFIC has a very critical role in monitoring illegal wildlife trade. Since the 
organization collects information by going into wildlife markets, information derived 
- 162 - 
from fieldworks can be used in analysing the effectiveness of states’ law enforcement 
on the illegal trade of wildlife. In Southeast Asia, TRAFFIC observed the trade of 
endangered species parts such as bear bile along the international borders of 
Myanmar (Shepherd, 2007: 24) and ivory in Thailand (Ives, 2015). At the global level, 
TRAFFIC is responsible for the Elephant Trade Information System (ETIS). According 
to Participant G (2015), TRAFFIC has an influential role in monitoring global illegal 
ivory trafficking. Parties have to report their seizures to ETIS. The information 
includes the country of origin, transit countries through which illegal ivory passes, 
country of destination and where stocks have been caught. Then TRAFFIC assesses 
this information and records the transit countries that fail to detect those tusks. The 
records are used to evaluating the improvement of the law enforcement of relevant 
countries. And if those countries do not have a practical plan to control the illegal 
ivory trade domestically and/or stop the illegal shipments at their ports, they may 
face trade sanctions (Participant G, 2015). 
5.4.1.2 The role of NGOs in supporting ASEAN and ASEAN-WEN 
The contribution of NGOs in combating the illegal wildlife trade in Southeast Asia has 
been recognized as adding value to the work of governments in horizontal forms of 
governance (Elliott, 2007: 7). In the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Pathfinder 
Dialogue with ASEAN and Pacific Islands Forum Partners on Corruption and Illicit 
Trade, many agencies highlighted the crucial roles of NGOs in raising public interest 
in the issue, providing capacity building, and communications support (ARREST, 
2013a). Since cooperation can happen at both policy and operational levels (Elliott, 
2007: 6), this part addresses the role of NGOs in two broad aspects: in terms of policy 
by increasing the important of the issue at the regional cooperative framework, and 
in terms of operations through fostering better implementation of ASEAN-WEN. 
The role of NGOs in terms of initiating policy cannot be obviously seen. According to 
Participant G, parties to CITES already have policy guided by the convention; 
therefore, NGOs mostly engage at ASEAN-WEN meetings to offer what they can in 
terms of fostering implementation (Participant G, 2015). However, in order to 
leverage the wildlife trade issue and gain more attention from states’ 
representatives, there was an attempt to move the issue from being environmental 
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to security-related by considering it a transnational organized crime. According to 
Sallie Yang, a senior programme officer working for Freeland, the movement in this 
way would move the main handling of the issue from the agriculture, forestry and 
environment ministries to the national security ministries, which can apply more 
teeth and/or more resources in managing wildlife crime in addition to human 
trafficking and drugs (The Straits Times, 2015p). Although there are difficulties in the 
various definitions of wildlife crime, as well as different laws and penalties among 
ASEAN countries, it is hoped that working in this way might increase the effectiveness 
of the cooperation through information sharing and law enforcement backed by the 
United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime, which has been 
signed by all ASEAN member countries (The Straits Times, 2015p). 
Recognizing the difficulties derived from the various legislations, the Eighth ASEAN 
Inter-Parliamentary Assembly (AIPA) Caucus tabled wildlife crime suppression as a 
special topic for the first time to seek potential legislative improvements to combat 
the issue. At the meeting, efforts in bridging the gap between existing international 
bodies (including ASEAN-WEN, AIPA, ASEANAPOL and ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting 
on Transnational Crimes) and harmonizing legal cooperation were mentioned as 
means to make progress on policies on wildlife protection. Freeland was invited to 
the caucus to present on the legal frameworks and toolkit compendium. In addition, 
Freeland has been a formal partner of AIPA on wildlife trafficking issues and works 
closely with AIPA to conduct research, engage members of parliament to advocate 
better policy on natural protection, as well as editing the ASEAN Handbook on Legal 
Cooperation to Combat Wildlife Crime, which stresses the importance of regional 
priorities for legislation harmonization (AIPA Secretariat, 2016). Prior to this AIPA 
meeting, delegates of the AIPA had been sent into the field to discuss with park 
rangers the main problems they encountered every day. The event aimed to gain 
more support from politicians through better understanding of those problems in 
implementation. IPA delegate and Philippine MP Maria Lourdes Acosta-Alba 
recognized the importance of the harmonization of legislation across ASEAN, which 
will take time; however, Steve Galster, Freeland’s founder and executive director, 
stressed the necessity to strengthen laws before trade barriers are removed when 
the ASEAN Economic Community comes into effect (Channel NewsAsia, 2015c). 
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The role of NGOs is more obvious at the operational levels, especially in ensuring the 
success of ASEAN-WEN implementation. Freeland and TRAFFIC Southeast Asia 
actively engaged in supporting the support programme, funded by the USAID. 
Neither organization has any formal agreement with ASEAN; however, they have 
supported a resource available to ASEAN-WEN players in several ways (Schaedla, 
2007: 44). In supporting regional cooperation in combating illegal wildlife trade, 
Freeland is considered a lead agency engaging in ASEAN-WEN, a central actor in the 
public–private partnership, as well as an honest broker in getting people’s attention 
(Elliott, 2007: 6-7). On the other hand, TRAFFIC has also acted energetically in 
supporting the network in Southeast Asia (Suksuwan, 2015). TRAFFIC bolsters the 
work of wildlife enforcement networks in several ways, including support for 
meetings and workshops, capacity building and technical assistance. TRAFFIC 
engages with ASEAN-WEN by sponsoring and co-sponsoring ASEAN-WEN 
conferences and workshops to promote coordination and commitment among 
governmental agencies within ASEAN countries, as well as other external 
governmental bodies, for example China’s National Interagency CITES Enforcement 
Coordination Group and the East and Southeast Asia Biodiversity Information 
Initiative (ESABII) (TRAFFIC, 2016a). Further, TRAFFIC supports capacity building for 
ASEAN-WEN under ESABII and subregional cooperation such as the Heart of Borneo 
Initiative to combat illegal trade in marine turtles and other marine species (Schaedla, 
2011). 
Technical assistance, as well as the development of technology and sciences, is also 
a critical contribution that NGOs make to increase regional and national authorities’ 
capacities to govern illegal wildlife trade. For example, TRAFFIC has developed an 
identification sheet to help government agencies’ work easier in their search for 
contraband wildlife (TRAFFIC, 2016a). In addition, the DNA forensic tool, a 
collaborative project between the Thai government and TRAFFIC to help trace the 
origin of ivory, has been developed and trialled to examine ivory products commonly 
available in local markets (Wildlife News, 2015). Furthermore, Freeland has launched 
an application called WildScan, which was collaboratively developed by academics, 
law enforcement, scientists and other wildlife specialists from IUCN, the US Fish and 
Wildlife Service (USFWS), the Zoological Society of London, the World Animal 
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Protection, and the Cummings School of Veterinary Medicine at Tufts University. This 
application allows users, especially front-line wildlife law enforcement agencies, to 
input information of the animal in question to quickly identify the species; it also 
provides an easy report function designed for the users to report wildlife crimes 
confidentially or publicly to appropriate law enforcement authorities through secure 
servers (USAID, 2014; Freeland, 2016g). The device is available for free in English, 
Thai, Vietnamese, Khmer, Bahasa Indonesia (Freeland, 2016f; Freeland, 2016g; 
Freeland, 2016e). 
5.4.1.3 The role of NGOs at the national level 
At the national level, NGOs play a critical role in supporting environmental policy and 
laws. On the one hand, they generally and obviously criticize governments’ policy and 
law once it negatively affects the environment and/or there is any legal loophole on 
environmental and conservation policy. On the other hand, some NGOs calmly 
collaborate with the government in developing, implementing and enforcing 
environmental law and policy. 
NGOs always actively respond to governments’ environmental policy when they find 
any legal loopholes on it. According to Participant F (2015), another key reason that 
the Seub Nakhasathien Foundation has to raise strong objections to controversial 
draft amendments is because of several legal loopholes. The drafts are adopted from 
previous laws that were written 10 years ago. They are not up to date. More 
importantly, the environmental conditions and contexts that have been continuously 
changed by time are not considered and adjusted. Therefore, if these two laws are 
passed it will severely damage to the forests and wildlife (Participant F, 2015). 
Another example of NGOs’ role in finding flaws on national laws and regulations on 
wildlife is their observation on the ivory registration system in China; this system was 
later adopted in Thailand. According to IFAW (2006), China’s ivory registration system 
could not (in 2004) lead to effective implementation; in addition, there has been an 
increase in both ivory processing and retail stores. IFAW also finds that the legal 
loopholes present challenges in law enforcement; in contrast, illegal traders seem to 
know very well about the loopholes in government trade controlling system (IFAW, 
2006: 3-4). As a result, the ivory trade laws in Thailand are considered tiny progress 
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in a big fight against elephant poaching (Ives, 2015). NGOs’ position in reacting loudly 
to national environmental policy is intended to gain public attention. However, this 
can lead to the perception that NGOs are working against the government despite, 
in several cases, complementarily working with national environmental departments 
and law enforcement agencies. 
NGOs obviously play several roles in supporting conservation policy and national 
agencies to confront the illegal wildlife trade issue at the national level. Some 
examples can be revealed. Firstly, NGOs support government agencies in developing 
states’ instruments to comply with international agreements. This crucial role of 
NGOs can be seen in the development of legal tools to control the illegal trade in 
ivory in Thailand, where TRAFFIC and WWF-Thailand have closely engaged with Thai 
government agencies. In Thailand, TRAFFIC, WWF and Freeland are the main NGOs 
concerning on the illegal wildlife trade issue; they keep an eye on a new wildlife issues 
and then provide some recommendations to the government to respond to it 
(Participant E, 2015). According to Participant G (2015), TRAFFIC and WWF have been 
invited to every meeting in developing national ivory action plans. WWF and TRAFFIC 
are recognized as government allies, making a positive contribution to the progress 
on government measures to control the wildlife trade issue (Participant G, 2015). 
TRAFFIC closely works with the Department of National Park, Wildlife and Plant 
Conservation. The key tasks include assisting the Thai government in the process of 
drafting the Ivory Trade Act and a national action plan to control the trade in ivory, 
making comments on revised drafts to close the legal loopholes, giving technical 
assistance on matters of law and providing statistical information in depth on the 
scale of the ivory trade in domestic markets and dealers (Participant D, 2015). WWF 
is not only a key observer in the CITES meeting; it is also very active in the ivory trade 
issue in Thailand (Participant E, 2015). According to Ongsiriwittaya (2015), since 2012 
WWF has been working hard in mobilizing the wildlife trade issue to move to the top 
of the agenda in the relevant countries. The issue must be included, at least, in 
ministerial and/or cabinet meetings. Thailand is one of the countries of primary 
concern for CITES on the trade of illegal ivory; therefore, WWF is working at full scale 
to stop the trade in ivory. Initially, WWF supported the total ban of the ivory trade; 
however, this goal does not seem to be possible in the near future. Since the Thai 
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government has decided to control the ivory trade by law, the government has to 
amend its national laws into conformity with CITES. WWF works closely with the Thai 
government and provides suggestions, for example, on the drafts related to the 
sentencing guidelines, fines and permit fees. Further, WWF is the only NGO involved 
in the national committee of CITES, which consists of delegates from the Ministry of 
Natural Resources and Environment, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Thai Customs, 
the Immigration Bureau, the Airport of Thailand, Thai Airways, the government public 
relations department and the Department of Livestock Development. Therefore, 
WWF has constructively engaged with the government, from the policy level to the 
operational one (Ongsiriwittaya, 2015). 
In order to engage with the government, a moderate approach is identified as a key 
strategy that WWF and TRAFFIC have in common. WWF and TRAFFIC take a similar 
approach in engaging with the Thai government in developing policy and national law 
to stop the ivory trade. These two NGOs apply a moderate approach to work with the 
government. According to Participant D (2015), TRAFFIC has changed its method of 
engaging with the Thai government. Previously, the government was attacked by 
TRAFFIC’s finding on the illegal wildlife trade. However, TRAFFIC has changed tack to 
work with the government by reporting findings directly to government authorities 
with the questions that might be asked by the public before publishing the findings. 
Working in this way helps improve relations because the government does not feel 
humiliated in front of the public; at the same time, it prepares the authorities on how 
to solve the issue. Moreover, TRAFFIC is willing to provide updates on the progress 
of the government work through its channels (Participant D, 2015). Similarly, WWF 
has engaged the government through the existing formal channels. In addition, WWF 
has contacted the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment, which is the focal 
point for providing information. WWF understands and respects the government’s 
position. One feature that makes WWF different from some NGOs is its realistic 
approach. For example, in the case of the ivory trade, although the ultimate goal of 
WWF and some NGOs is a total ban of the trade, WWF recognizes that that goal is 
nearly impossible in the context of Thai society. Therefore, WWF works with the 
government and carefully considers the extent to which each authority can do within 
his power and jurisdiction. The organization thus gradually gains trust from the 
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government (Ongsiriwittaya, 2015). Participant E (2015) confirms the critical 
engagement of WWF in promoting the illegal wildlife trade issue. Although the 
government cannot promote the banning of the ivory trade, WWF still has a role in 
assisting the government to develop national measures to resolve the illegal ivory 
trade issue. Furthermore, WWF also has a communication role in promoting new 
environmental policy to the public (Participant E, 2015). 
Furthermore, a moderate approach is also applied by WWF in Malaysia. According to 
Suksuwan (2015), WWF was invited by the Malaysian government in a consultation 
process when a new policy was issued or introduced. From his experience, the new 
Wildlife Conservation Act in 2012 and policy documents such as the National Tiger 
Conservation Action Plan were reviewed by WWF. WWF also worked on the National 
Physical Plan (land use plan) for peninsular Malaysia and the Malaysian Central Forest 
Spine master plan, which is about linking the different forest landscapes in peninsular 
Malaysia. Beside WWF’s moderate approach, Suksuwan (2015) points out to a good 
mixture of organization’s different skills including wildlife biology, policy people, GIS 
and environmental education. This covers almost every aspect of conservation, 
whereas other, smaller NGOs may not have enough capacity (Suksuwan, 2015). 
The second complementarily role of NGOs in supporting environmental law and 
policy can be seen from their joint collaborations with governmental departments 
and agencies for better implementation and law enforcement. NGOs contribute to 
the field conservation operation. In the state of Johor, Malaysia, WCS coordinated 
other five state agencies (including national parks, the police, the Forest Department, 
the Wildlife Department and the plantations) on a joint patrol programme called 
‘Tiger Forever’ to protect tigers and their prey species in the area such as bearded 
pigs and muntjacs (Participant A, 2015b). According to Participant C (2015), in 
countries where WCS functions, the organization actively works closely with 
government agencies in conservation science and wildlife. In Thailand, WCS works 
with the Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP). WCS 
is a science-based organization that does a lot of field science and field conservation 
works, for example conducting surveys on endangered species and assessing habitat 
integrity. In addition, WCS provides advice on protected area management and 
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enforcement issues related to wildlife on the ground. Moreover, it provides rangers 
with training to do better enforcement, better patrolling and better collection of data 
(Participant C, 2015). 
Furthermore, NGOs help strengthen law enforcement by collaborating with national 
agencies in seizure operations. In Vietnam, WCS and ENV coordinated the Central 
Environment Police to arrest a Ho Chi Minh City pet shop owner who smuggled wild 
animals from Thailand for sale in Vietnam and advertised other rare species trade on 
the Facebook page of his shop (Thanh Nien News, 2015a). Another case is the role of 
WCS’s Wild Crime Unit in helping the Indonesian National Police seize a large 
shipment of 13.8 tons of frozen pangolins smuggled through Indonesia and headed 
for China (WCS, 2015). In Cambodia, Wildlife Alliance has dedicated its two 
permanent staff to fully support the Wildlife Rapid Rescue Team – an animal police 
unit – serving as Cambodia’s national task force for ASEAN-WEN (Wildlife Alliance, 
2017). 
While this information and evidence confirms the role of NGOs in governing 
environmental policy and law in wildlife conservation, this should not lead to the 
conclusion that they are working individually, fragmentally or without cooperation 
with other organizations. It can be noticed from the role of NGOs – which have 
supported the achievement of CITES at different levels – that some of them can 
engage with national governmental agencies, ASEAN-WEN and the CITES Secretariat. 
They have also formed information sharing links with other NGOS at different levels 
and across levels. Exploring the key NGOs in this part is a foundation before 
examining the links between them, which are presented in the following section. 
5.4.2 Policy networks in combating the transnational illegal wildlife trade 
While the previous section identifies the individual NGOs in joint collaboration with 
states and IGOs, this section reveals their connections with other NGOs at different 
levels and across levels in collectively operating to strengthen the CITES monitoring 
system, regional law implementation and enforcement, and national environmental 
policy and laws. This section firstly presents how international NGOs, WWF, TRAFFIC, 
WCS and Freeland have formed their structural network within their structural 
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organization (WWF-Global, 2017; Freeland, 2015a; WCS, 2017b; TRAFFIC, 2008d). 
And, secondly, since these actors do not always act alone, these create information 
sharing links among those who collectively operate to achieve their policy goal. Policy 
networks are established to support wildlife conservation policy and governing illegal 
wildlife trade. 
International environmental NGOs share similar means in gathering information on 
the species in their concerns and use their expertise to engage with governments. 
Defined links as information and resource sharing, the connections between actors 
at different levels and across boundaries can be identified. TRAFFIC, WWF, IUCN, WCS 
and Freeland have regional and local offices around the world. Their bases in different 
countries monitor the environmental situation and keep an eye on development 
policies affecting the environment and wildlife habitats. In addition, in Southeast 
Asia, these international NGOs have a key contribution to the improving of 
environmental policy. For instance, WWF can give a consultation to the government 
partners on the policy problem because it has political understandings, intelligence 
and scientific knowledge and databases on the best practices and lessons learned, 
which are derived from its experiences working with other partners in different parts 
of the world (Ongsiriwittaya, 2015). Apart from TRAFFIC and WWF, which have offices 
in several countries across Southeast Asia, WCS also works in similar way in collecting 
scientific data on protected areas such as in Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia, 
WCS made records on the populations of rare animals in the park including Sumatran 
tigers, rhinos, elephants and orangutans and reported the decreasing number of 
them over the past 20 years (The Jakarta Post, 2015s). In Thailand, WCS has 
conducted research and collected information on hunting and on the trade in species 
of concern such as tigers; the organization attempts to use this solid information and 
science-based approach to advise policymakers at the national level (Participant C, 
2015). Furthermore, emphasizing regional wildlife law enforcement, Freeland’s 
offices in Southeast Asia – including Vietnam, Thailand and Indonesia – have 
organized meetings and training courses to promote regional joint efforts through 
information sharing and best practices among officers and partners from different 
countries (Freeland, 2015a). Similar attempts resulting from the network of NGOs 
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include the achievement of recommending the CITES COP17 to make pangolin 
species fully protected by Appendix I of CITES (Freeland, 2016b). 
It can be seen that, at the international level, environmental NGOs have a strong role 
in providing scientific data in different countries to support the monitoring 
mechanism of CITES. Within their organization, there are branches around the world 
to collect information and work with other NGOs and/or government partners to 
make progress on wildlife conservation. These NGOs have been invited regularly to 
the CITES COP (Participant G, 2015) as well as the Consortium of the ICCWC (ICCWC, 
2013). From the ICCWC perspective, representatives from the NGO community 
contribute their experiences, lessons learned and recommendations for better 
implementation in fighting wildlife crime (ICCWC, 2013); however, from some states’ 
points of view, they complain that NGOs play too much of a role in influencing the 
CITES meetings (Participant G, 2015). 
Information sharing among NGOs can be observed from their projects in updating 
databases on populations of concern to their organizations. For example, EIA 
acknowledges information contributed by TRAFFIC, WWF, IFAW and other NGOs in 
different geographical areas to update the map and data set on illegal wildlife 
products including rhino horns (EIA, 2017e), elephant ivory (EIA, 2017c), helmeted 
hornbills (EIA, 2017d), pangolins (EIA, 2017g) and tigers and Asian big cats (EIA, 
2017f). Since natural habitats of wild species locate in different areas and some 
species are more threatened by consumption demand, this also creates information 
sharing across organizations whose concerns are based on those particular species. 
For example, tigers and big cats are prioritized by WCS, WWF, TRAFFIC, Wildlife 
Alliance, Freeland, EIA and EVN. Their offices in different locations in Southeast Asia 
work closely to monitor the species populations, farming and breeding, illegal trading 
in black markets, and the improvement of law enforcement in relevant countries. 
These NGOs also work as alliance in the Global Tiger Initiative, which aims to double 
the global number of wild tigers by 2020 (GTI, 2008). Likewise, in the case of sharks 
and rays, TRAFFIC, WWF, WCS, IUCN, Shark Advocates International and the Shark 
Trust work together to develop 10-year strategies to stop the decline of sharks and 
rays (TRAFFIC, 2016b). 
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Resource sharing among NGOs for the better implementation of environmental 
conservation policies can also be found from NGOs’ projects in implementing 
conservation policies in protected areas that are home to several endangered 
species. Apart from supporting ASEAN-WEN, NGOs have also bolstered two 
subregional initiatives: the Heart of Borneo (HOB) and the Coral Triangle Initiative on 
Coral Reefs, Fisheries, and Food Security (CTI-CFF). These activities also represent 
connections among NGOs in conserving wildlife species in the region. 
The HOB initiative was proposed by WWF and led to the governments of Brunei, 
Indonesia and Malaysia signing a declaration to conserve and sustainably manage the 
core area of Borneo, where most of the forests are located (Suksuwan, 2015). 
TRAFFIC collaborates with WWF to support HOB, initiated by the three governments 
with the aim of protecting the last vast contiguous natural Bornean forest. TRAFFIC 
continues support capacity building efforts of this framework (Schaedla, 2011). Both 
WWF and TRAFFIC were involved in the meeting to discuss wildlife trade issues as 
well as strategic outputs and action plan suggested for further collaboration 
(TRAFFIC, 2015a). Currently, WWF-Malaysia and WWF-Indonesia are playing a role in 
supporting coordination between the governments of Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Brunei (Heart of Borneo Rainforest Foundation, 2013a; WWF-Malaysia, 2016). In 
addition, this initiative also attempts to create the Borneo Hub to coordinate and 
map information on research station projects, concession boundaries and 
communities databases among action groups under one roof (Heart of Borneo 
Rainforest Foundation, 2013b). This exemplifies how an NGO supports the 
governments’ initiative through implementing conservation project; it also attempts 
to set up a database on wildlife conservation by collaborating with civil society actors, 
communities and businesses to participate in and support sustainable management 
in the protected area. 
On marine conservation, Conservation International (CI), the Nature Conservancy 
(TNC) and WWF are working together with the Coral Triangle centre, local NGOs and 
governments of Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Papua New Guinea, the 
Solomon Islands and Timor-Leste to protect the Coral Triangle under the CTI-CFF 
cooperative framework (WWF, 2009; UNEP, 2013: 8; CTI-CFF, no date). In 
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emphasizing the conservation objective, the Marine Protected Areas Governance 
programme was established and got financial and technical assistance from WWF, CI, 
TNC and WCS to support the Indonesian government in improving marine protected 
areas management, which includes activities such as support local partners in 
monitoring and patrolling the areas, collecting data on endangered marine turtles 
and preventing destructive fishing (WWF, 2017a; WWF, 2017b). 
It can be noted that, while international NGOs can find opportunities to engage with 
governments and other NGOs through international species-based initiatives and 
protected areas collaborations, this creates transnational information sharing links 
among them and national or local partners to support monitoring systems on 
endangered wildlife species. In addition, it can mean that, aside from ASEAN-WEN, 
NGOs have more options to engage with other international frameworks or other 
networks in protecting wildlife and/or monitoring illegal wildlife trade in the region. 
This assumption is supported by Ongsiriwittaya’s explanation of WWF’s 
considerations in working with ASEAN. She comments that engaging with ASEAN 
framework is unlikely to be the best option. Since ASEAN countries insist on the 
principle of non-interference on domestic issues and environmental issues are always 
less important than other issues, NGOs engage with other international bodies, which 
are more constructive and active on environmental issues. NGOs will choose to 
engage with the body that provides more opportunity for the organization’s success 
in conducting advocacy with less resources allocated to that activity (Ongsiriwittaya, 
2015). 
While species-based collaboration among NGOs provides several options for NGOs 
to create their networks, it is not easy for NGOs to specify which one should be the 
centre of the network. According to Ongsiriwittaya (2015), each NGO has its own 
priority, approach and goal in conservation, while intergovernmental bodies – which 
her organization engages with – have different mandates and jurisdiction. From her 
experience in working with other NGOs at the national level, she notes that there are 
not many NGOs working to protecting the environment; they generally know what 
each organization is working on and what each other’s standpoints are. 
Complementary work with environmental agencies in protected areas in different 
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parts of Thailand can be a good example. NGOs acknowledge each other in their 
responsible areas. They do not try to work with a department that has already been 
supported by another, but they instead open up new areas to bolster other agencies 
in different parts of the country. Therefore, each NGO works individually according 
to its organizational mandate, but their works are not contradictory (Ongsiriwittaya, 
2015). However, this does not mean that there is no network among them. Although 
they are working in different places to fulfil their organization’s goal, information 
sharing for monitoring national policy related to wildlife conservation and illegal 
wildlife trade exists. Ongsiriwittaya (2015) and Participant F (2015) confirm 
information sharing among NGOs. Since NGOs work to monitor any matter affecting 
the environment in different geographical areas, together they work as an alliance to 
raise their voice when an environmental crisis occurs. The kind of alliance depends 
on the issue (Participant F, 2015). For example, an open letter jointly signed by NGOs 
in Thailand was sent to the government to include the wildlife agenda into the 
national agenda (Ongsiriwittaya, 2015). Participant F (2015) also notes that 
environmental issues are, on the one hand, an opportunity for NGOs to gather 
together to raise the importance of the issue to the public. On the other hand, the 
increasing number of environmental issues is also a crucial condition that obscures 
them from forming a strong alliance. This is because NGOs are facing challenges from 
limits of resources resulting from the lack of financial support in operations and 
recruitment (Participant F, 2015). 
Apart from supporting agencies to better implement and enforce environmental 
policy, NGOs have formed a loose network at the national level to monitor national 
development policy, which potentially causes harm to wildlife habitat. This role is 
obvious in the NGOs’ work on conservation or protected areas. For instance, when 
Cambodia’s vast Virachey National Park in Cambodia was handed out for mining 
exploration, an NGO called HabitatID – supported by other three local NGOs – tried 
to persuade the Khmer government to end the mining permit by presenting a video 
recording of rare species found in the national park to show that the area should be 
protected to serve as a home for wildlife (Mongabay, 2015m). There was a similar 
example in Thailand, when the Seub Nakhasathien Foundation found that ‘[t]he 
Department of National Parks, Wildlife and Plant Conservation (DNP) is attempting 
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to pass controversial draft amendments to two laws that will allow national parks to 
be leased to private resort operators and the wildlife trade to be legalised’ (The 
Bangkok Post, 2015b). The seminar, entitled ‘Amending forest and wildlife laws for 
whom?’, was held by the foundation itself, along with the Thai Journalists Association 
and the Thai Society of Environmental Journalists. Learning from the failure of the 
government’s attempt in integrating tourism into the management of national park 
in the past, participants in the seminar had strong opposition to this 
commercialization of the parks in the name of tourist promotion. The strong 
opposition in the seminar led the DNP’s representative to announce that a public 
hearing on the proposed amendments was planned later in the month (The Bangkok 
Post, 2015b). 
The network of NGOs can be generally found at the national level in campaigns to 
reduce demand on wildlife consumption by raising people’s awareness on the 
importance of the wildlife issue. Campaigning on wildlife protection can often be 
seen in countries across Southeast Asia. For instance, it is found that the WildAid’s 
campaign on shark-fin resulted in a 50–70 per cent reduction of the shark-fin trade 
among consumers in Asia in some markets (Wyler and Sheikh, 2008). Freeland 
launched a campaign called iTHINK to encourage behavioural change in Thailand, 
Vietnam and China to persuade people to stop the consumption of endangered 
species (Freeland, 2016a). With the attempt to reduce commercial demand, which is 
the key factor driving poaching, celebrities, politicians and doctors have joined the 
campaign to protect wildlife and change people’s beliefs that rare animal parts can 
cure diseases (Thanh Nien News, 2015c; Freeland, 2016a). In particular in Vietnam, 
which is a major market for wildlife consumption, the Vietnamese government, with 
support from the USAID-funded ARREST group, convened a meeting to form a 
coalition to address the wildlife trade in Vietnam. NGOs including the Vietnam 
Association for Conservation for Nature, the Asian Turtle Program, PanNature, 
Freeland, the Wildlife Conservation Society and the World Society for the Protection 
of Animals have together developed communication strategies for reducing the 
illegal consumption of wildlife; a detailed strategic communication plan was drafted 
(UNEP, 2013: 3). Further, with the attempt to reduce the demand for wildlife resulting 
from traditional medicine, TRAFFIC and the National Center for Health 
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Communication and Education of the Ministry of Health (T5G) of Vietnam jointly 
organized workshops for 600 scientists, professors and traditional medicine students 
to highlight their roles in creating sustainable and wildlife-friendly practices (TRAFFIC, 
2015b). 
Applying the network approach to identifying policy networks governing the illegal 
wildlife trade issue in the region, it is obvious that, even though NGOs can individually 
operate to support wildlife conservation and policies that tackle the trade in illegal 
wildlife, they are collectively complementary in their work to support the monitoring 
system of CITES in the broader picture. Policy networks are composed of actors at 
different levels of governance who are linked by information and resource sharing 
activities. Although the networks among national NGOs are not distinct owing to their 
responsibility to support government agencies in different areas, their contributions 
in gathering field evidence on wildlife populations, monitoring national law 
enforcement and increasing capacity building to state agencies make them parts of 
policy networks. Since some international NGOs have their offices based in different 
countries, on-the-ground information is sent to their headquarters. Then, this 
information can be disseminated to other network actors to be applied further in 
proposing policy recommendations to government actors and IGOs at different 
levels. Moreover, collaborations between NGOs for better implementation can also 
be pointed out. International NGOs – especially EIA, TRAFFIC, Freeland and WWF – 
which have offices based in various countries, can always find alliances at the national 
level to improve states’ agencies capacities. For example, EIA and its partner offer 
hard intelligence to Interpol and WCO (EIA, 2017a); similarly, WWF-Malaysia and 
TRAFFIC-Southeast Asia (TRAFFIC-SEA) work closely with the Department of Wildlife 
and National Parks to fight a secret army of poachers in Malaysia (WWF-Malaysia, 
2017). Policy networks, therefore, take a critical role in supporting national 
governmental agencies, increasing the ability of ASEAN-WEN in regional 
implementation and law enforcement of CITES, and providing solid evidence for the 
CITES to strengthen the monitoring and compliance mechanism. 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Southeast Asia is rich in biodiversity. However, these natural resources, especially 
wildlife species, are threatened by unsustainable exploitation. The region has 
become a hotspot for illegal wildlife trade and trafficking. Although there is 
intergovernmental cooperation through CITES as well as ASEAN cooperation to tackle 
the illegal wildlife trade, this is insufficient and ineffective. At the international level, 
there are information gaps resulting from IGOs’ incomplete information on states’ 
enforcement of CITES. This weakens the ability of CITES to legitimately apply 
sanctions to non-compliant states. In addition, the problem of communication and 
coordination among law enforcement agencies can be pointed out at both global and 
regional levels. Although ASEAN-WEN was established to better implement and 
enforce CITES at the regional level, this difficulty is only partly resolved. In addition, 
inadequate resources of ASEAN-WEN in activities for improving agencies’ capacity 
bring about governance gaps in regional implementation and law enforcement. At 
the national level, governance gaps include the inability of each individual country to 
formulate, implement and enforce national law and policy to effectively stop the 
illegal wildlife trade. The absence of political will can be a key explanation for why 
sufficient resources are not allocated to implement environmental policy on wildlife 
conservation or operations to fight illegal wildlife syndicates. 
Exploring governance gaps in lengthy international policy process for tackling illegal 
wildlife trade, it is found that several NGOs can find opportunity in complementary 
work with IGOs, states and national environmental departments to close the 
governance gaps. At the national level, NGOs individually and collectively act in the 
form of networks, supporting government agencies to develop policy and laws, 
identify legal loopholes, implement conservation projects, increase state agencies’ 
capacity and supply their expertise and technical assistance to governmental officials, 
for example. NGOs working in and responsible for different areas also form networks 
in monitoring national development policy that potentially causes negative effects 
for the environment. At the regional level, TRAFFIC, Freeland and Wildlife Alliance 
are included in ASEAN-WEN. With support from these NGOs, communication and 
coordination among ASEAN members has been improved through meetings and 
workshops. This results in better implementation of CITES, for instance in the 
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increased seizures of illegal wildlife at international ports and borders. At the global 
level, NGOs support the monitoring system of CITES by collecting and analysing 
information on wildlife situations and reporting the progress of wildlife law 
enforcement of states. 
Linked by information and resource sharing for better monitoring and 
implementation of wildlife conservation and anti-illegal wildlife trade policy, policy 
networks are formed at different levels and across levels. While some NGOs’ 
organizational structures have constructed their own networks by linking their 
national and regional offices with their headquarters, these offices have also 
collectively worked with other NGOs and partners to meet particular wildlife policy 
goals. Further, the networks can be based on particular endangered species in 
relevant countries where species’ and/or their natural habitats are severely 
threatened. Working with states, IGOs and environmental or law enforcing 
departments to close governance gaps, NGOs can find opportunities to engage with 
those actors. Therefore, links among them are present. NGOs in policy networks take 
two roles in supporting networks’ operations for improving the effectiveness of the 
CITES regime. Firstly, they take a crucial role in monitoring wildlife conservation and 
sustainable wildlife trade policy. The networks of NGOs support the CITES monitoring 
system by collectively transferring their analysed reports and recommending policy 
to the CITES Secretariat. At the national level, they also keep an eye on national 
development policy, and the progress of national law and policy on conservation and 
control of illegal trading of the wildlife. Secondly, NGOs individually and/or 
collectively work with states and/or ASEAN for better implementation and law 
enforcement. NGOs have shared their knowledge, technical assistance and financial 
resources to increase the capacity of national environmental officers and 
enforcement agencies at the national level and with regional inter-state agencies, as 
well as the coordinating centre of ASEAN-WEN. The improvement of regional 
environmental policy outcomes on anti-illegal wildlife trade, therefore, can be noted 
and revealed through the collective attempts by these networks’ actors. 
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 Comparative analysis 
To answer the main question on under what circumstances policy networks can 
facilitate inter-state cooperation in governing transnational environmental issues in 
Southeast Asia, this chapter compares the two case studies set out in the previous 
chapter to identify contextual and independent factors determining and influencing 
the progress of international regimes. There are three main sections in this chapter. 
The first section compares the cases through the analytical structural framework 
constructed in the methodological chapter. Within the similar categories, distinct 
differences are revealed and examined to assess why one case presents better 
international environmental outcomes. Comparison in this part also focuses on the 
importance of the international political context and the quality of regimes which 
underlie the connections between CSOs and state/IGO actors. In this part, policy 
networks – which are defined as the networks which aim to improve environmental 
policy – are classified into two different categories: transgovernmental networks and 
non-government networks.6 Similar governance gaps, where states and IGOs in the 
two cases cannot work effectively, are pointed out as similar political opportunities 
where policy networks can together operate to fill them. The second section 
compares the macro-structure of networks in the two cases to examine the 
relationships between the components of the networks and the effectiveness of the 
regimes. The network analysis method is applied to create the macro-structure of the 
networks, to observe the functional role of policy networks in improving the 
effectiveness of regimes, to consider the potentials of network actors in influencing 
political changes in terms of policy, and to examine the role of particular nodes in key 
positions of the networks. The final section discusses the similarities of the nature of 
states and ASEAN cooperation in developing the environmental regimes, the obvious 
                                                     
6 The categories are considered from the kinds and number of actors involved in a network. 
Transgovernmental networks are composed of nodes and links where the majority of the 
group are states and/or IGOs actors. On the other hand, non-government networks refer to 
connections among nodes where the majority of them are CSOs. In the haze case, non-
government networks are much more obvious than the transgovernmental network. In 
contrast, for wildlife, the transgovernmental network (especially ASEAN-WEN) and non-
governmental networks (networks among CSOs to support monitoring activities on particular 
endangered wildlife species) can both be clearly found. 
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attempts of CSOs and policy networks to shape environmental policy and outcomes 
at different levels, and the application of the network perspective in explaining and 
understanding actual environmental governance in the region. 
6.1 Comparison of the cases through the analytical framework 
This section compares two case studies through the analytical framework developed 
in Chapter 3. Regimes, their effectiveness and policy networks of the cases are 
comparatively examined to assess why one case is more successful than another. 
Similarities of the cases, ongoing environmental issues and the involvement of CSOs 
in supporting the development of policy to tackle them, are discussed. Differences 
between the cases, including the effectiveness of regimes and different kinds of 
policy networks, are revealed in different international political contexts which are 
conditions for forming links between IGOs/states and CSOs. 
Although both cases are transnational environmental problems, they are different 
kinds of international cooperation problem: inter-state tension in the case of haze 
and operational problems for the wildlife case. Different degrees of conflict of 
interest for states involved in the issues not only explain the progress of the 
development of policy and functional mechanisms to deal with transnational issues 
but also result in constraints on NGOs to participate directly in the formal process. 
Political channels for CSOs to engage with states and ASEAN to improve the 
effectiveness of regimes can be observed and compared from links between them 
through the structural framework. 
Within the same structural framework for comparison, the first important difference 
is the existence of ASEAN’s transgovernmental network as a recognized intervention 
to improve the effectiveness of ASEAN cooperation, since every member has an 
obligation to fulfil the goal of CITES, the global regime for tackling the illegal wildlife 
trade issue. In contrast, the transgovernmental network does not exist in the haze 
case. However, the non-government network in the haze case can be identified 
outside the ASEAN forum. Its operations have contributed to governing the haze 
issue, for example in its attempts to improve the regional monitoring system and to 
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find alternative means to strengthen the enforcement of Singaporean unilateral 
sanction. 
In comparing the development of regimes based on the content of international 
agreements, it is obvious that the global regime governing the trade in wildlife is 
more developed than the regional regime dealing with the haze pollution issue. This 
can be referred back to the nature of the international cooperation problem. At the 
global level, parties signed CITES to protect certain wildlife species - which are types 
of natural resources the loss of which is irreversible - against over-exploitation. States 
individually gain benefits from the trade in wildlife as well as mutual advantages from 
international cooperation on protecting listed or endangered species. The 
cooperation is a settled agreement which clarifies what illegitimate practice is. With 
a global agreement that contains a sanction mechanism to ensure parties’ 
compliance and implementation, ASEAN countries established ASEAN-WEN – a 
transgovernmental network – to make international law enforcement on this issue 
more effective. An obvious mutual gain from this network form of regional 
cooperation can be the avoidance of trade sanctions if an individual state fails to 
enforce the law. 
In contrast, since the effective means to solve the haze issue seems to be in the 
bargaining process, the ASEAN body managing the haze issue is the Conference of 
Parties, which is the ASEAN main forum for ministers to address the haze issue. The 
haze case is a transboundary issue causing loss to both the state that is the source of 
the problem and its neighbouring countries. To solve the haze problem effectively, 
Indonesia has to sacrifice parts of areas for agricultural development to conserve 
forests and peatland. However, this way limits choices for the government and its 
people in using their lands for agricultural or other economic development. Even 
though the basic cause of the fires and measures to prevent, monitor and mitigate 
this are stated clearly in the ASEAN Haze Agreement, it is difficult to do it in practice. 
At the same time, Indonesia’s neighbouring countries continue to suffer from the 
recurrence of the annual haze. This negative externality leads to international 
tensions among the parties involved, while approaches to resolve the problem have 
been developed without the sanction mechanism. 
- 182 - 
The different kinds of international cooperation problem and the advancement of 
regimes have set different international political contexts, which provide different 
political channels for CSOs to engage with ASEAN. With back-up from CITES’s sanction 
mechanism, an individual state has an obligation to comply with the agreement. In 
governing the illegal transnational trade in wildlife, ASEAN countries do not need to 
initiate regional agreements. Instead, regional cooperation in the form of the 
transgovernmental network is established to ensure collaborative operations. In the 
wildlife case, NGOs can take part in and obtain the status of partner in the 
transgovernmental network. NGOs take a crucial role in strengthening the network. 
They are invited to the open session at the annual ASEAN-WEN meeting. They 
organized several forums and workshops to create events for state agencies to form 
personal connections for better coordination and communication, as well as 
increasing state agencies’ operational capacity. This kind of activity was hardly found 
in the haze case. There are very limited political channels for CSOs to take part in the 
ASEAN formal meeting. Further, considering the ASEAN principles for regional 
cooperation, which include non-interference, consensus and consultation, it is very 
sensitive for a state to urge Indonesia to take more action to improve its policy and 
implementation to support regional cooperation on the haze issue. Since common 
ground and mutual interest among Indonesia and its neighbouring countries have not 
yet been reached, it seems less possible for CSOs to engage in regional dialogue. 
The two cases are similar when we measure the effectiveness of regimes in terms of 
problem-solving. Both cases are ongoing environmental problems. Effectiveness in 
terms of problem-solving has still not been achieved by the parties to the agreement. 
However, the failure in terms of problem-solving does not mean that there has been 
a lack of activities where the ultimate goal is to end the problem. There are both state 
and non-state actors that are currently working by various approaches to protect the 
environment. By looking through the process rather than the product, the 
improvement in environmental quality is actually derived from international 
cooperation and other kinds of governance activities. Therefore, emphasizing 
effectiveness in terms of the process would reveal both state cooperation activities 
and other kinds of governance activities, which leads to better consequences despite 
the recurrence of those environmental issues. To clarify, effectiveness in terms of 
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problem-solving can be perceived from physical evidence such as the decrease of 
hotspots in the haze case and the decrease in the list of endangered species in the 
wildlife case. On the other hand, the effectiveness of regimes in terms of better 
governance is emphasized in the processes directly or indirectly related to the 
improvement of policy and laws which would then bring about those better physical 
results. In other words, the progress of regimes is seen by the improvement of policy 
and laws, which can directly result from state cooperation, from collaboration among 
CSOs and/or from state–CSO collaboration. 
Both cases share a similarity in the problem of deterrence, law enforcement and 
policy implementation. These problems constrain the effectiveness of the regimes. 
This thesis, therefore, set the boundary in investigating the governance activities 
where non-state actors directly or indirectly contribute to the effectiveness of the 
regimes in terms of better process. To clarify, while there are policies and laws across 
Southeast Asian countries that ban open burning and trading endangered wildlife 
items, these illegal practices are persisting. The existence of policy and laws by itself 
does not guarantee the effectiveness of regimes. The effectiveness of regimes occurs 
when states fulfil their international obligations by improving the process of 
monitoring, enforcing the law and implementing policy. However, since the 
processes are still ineffective and can be considered to be governance gaps, this is 
where networks’ activities are explored. Different kinds of networks as an 
intervention to close the similar category of governance gaps are examined to see 
how their operations can improve the quality and process of those international 
regimes. 
Comparing the effectiveness of two regimes through the development of regional 
policy and the progress of law enforcement, it is clear that the wildlife protection 
regime is more developed because the regime is supported by international law with 
sanction mechanisms to guarantee parties’ compliance in implementation, while 
there is nothing to punish a state which causes pollution to others and the 
environment in the haze case. The sanction mechanism is a crucial factor that 
ensured that parties’ obligations are addressed in the agreement. In the wildlife case, 
each country has to translate international agreement into the national policy and 
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law. Although a country has its own responsibility to control the illegal wildlife trade, 
the establishment of ASEAN-WEN to increase the effectiveness of enforcing 
international law presents a regional attempt to cooperate beyond their countries’ 
commitment to CITES. At the least, ASEAN countries have admitted that there is a 
law enforcement problem in operations to tackle the transnational illegal wildlife 
trade issue. With the aim of making better law enforcement of the illegal wildlife 
trade, the progress of regional collaboration can be seen and partly implied7 from the 
increasing numbers of seizures, which have resulted from better communication and 
coordination among state agencies at international borders or ports. In addition, 
considering the purpose of the CITES regime, the network of law enforcement could 
contribute to the sustainable goal as better enforcement can help increase the 
number of endangered species if poaching is reduced and the criminals involved in 
the illegal wildlife trade chain are caught and prosecuted. Furthermore, effectiveness 
in terms of policy can also be measured alongside the operations of the 
transgovernmental network through the increase of law enforcement or a national 
action plan, and the number of operations to increase the capability of the state’s 
obligation in monitoring the trade on endangered wildlife in countries where other 
kinds of non-government networks can provide support outside the state 
cooperative framework. With support from NGOs who worked with ASEAN-WEN 
during the support programme from USAID, it can be seen that the operations of the 
transgovernmental network resulted in an increased number of seizures owing to 
better communication, coordination and capacity. Although these better governance 
activities can partly contribute to the effectiveness of the regime to protect 
                                                     
7 An official suggests that the best way to see the effectiveness of network in dealing with 
the illegal wildlife trade be done by matching the number seizures with the coordination 
activities among government agencies. However, she admits that in assessing the 
achievement of the network through this method is very hard. This is because the 
communication record on operations is incomplete on ASEAN-WEN database due to that not 
every country reports this to the ASEAN-WEN coordination Unit. In addition, the 
measurement of the capture of the illegal trade may not mean the operation achieves; but, 
it may be because of the animals is hard to be found or the criminal groups stop trading and 
then shifting to supply the market by replacing the rarer one with other similar species. The 
decline number of illegal capture does not mean less cooperative effort since it may due to 
less criminal activity or rare endangered species left. In contrast, the decline of capture does 
not mean less cooperative effort since it may due to less criminal activity or endangered 
species become rarer. 
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endangered species, it presents the crucial role of the transgovernmental network in 
increasing the effectiveness of ASEAN cooperation to achieve the goal of CITES. 
It is obvious that the CITES agreement is more mature in terms of the development 
of a mechanism to manage with the wildlife trade issue. The existence of a sanction 
mechanism and bodies responsible for ensuring compliance with the agreement to 
some extent make states act to develop their laws and regulations as well as plans of 
action in an acceptable way to ensure that wildlife will not be threatened by trade. 
As the structure of CITES allows NGOs to give recommendations to the committee, 
NGOs can have an influence on the committee by addressing the current situation of 
particular species. For example, when a state wants to remove a species from 
Appendix I to Appendix II, NGOs will use the information they have to hand to suggest 
whether the requested species should be moved from the list or not. NGOs can have 
an influence on the committee by proposing the current situation of the requested 
wildlife species. They submit fieldwork evidence such as increasing or decreasing 
numbers of wild species populations as another source of information to the 
committee before the decision is made. 
The benefit of the sanction mechanism in CITES in pushing states to develop 
conservation policy is clearly seen in the case of Thailand’s ivory trade. Since Thailand 
had not made much progress in law to prevent the laundering of ivory, the CITES 
committee warned that Thailand could receive trade sanctions as a necessary 
measure to ensure it meets its obligation to preventing illegal trade in ivory. This 
trade sanction mechanism did not only accelerate the Thai government to formulate 
a national action plan; it also made the Department of the Environment form a better 
coordination of the agencies and departments that could be affected by trade 
sanctions being imposed on Thailand. At that time, WWF-Thailand was also officially 
included in the working group that was to give an opinion on the draft ivory trade 
plan. This crisis formed trust between state and non-state actors. Therefore, the 
presence of the international sanction mechanism is a political opportunity that can 
open an alternative channel of communication for states and NGOs to mutually 
develop environmental policy. 
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The trade sanction mechanism offers more effective control of state behaviour so as 
to act more on transnational illegal trade issues; however, this global regime cannot 
stand alone without the effective role of NGOs in monitoring states’ compliance with 
the regime. NGOs work in different parts of the world and transmit key reports and 
suggestions to the CITES committee for their decisions on sanctions. It can be seen 
that the role of monitoring networks led by TRAFFIC provides a more legitimate 
position for CITES by looking not only at information reported by states. Monitoring 
networks of NGOs do not only trace the failures of states in operations to tackle down 
wrongdoers; they also seek ways that states can improve their environmental 
situations. On several occasions, they have come to engage with governmental 
agencies to increase capacity building. They invest in technologies and circulate those 
to states as well as to members of the public who want to join the green policy. 
In contrast, regional policy cooperation to tackle the haze pollution has been 
developed; however, the progress in terms of states’ compliance and the 
implementation of those policies is rather sluggish when compared to the wildlife 
case. Regional policy to deal with the haze issue is clearly addressed, but there are 
many difficulties in translating the regional agreement into domestic law, especially 
in Indonesia, where there is highly decentralized government. While policy is 
informal, law is formal by nature. Policy can create new law, but policy must comply 
with the existing law. Therefore, the haze case is hard to manage as part of the 
problem is based on the national land law and this may relate to social justice on 
landholding by the poor. It takes a lot of time, not only for the Indonesian people to 
change their traditional way of practice in preparing their lands for agricultural 
development but for the Indonesian government to adjust its national laws, which 
are very complicated and highly related to politics of interest among various 
stakeholders. Without any international mechanisms to accelerate Indonesia’s 
compliance with the regional agreement, there seems to be little prospect of seeing 
the changes in terms of law and policy. Having suffered from the transboundary haze 
issue for more than two decades, Singapore finally developed its own national law to 
punish anyone who sets fire for land clearing in Indonesia. This law is a unilateral 
mechanism that attempts to deter businesses investing in Indonesia not to use fires 
to clear land. However, high political tension between Indonesia and Singapore has 
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arisen; the law seems to use extraterritorial jurisdiction towards Indonesian business 
and its people without the consent of Indonesia. To bring the case into the 
Singaporean court, evidence from the ground is needed to go alongside the satellite 
data on hotspots. Until now the application of Singaporean unilateral sanctions is still 
limited. However, non-governmental networks have been formed not only to draw 
unofficial maps of Indonesian land concession but also to collect evidence from the 
ground to support the sanction mechanisms including social boycotts and the 
Singaporean law on transboundary haze pollution. 
A similar feature of the two cases is the role of CSOs in developing ASEAN 
environmental policy to tackle transnational environmental issues. CSOs can only 
take part in ASEAN meetings to support the regional policy implementation process. 
This reflects the nature of the ASEAN forum, which actually serves states’ interests. 
Although NGOs in the wildlife case can participate in the open session, they can 
actually offer their ideas and supply their resources to ASEAN-WEN. This is similar to 
the GEC, in that only NGOs that can take part in ASEAN meetings receive approval 
from ASEAN states to implement the project on peatlands. However, despite these 
NGOs finding little opportunity to have direct influence on the development of 
regional environmental policy, they can find alternative options and strategies to 
support conservation policy at other and across levels. Since the environmental 
issues are very complex and until now there has been no silver bullet to dealing with 
them effectively, their attempts through collective activities help form connections 
between and among actors. By applying the network analysis method, policy 
networks are constructed to identify connections among key actors who work 
through political channels to improve the quality of the environment by supporting 
particular environmental policies. 
In short, comparing the two cases of transnational issues leads to three main factors 
that explain why the wildlife protection regime is more advanced than the haze case. 
These three different factors are the different kinds of the problem for international 
cooperation (which results in the different degree of politics in finding the mutual 
consensus in settling the problem), the existence of sanction mechanisms, and the 
establishment of the transgovernmental network as a regional mechanism to 
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improve operations and support the enforcement of CITES. The limitation of state 
cooperation to deal with the haze issue leads to the formation of non-government 
networks outside ASEAN. Although the non-government network has limited access 
to the ASEAN negotiation process, it still has a crucial role in functional operations 
with its attempt to improve the effectiveness of the regional regime. While both 
cases are similar, as regional deterrence and enforcement mechanisms still need to 
be improved, non-government networks outside the formal regional framework are 
compared to find how governance activities can contribute to filling those 
governance gaps when the political channels for stakeholders are limited by inter-
state conflicts of interest in dealing with the issue. The following section reveals how 
these non-government networks contribute to the regional environmental 
governance. Applying the network analysis method, the next section presents the 
macro-structure of the networks, which illustrates how actors are connected with the 
aim to govern their respective issues. 
6.2 Comparison of the cases through the macro-structure of 
network 
According to Underdal (2004), three critical factors determining the effectiveness of 
regimes are the nature of the problem, the characteristics of the groups and the 
properties of regime (Underdal, 2004: 40–41). While the previous section presented 
the different achievement of international regimes deriving from the nature of the 
problem and the attributes of each regime, this section compares the macro-
structures of networks with an aim to find out the key characteristics of the groups 
in forms of network which determine the effectiveness of those regimes. This section 
constructs the macro-structure of the networks which govern transnational issues. 
The network actors are connected through links which are defined by information 
and resource sharing. The first part of this section presents the basic similarity of the 
cases, which is that both networks play a crucial role in implementing environmental 
projects and supporting the monitoring system for increasing the effectiveness of 
regimes in deterrence and enforcement. The second part of this section, however, 
focuses on the influential role of the network, which can be comparatively analysed 
from the links between subgroups of the macro-structures of networks and the 
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connections between CSOs and states/IGOs at different levels. The third part of this 
section compares the macro-structure of networks and the role of key network actors 
to explain why the network in one case can have a better impact on the improvement 
of the regime. Further, this part also explains how the components of networks 
reflect the feature of good governance (communication, coordination and 
participation) and can better bring about the effectiveness of regime and 
environmental governance. This section, overall, applies the network approach to 
comparatively analyse the structure of policy networks to identify the features of 
policy networks which can better influence on environmental policy, actions and 
outcomes. 
The first part of this section applies the method of network analysis in constructing 
the structure of networks in governing environmental issues in each case study. 
Within an environmental issue, an overall network, hereafter called a macro-
structure of networks, is composed of subgroups of actors. Subgroups in the macro-
structure of the network are consisted of nodes (states, IGOs and CSOs) which 
intentionally link to act collectively for achieving particular goals. The macro-
structure of the network reveals how actors are connected to others in governing the 
issue, even though actors do not realize it. It also presents unintentional and 
uncoordinated links among subgroups which have supported different policy but 
whose works have an impact on the effectiveness of regimes. According to Sikkink, 
where networks are unintentional and uncoordinated the network’s effects are 
stressed, rather than the effectiveness, since networks could have influence but not 
necessarily be effective in the sense of meeting specific goals. In contrast, where 
specific goals are collectively designed, the effectiveness could be measured by 
changes in the direction of the network goals (Sikkink, 2009: 235). The effects of 
networks in making regimes function better and the effectiveness of networks in 
achieving particular goals of regimes serve as a means to reveal the role of networks 
in developing environmental governance in the region. 
The network analysis method is applied in this part to see the connections among 
actors who collectively work to close governance gaps and to improve the 
effectiveness of regimes. Since poor deterrence, enforcement and implementation 
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are the similarities of the two cases, the links between actors are drawn from 
activities representing the sharing of information and resources between them. The 
macro-structures of networks are used to compare and explain the role of policy 
networks. In the first part of this section, the links among all actors identified by the 
activities of policy networks in supporting and implementing the monitoring system 
reveal the functional role of networks. The network perspective illustrates 
governance activities that actually happen at all and across levels to manage 
transnational environmental issues. In the second part of this section, the influential 
role of policy networks at different levels is examined from two aspects: connections 
among subgroups within the macro-structure of networks and connections between 
CSOs, IGOs and state actors at different levels. 
6.2.1 Functional role of networks in sustaining the environment 
Functional activities are efforts initiated by network actors who are linked by sharing 
resources with the goal of improving the effectiveness of regime. In closing 
governance gaps, network actors have individually and collectively taken on the role 
of monitoring as well as implementing projects for achieving the regime’s goal. 
Information and resource sharing through forums and associations has formed 
subgroups of macro-structural networks. These subgroups may function differently; 
however, they work complementarily to govern the transnational issue. 
Networking among actors in improving the function of regime in governing the 
transnational issues is drawn from information and resource sharing. Network actors 
are connected to improve the functions of regimes. Two operational activities which 
create links among them are aimed at developing the monitoring system and 
supporting policy implementation. 
The first and important foundation of the links among network actors is information 
sharing for improving governance gaps in deterrence and law enforcement 
mechanisms. Networks of CSOs in the two cases share similarities in playing this 
crucial role by using the information to improve and strengthen the monitoring 
mechanisms. Information is collected by local and national NGOs, then given to other 
network actors for further action to close governance gaps. In the wildlife case, where 
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the regime is more effective and supported by the sanction mechanism, information 
gathering by CSOs can be submitted to CITES for updating the species population as 
well as for imposing sanctions on states if it is proven that the state has not made 
enough efforts to stop the illegal wildlife trade at the national level. Information 
shared by networks of CSOs is useful for the CITES committee as it is another source 
of information to compare with data reported by states. Although there is no sanction 
mechanism in the haze case, the non-government network has developed a 
punishment mechanism to control such agribusinesses as palm oil and pulp and 
paper. Unofficial maps drawn by networks of local NGOs, and concession maps given 
by businesses that are members of RSPO are crucial data to be used temporarily, 
while the regional monitoring system cannot be used because of the absence of 
authoritative maps from Indonesia. Further, another important role of local and 
national NGOs is to search for strong evidence to bring wrongdoers to court. 
Unofficial maps, a satellite monitoring system and strong evidence are components 
to support mechanisms – which include financial penalties applied by Singapore’s law 
and consumer boycotts – for punishing businesses proven to use fires to clear land. 
The second kind of link which can be found among network actors is the allocation of 
resources for implementing projects and activities which directly aim to fulfil 
particular objectives of the regimes. The two cases are similar as there are CSOs 
individually involved in the networks supporting operations of state agencies as well 
as working with local communities and NGOs at the operational level. In the haze 
case where the main area of concern is located in Indonesia, WRI Indonesia (as an 
affiliate with WRI) and GEC work on projects with other local CSOs and communities 
to implement the restoration of degraded forests and to conserve peatland, 
respectively. In the wildlife case, there are many CSO actors taking part in states’ 
implementing activities. CSOs can work closely with state agencies both through 
transgovernmental networks and non-government networks across Southeast Asian 
countries. As a partner of ASEAN-WEN, Freeland and TRAFFIC Southeast Asia have a 
crucial role in providing resources to increase regional capacity in combating the 
illegal wildlife trade by organizing training workshops for state agencies for better 
implementation and enforcement. Workshops also help to improve coordination 
among state agencies to develop networking among actors who have similar 
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responsibilities in operations. Further, national and local environmental NGOs in 
Thailand, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia collectively and individually work with 
governmental agencies in operations for better implementing and enforcing laws. 
These two kinds of link are used in drawing the macro-structure of policy networks in 
governing the haze issue (as illustrated in Figure 6-1) and the wildlife trade issue (as 
presented in Figure 6-2) in the region. The first kind of link for better monitoring is 
mostly based on information and communication among actors within networks, 
while the second kind of link reveals resource allocation for better implementation 
from actors who are providers to others who are receivers. Two cases present the 
importance role of CSO actors in first working individually to connect with state 
authorities at different levels for the better implementation of the regime, and 
second in collectively monitoring states’ and the businesses’ action in complying with 
the existing international agreement through non-government networks. Even 
though CSOs seem to work individually in supporting states’ implementation and 
enforcement, their functional work at local and national levels also support the 
monitoring role of networks. While CSOs are working on the ground to improve 
better implementation with other actors, some kinds of information are gathered 
and then fed into the network for monitoring. Their experiences, new observational 
data and best practices, for example, are reported to the public, their affiliate 
organizations and/or other network actors. In the wildlife case, to gather information 
such as the population of rare species it is necessary for NGOs to get permission from 
the state to access conservation areas, especially national parks. In that case, some 
conservation NGOs can find opportunities to work with government agencies in the 
environmental department, where financial and human resources in patrol 
operations are insufficient. They can have access to the areas to fulfil their 
organizational task in updating the wildlife situation. Similar to the haze case, GEC 
has a crucial role in implementing ASEAN peatland management projects in selected 
pilot countries. Lesson learned from different sites are shared among state agencies 
and communities involved in projects. Working in different peat areas across 
Southeast Asia, GEC can provide suggestions to the RSPO for monitoring palm oil 
business on peatlands. In this aspect, NGOs can individually play a complementary 
role to increase the effectiveness of operational activities; also, they can gather key 
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information on the ground to support collective monitoring activities and circulate 
this to other network actors. 
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Figure 6-1: Macro-structure of policy network in the haze case 
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Table 6-1: ID of actors in the haze case 
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Figure 6-2: Macro-structure of policy network in the wildlife case 
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Table 6-2: ID of actors in the wildlife case 
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6.2.2 Influential role of networks in supporting the environmental 
conservation policy 
The foundation links among network actors through information and resource 
sharing can be also applied for analysing the influential role of networks in developing 
environmental policy at both the international and national levels. Information 
sharing indicates communication activities among actors in working in a collective 
way to achieve particular goal. In both cases, the ultimate goal in terms of problem-
solving is clearly articulated for both states and CSOs actors involved in governing the 
transnational environmental issues. However, what make networks in the two cases 
distinct in their ability to shift the policy into a more conservation-related focus are 
the agreement on the means to achieve the end among subgroups of network and 
the existence of information sharing links that CSOs involved in policy networks can 
connect to states and intergovernmental organizations. 
In the wildlife case, network actors work in the same direction in operations that 
support the conservation of endangered wildlife species and attempt to stop the 
illegal trade chain and demand. One good example for explaining this is the 
consensus among NGOs that considers that a moderate policy that includes minor 
exceptions allowing the trade in endangered wildlife parts cannot effectively end the 
trafficking problems. With this collectively strong position, NGOs strictly monitor and 
continuously search for errant cases to prove their presumption. They systemically 
report and update their findings to other network actors. Further, since the CITES 
Secretariat is formally open for NGOs to submit their suggestions, effective 
monitoring network of NGOs linked with the CITES Secretariat can have a crucial 
influence on changing conservation policy at the international level. 
In contrast, the non-government network in the haze case has actors/subgroups that 
do not see eye to eye on the approach to preventing the recurrence of haze. One 
good example is the disconnected links between WALHI and other NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and CIFOR who support forest conservation and the REDD programme. 
Although WALHI supports a moratorium to reduce forest degradation, the NGO is 
against carbon trading as the programme neither aims to reduce the demand for raw 
materials such as crude palm oil and mining products nor actually reduces the release 
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of gas to the atmosphere (Surya, 2012). It is true that there is no silver bullet to stop 
the haze, however several approaches can also reflect the difficulty in finding a 
mutual and practical means accepted by most network actors. 
The subgroups of actors within a macro-structure network present different 
approaches for how the problem should be effectively managed. More subgroups of 
non-government networks are present in the haze case. A policy choice to conserve 
only forests may not be articulated easily as lots of Indonesian people are dependent 
on forests. In addition, forests are sources of economic development. They provide 
revenue and income for the governments and create jobs for the poor when the land 
is granted for agricultural concession. Since the haze case is more complicated and 
the ways to solve the issue affect people’s way of life, the private sector and the 
national development policy, each organization prefers to support the environmental 
policy that goes along with its prioritized organizational goal. 
At the national level, NGOs which support local and community rights insist that 
forests are best saved by the community and indigenous people. Led by WALHI, a 
network of several environmental and social NGOs across Indonesia supports this 
forest governance approach. It opposes the leading role of the government even in 
the moratorium policy because of its experience that some governments tend to 
include monoculture plantations as forests (Surya, 2012). However, WRI Indonesia, 
Greenpeace Southeast Asia and CIFOR have different perspectives in dealing with the 
deforestation problem. They support the president’s moratorium by working with 
Indonesian national REDD agencies to implement projects to achieve emission 
reduction goals (Participant K, 2015; Participant M, 2015). Further, in conserving the 
forest, Greenpeace Indonesia and Forest Hero are working together to deliver a 
strong low-carbon economy by ensuring that states and companies implement zero-
deforestation policies (Participant K, 2015; Forest Heroes, 2017). Similarly, GEC also 
works with communities on peatland conservation. The sustainable management of 
peatlands and forests is the organization’s goal for preventing fires on peat soils. 
Moreover, the private sector, especially RSPO, proposes a sustainable management 
approach as a compromise in conserving forests and peatland, as well as imposing 
social responsibility on businesses. Monitoring by NGOs working locally and the 
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application of high-resolution pictures from satellites mean that agricultural 
businesses have to prevent fires occurring on their lands and cannot clear their land 
by using fires. Otherwise, they can be boycotted by consumers, lose their certificates 
or be brought to court in Singapore. 
Moreover, in the haze case, different approaches towards solving the problem bring 
about disagreement among network actors who support the interests of different 
stakeholders. Subgroups of non-government networks in the haze case prefer 
different policies, spanning better land management policy, forest conservation 
policy (supporting the president’s moratorium or people’s forest governance) and 
sustainable management policy (which is the compromised approach on balancing 
the need for development and the necessary to conserve the environment). 
However, the stated policy choices do not completely support the goal of each 
subgroup involved in the non-government network; when the haze starts, a blame 
game occurs among businesses and local people. In the absence of an authoritative 
map to precisely prove who lit the fires on overlapping lands, trust between 
stakeholders is hard to develop. This also results in fewer links between different 
subgroups with different approaches to managing the issue. It is also very difficult for 
those network actors to collectively and influentially mobilize a particular policy, 
whether sustainable development or environmental policy, towards the Indonesian 
government. Furthermore, since there is currently no mutually accepted mechanism 
for what sustainable development actually is and how to collectively measure the 
situation, the role of the network in influencing particular policy through an effective 
monitoring mechanism on state compliance and implementation is very limited. This 
is a key difference between the haze case with the wildlife one. 
On the other hand, CSO actors in the wildlife protection network work in the similar 
direction with less conflict to fulfil the goal of CITES in conserving endangered wildlife 
species. At the regional level, transnational NGOs such as Freeland and TRAFFIC are 
crucial partners of ASEAN-WEN in supporting resources through the ASEAN PCU for 
better law enforcement. Their specialities in information and resource sharing are 
allocated to governmental agencies at different levels. Through the ASEAN-WEN 
meeting, two organizations discuss and share responsibility based on their 
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organization’s expertise and on what training programmes and workshops they can 
offer to state members. The effectiveness of combating the illegal wildlife trade and 
the conservation of endangered wildlife species comes together to fulfil the CITES 
goal in sustainable trade in wildlife. 
The influential role of the non-government network in the haze case is limited not 
only by different approaches and policies which the subgroups view in dealing with 
the problem, but also by there being few direct links between the ASEAN Haze 
Coordinating Centre and CSOs, which allows the CSOs to share their informative data 
to Indonesia and ASEAN for improving measurement and developing regional 
environmental policy. Two CSOs that have the closest connections to the ASEAN haze 
are GEC and SIIA. While GEC works closely with ASEAN, it mainly focuses on 
implementing peat conservation projects across Southeast Asia. It does not have any 
links with Indonesian NGOs for actively urging the Indonesian government to develop 
policy supporting conservation peatlands and forests. Further, although GEC and 
Greenpeace similarly supporting forest conservation policy, they apply different 
means to deal with the issue. While GEC emphasizes implementing regional projects, 
Greenpeace bolsters the zero-deforestation policy through campaigns. They does not 
have any direct functional links to each other. On the other hand, SIIA, which seems 
to be the coordinator of the non-government network in managing the haze 
pollution, has few formal and direct connections to the ASEAN Haze Coordinating 
Centre. And, according to Participant I (2015), there seems to be no increasing 
opportunity for CSOs to engage in the regional policy development process. Even 
though information sharing temporarily backing up the regional monitoring system 
can currently partly apply to some groups of stakeholders at the regional level to 
support the objective of the ASEAN Haze Agreement, the influential role of network 
actors in moving environmental policy towards more conservation methods is still 
very limited owing to the absence of a communication channel between network 
actors and the Haze Centre at the regional level. 
At the national level, national NGOs in the haze case do not have much of a role in 
developing policy on the environment, either. They instead work similarly on 
implementing policy rather than initiating it. Aside from the ASEAN regional 
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framework on the haze issue, the Indonesian government has cooperated in the 
UNFCC on global cooperation. To reduce greenhouse gases, environmental NGOs 
play an important role in supporting the Indonesian government as an implementer 
and facilitator of the clean development mechanism (CDM) and the REDD project. 
Even though the CDM and the REDD project have the similar aim of decreasing 
emissions of greenhouse gases to the environment, they have different focused 
objectives. The function of CDM aims to manage pollution released in cities and urban 
zones, while the purpose of the REDD is to decrease the air pollution caused by 
deforestation and the unsustainable use of lands and forests. As a result, 
environmental NGOs facilitating the CDM are centred on Java and their activities are 
mostly focused on the energy and waste sectors (Ministry of Environment, 2010: 
117). Therefore, despite working within the same global framework, different groups 
of national NGOs are monitoring to achieve different objectives. However, their 
distinct similarity is their critical role in implementation, but not in formally engaging 
the government in improving the environmental policy. 
6.2.3  The components of networks and their effects on international 
regimes 
While the macro-structure of networks can reveal the functional activities and the 
networks’ channels of communication to influence state and IGO actors to develop 
environmental policy, this part applies the network tools to analyse and compare the 
structure and components of the networks across the cases to show the attributes of 
the network that potentially have significant impacts on the effectiveness of regimes. 
While both networks are obviously similar in improving the function of regimes, 
especially in monitoring activities, they are very different in their influence on the 
effectiveness of regimes. The non-government network and transgovernmental 
networks which support the goal of CITES are playing a much more critical role in 
governing the issues at different levels across the region. In the haze case, although 
there is a non-government network for supporting the regional monitoring system 
through RSPO, SIIA and WRI, the effect of the network can only work to monitor the 
private businesses who voluntarily agree to support the sustainable practices. 
Further, without clear and concrete evidence backed up by satellite images and other 
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evidence on the ground gathered by Indonesian authorities or local NGOs, it is very 
difficult to impose legitimate boycotts or other punishments on errant parties. This 
difference in the network effects between the two cases reveals the importance of 
states’ responsibility and involvement in settling an effective formal mechanism for 
monitoring. Although the ASEAN Haze Agreement has addressed what states should 
do to monitor the situation, the agreement has not proposed any system to monitor 
the commitment of the parties to comply with the agreement. Regional cooperation 
on haze, therefore, is very vague in the sense that it proposes what states should do 
to monitor the occurrence of the fires, prevent them by conserving peatlands and 
mitigate the situation when the fires occur. However, no precise prioritized policy is 
set. There is no clarity on the direction from states to protect the environment. The 
agreement gives a chance for the parties to interpret how to voluntarily support the 
agreement. 
The effect of networks to support the effectiveness of regime is highly related to the 
quality of regimes. Miyazaki (2011) observes that networks can create capacity to 
monitor an issue by gathering data, implementing projects related to support 
international framework, strengthening ties among network actors and identifying 
measures to deal with the problem (Miyazaki, 2011: 59). Networks in both cases have 
capacity to monitor the issue, however their effects on regimes are different. Data 
gathering by CSOs in the haze case can be useful for improving monitoring capacity 
only if the information is accepted by the states involved, especially Indonesia and 
Singapore, to impose punishments on wrongdoers, which is currently limited only to 
transnational companies. On the other hand, data collection by CSOs in different 
locations is circulated to be used as a critical source for monitoring states’ compliance 
in taking action against guilty parties. In addition, while both cases present the role 
of network actors in implementing projects to fulfil the objectives of the regimes, GEC 
is the only network actor that can play this role for managing the peatlands better to 
support the ASEAN framework on haze. In contrast, there are many NGOs taking part 
in ASEAN-WEN to support works to fulfil the CITES regime by strengthening the 
governmental authorities’ capacity in enforcement and implementation. 
Furthermore, as CITES is very clear that it expects states to take responsible for their 
commitment on the sustainable exploitation of wildlife, network actors in the wildlife 
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case have much more ability to develop measures for dealing with the issue by using 
their information to suggest that the CITES committee make change on CITES’s 
Appendices I-III. However, as the Haze Agreement does not require progress in 
establishing such a monitoring system among the parties or any prioritized measures 
to seriously tackle the haze, the network is lacking a legitimate and referred guideline 
which can help to identify mutual measures to collectively solve the issue. The 
relationship between the network effects and the effectiveness of the regime shows 
that it is not only the attributes of regimes that relate to the capacity of the networks. 
The more that states are clear on which principle they want to achieve, the better 
the network can act collectively and complementarily to support the effectiveness of 
the regime. On the other hand, as negotiation among states in the haze issue is still 
carrying on and there have been no concrete measures to compromise the necessity 
for development and the need to sustain the environment, subgroups of network 
work in their own way. It is clear that their works have an effect on the regime. 
However, their works might not present the effectiveness of the network owing to 
the absence of the mutually agreed goals among the subgroups, as well as the lack of 
inter-state clarity on how sustainability should be defined and monitored. 
The functionality of the networks can be measured through the structure and the 
components of the network. According to Sikkink (2009), even though a network may 
have multiple motivations, the main purpose of the network can always be identified. 
To measure the effectiveness of the network, it is necessary to interpret the structure 
with the main purpose of the network. Al Qaeda’s chain structure of networks 
(illustrated in Figure 6-3) is considered more effective than the dense one (shown in 
Figure 6-4) because it requires secrecy; the dense network is more effective than the 
thin one8 if the network seeks for cooperation (Sikkink, 2009: 230, 237). Since the 
main purpose of the networks in both cases is to end transnational environmental 
                                                     
8 A dense network refers to a network which presents the number of connections among 
actors. Each actor in the network has several links connected to others. In contrast, a thin 
network refers to few connections among network actors. For example, although two 
networks have the same number of actors, different numbers of links among actors result in 
different degrees of network density. The network which has smaller number of links among 
actors is considered the thinner network than the network which possesses a higher number 
of connections among actors. 
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issues and they serve the basic function of monitoring, the structure in the wildlife 
case, which obtains more ties among network actors between and across subgroups, 
is likely to be more effective than the haze structure. 
 
Figure 6-3: Chain structure of networks 
 
Figure 6-4: Dense structure of networks 
 
The effectiveness of the network can be also examined from the expected role and 
capability of network actors in particular positions. According to Hafner-Burton et al. 
(2009), the network analysis offers an alternative view of power and a new basis for 
international influence in international relations. Since the network analysis concept 
emphasizes the association of nodes rather than the attributes of nodes, the position 
of nodes in relation to others provides network power, which can be defined in three 
different ways: the power of access, the brokerage power and the power of exit 
option (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009). Therefore, from the macro-structure of the 
network, particular nodes can obtain additional power from its position, aside from 
actors’ attributes and resources. The actors’ positions also plays a particular and 
expected role in the network (Hafner-Burton et al., 2009: 571). Investigating the role 
of actors locating in key positions such as centres, cut-points and marginalized nodes 
would help analyse the ability of the macro-structure of the network and its potential 
impact on regimes. 
The number of subgroups, the links among the centrality of each subgroup, and the 
role of the centrality of the macro-structure of network can be used to compare the 
effectiveness of the network. A subgroup is composed of like-minded actors working 
closely together. A centrality of each subgroup refers to a node with a high number 
of ties. The subgroups can present different means, purposes or divisions of tasks 
among network actors. To assess the effectiveness of the networks, a number of 
subgroups are considered together with the existing of degree of links between the 
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centrality of each subgroup. An information network that has a bridge (a line which 
if removed would disconnect the a subgroups from others) seems to be more 
vulnerable to disruption than networks with many redundant paths (Knoke and Yang, 
2008: 49). At the international level, subgroups of the network in the haze can be 
noticed easier than wildlife ones because there are few ties connected among the 
centralities of each subgroup. It is obvious that the ASEAN haze case has only direct 
links with the GEC but lacks a direct link between RSPO and SIIA. On the other hand, 
the subgroups in the wildlife case are not obvious because there are several paths 
connected among centralities. 
Moreover, another point to show that the network in the wildlife case is more 
effective than the haze one is the ability to accommodate their resources among 
centralities – Freeland and TRAFFIC Southeast Asia through ASEAN-WEN PCU – as 
well as the division of tasks among CSOs in separately working with different state 
agencies at different levels of governance. Considering the limited resources in 
implementing environmental laws for states, NGOs working at the national level 
recognize other NGOs that are responsible for particular departments and protected 
areas. Information across areas can be requested and transmitted directly among 
organizations. On the other hand, even though the subgroups in the haze case seem 
to work in a complementary way to improve the monitoring system, their works gain 
less impact owing to the redundant task of presenting their maps. While the 
subgroups working on the ground present who actually holds the land, the RSPO 
collects the concession maps submitted by private sectors. The question of the 
overlapped land is not resolved as those two subgroups do not have any direct links 
to share this information. In addition, SIIA, which should be expected to be the 
coordinator of the macro-structure network – as it possesses the highest degree of 
centrality – cannot play its role as it does not have an associated link with the RSPO. 
Currently, the maps on hotspots can be viewed from ASEAN Haze online, SIIA’s Haze 
Tracker, WRI’s GFW Fires and EoF’s map. Therefore, in comparing the effectiveness 
of the networks in using the information for improving the functionality of the 
monitoring system, the macro-structure of the wildlife network reveals better 
connections between actors as well as the role of the coordinator of the network in 
providing, communicating and organizing resources and information. 
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Exploring the macro-structure network, one distinct factor which potentially makes 
the haze case and the wildlife one deliver different achievements is the role of 
regime’s centre: the Haze Centre and the ASEAN-WEN PCU. Despite the haze 
pollution broadly causing a serious negative impact on people and neighbouring 
countries, the Haze Centre functions only to facilitate the forum for inter-state 
discussion, which results in sluggish and minimal changes depending on Indonesia’s 
willingness. One failure of the Haze Centre is that it neither has a role in gathering 
the necessary and transparent information requested from affected states nor takes 
any updated information provided by non-state actors into the inter-state agenda. 
Further, comparing the ASEAN haze media released after an annual meeting, the 
reports are almost the same. The centre does not have the ability to accelerate inter-
state negotiation, set policy priority or be an information hub for any stakeholders. 
As the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre works only for inter-state cooperation at the 
international level, its role in dealing with transboundary issues is highly limited by 
the ASEAN principle of non-interference. Since the centre does not function as a 
significant actor in compromising the needs of affected states and people, the ASEAN 
Haze Coordinating Centre is not a real functional coordination centre for governing 
the haze issue once we consider it from the macro-structure of the network. Instead, 
at the international level, SIIA plays a significant coordination role. As SIIA works with 
several kinds of actors at different levels, useful information, ongoing activities and 
attempts to deal with the haze pollution are stored, updated and accessible from SIIA 
Haze Tracker. There are several forums and workshops held annually to exchange 
and discuss plans to manage the issue in the future. Representatives from the 
governmental agencies of ASEAN countries, the private sector and other CSOs are 
invited to SIIA’s organized forum. 
In contrast, ASEAN-WEN PCU plays a better role in coordinating the network at the 
regional level. The PCU acts as the coordinator for the state–CSO forum to strengthen 
law enforcement. The network works at the operational level, whose collaborations 
are guided by CITES. The transnational issue on the illegal wildlife trade is 
transnationally governed by collaboration among governmental agencies and NGOs 
at different levels. In addition, the ASEAN-WEN annual meeting serves as a forum to 
discuss the existing resources which Freeland and TRAFFIC Southeast Asia can 
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allocate for improving collaborative activities among partners to strengthen 
enforcing operations. The ties among highly centralized nodes (ASEAN PCU, Freeland 
and TRAFFIC) are obviously connected. Each centrality works with different agencies, 
who are responsible for different operational tasks. This presents the ability of the 
network actors to share their resources and expertise and work with different 
agencies to make the best use of exiting resource and to avoid redundancy. At the 
global level, it is clear that the coordinator is CITES. The distinction between the Haze 
Centre and the CITES Secretariat is very clear-cut, not only in terms of the political 
channel for CSOs to participate in the monitoring activities but also in the 
transparency on the basic information accessible and circulated to the public on the 
progress that is being made. Although the CITES agreement is far more developed 
than the ASEAN Haze Agreement, the different nature of the two regimes in their 
relations to CSO actors proves the importance of openness as a critical factor which 
makes the two regimes very different in the effectiveness. The macro-structure 
network in the wildlife case presents the effectiveness of the networks in relation to 
regimes as the network is open to transnational actors to share their information and 
resources at the international level, coordinated by the CITES Secretariat and the 
ASEAN-WEN PCU. Therefore, openness to transnational actors is the most important 
factor causing the two network cases to deliver different effects on their regimes. 
The macro-structures of the networks in the two cases similarly present the 
importance of transnational actors who serve as centralities of subgroups in the 
network. In the haze case, about which inter-state cooperation cannot do much, non-
state actors apply several approaches to deal with the cause of the issue. 
Transnational actors coordinate individual and marginalized nodes with other 
network actors. Thus, information derived from the marginalized nodes 
(communities and local NGOs) and resources allocated by international actors could 
be met for better implementation at the local and community levels as well as 
monitoring at the international level. Information and evidence on the ground to 
punish businesses which apply unsustainable practice on the ground are 
transnationally supported by NGOs, while governance mechanisms such as consumer 
power and the Singaporean law on haze can be imposed on wrongdoers. Even though 
it is difficult to prosecute them legitimately, it can at least send a warning message 
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to businesses. The structure of the network shows the flow of resources and 
information sharing among actors whose attempts together help to reduce the haze 
problem. Therefore, despite the sluggish development of inter-state cooperation in 
governing the issue, CSO actors work individually and collectively to create their own 
mechanisms to protect and bypass the environment. Looking through the network 
lens, it reveals environmental governance activities which are not limited to state 
cooperation. Governance happens at almost all levels, even though it is not 
presented in formal or authoritative forms implemented by states or international 
institutions. 
Comparing the network components of the two cases is not only helpful in explaining 
which factors make one network more successful than the other in supporting the 
international regime; it also confirms that the structure which presents the features 
of good governance (communication, coordination and participation) can better 
improve regimes through better process. The networks in both cases attempt to 
improve the function of regimes through monitoring activities, in which the 
effectiveness of monitoring depends significantly on the communication among 
actors in circulating information, the participation of actors working in different levels 
for better transparency, and the function of the coordinated centre in finding a 
common goal in acting collectively and managing resources among network actors. 
The macro-structure of the wildlife network possesses better features of governance 
than the haze case, which can be noted from the number of actors who can 
participate in operations at different levels of governance, the role of centralities that 
are well connected with an ability to divide tasks based on the network’s expertise, 
and the connection among CSOs and the regime in supporting the other’s source of 
data. These not only help the centre of the regime to assess the wildlife situation; the 
information sharing links recognized by CITES also support transparency and they 
make the sanction mechanism of the regime more legitimate. Further, the 
transnational network, the ASEAN-WEN, in which the NGOs are the key actors in 
supporting resources and expertise as well as strengthening states’ capacities across 
the region, becomes a good model of transgovernmental enforcement network for 
other regions. In contrast, although the non-government network has an effect on 
governing the private sector, the macro-structure of the network reveals less 
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opportunity for the network actors to support the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre 
to improve the ineffective function of the regional monitoring mechanism. In 
addition, ties between NGOs and governmental agencies are quite limited when 
compared to those in the wildlife case. The major role of the centrality of the macro-
structure of the network, SIIA, is annually organizing a regional conference on the 
haze which all stakeholders are invited to exchange and present ideas, experience 
and updated situations. However, the forum of the network has not yet advanced in 
collectively managing their resources. 
The macro-structure of the wildlife case can better response to the nature of 
environmental issues. Although the overall attempt of the network is to conserve 
endangered wildlife species by preventing their over-exploitation through 
international trade regulation as well as by tackling the illegal wildlife trade by 
species, NGOs at different levels can operate with states and/or IGOs ranging from 
protecting the wildlife on the ground to strengthening governmental agencies’ 
capacity to stop transnational crimes at international ports and monitoring the 
overall situations of wildlife around the globe. The operations to end the 
transnational illegal wildlife trade are shared by non-state actors, and the success of 
those operations does not only depend on states’ burden in implementing the 
agreement. On the other hand, haze pollution, which is by its nature a transboundary 
problem, does not have any functional inter-state mechanisms to deal with it 
effectively. Further, the ties between transnational actors and state actors across 
levels of governance are very limited. Most CSOs can partially work on implementing 
projects at the community level. While there are several attempts initiated by the 
network of NGOs across levels to work collectively to improve the monitoring system 
to make better law enforcement, the Indonesian government is not likely to involve 
those actors into the process of improving land management at the national level or 
take the evidence collected by network actors on the ground to act seriously against 
the culprits. The nature of the transnational problem requires the flow of information 
to serve the better management of the issue. Comparing the two cases points out 
the importance of the coordinated ties between non-state and state actors across 
levels of governance in managing the transnational issues. 
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To summarize, although both cases reveal the effects of networks on the 
functionality of the regimes, some different characteristics of networks can help to 
explain why the network governing the wildlife conservation issue is more successful 
than the other. Firstly, there are more ties connecting network actors. These links are 
not only among the same kinds of actors; state and NGO actors are connected to 
work together at different levels. Secondly, the close ties between the regime’s 
centrality and CSO centralities reflect collaborations among different kinds of actors 
in sharing expertise to improve the effectiveness of the regime. The final 
characteristic is the attributes of the regime itself, which not only allow CSOs 
participation but also identify legitimate points of reference for the network to 
initiate activities and measures to support the regime. These characteristics of the 
macro-structure of networks in the wildlife case illustrate the role of policy networks 
in improving the policy process through better information, coordination and 
participation. 
6.3 The role of the policy networks towards international 
cooperation on the environment 
By comparing the two case studies, there are similarities and differences which can 
be used to clarify how the nature of environmental governance in Southeast Asia 
should be understood. This part firstly points out the similarities of states’ challenges 
and difficulties at the national level and within the ASEAN framework in advancing 
environmental policy and law over development. This illustrates why the 
development of environmental policy and law by individual national governments 
and ASEAN takes place slowly. While ASEAN cooperation may not be able to deal with 
transnational environmental issues, the second aim of this part proposes that 
regional environmental governance should be analysed not only from the regional 
level but also from functional activities at different levels and across levels. This is 
where actual governance happens to serve networks’ purposes and results in the 
improvement of the effectiveness of regimes. Applying the network approach by 
emphasizing resource sharing reveals how non-state actors have currently worked to 
solve environmental issues through several means including finding an opportunity 
to work with governmental agencies at the national and community levels. This 
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seems to be a normal phenomenon in developing countries. To discover the 
circumstances that make the network in one case more successful than in the other 
in delivering environmental outcomes, the final point analyses the key differences 
between the two cases, especially the existence of the global regime, which allows 
and legitimizes non-state actors to take part in inter-state cooperation activities. 
6.3.1 The state’s view on the environment and the nature of ASEAN 
cooperation on the environmental issues 
The first similarity derived from the comparison of two cases is states’ inactive 
response to environmental issues. This states’ position is obvious especially when 
observing the development of international cooperation on the environment as well 
as the motivations of states in formulating policy and enforcing the law on 
environmental conservation at the national level. As most ASEAN countries are 
developing countries, governments focus on economic development rather than 
conservation of the environment. Economic development is the first priority for 
governments; environmental issues come to states’ attention when they cause 
negative effects on the economy. 
There are reasons why it can be difficult for environmental issues and environmental 
policy to gain strong support from politicians at the national level and governments 
at the inter-state forum. Firstly, compared to economic development policy, 
environmental policy does not provide much incentive to gain support from 
politicians and ordinary people at the national level. In developing countries, where 
economic development is a critical condition for people’s quality of life, it is difficult 
to argue that the environmental issue is more important than the development one. 
For example, in the haze case, to prevent the occurrence of the haze, the government 
must conserve forests and peatlands. This policy could decrease Indonesia’s 
economic growth and incomes from issuing concessions to agricultural business. In 
the wildlife case, the policy to allocate forests for protected wild animals cannot be 
articulated easily without considering the local people living there. Environmental 
policy does not make politicians popular with voters, but economic development 
does. In addition, not only does environmental policy have difficulty gaining attention 
from politicians and the public; sometimes governmental agencies and politicians are 
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also involved in business. The haze case makes this more obvious: the palm oil 
business has a close relationship with politicians, while in the wildlife case corruption 
makes some authorities lax in investigation. As a result, in the haze case, when the 
Indonesian president proposed the moratorium policy, he faced various challenges 
from supporters of economic development. 
Secondly, as states have to compromise the needs of various interest groups, it is 
hard for the government to push forward environmental policy and law in an extreme 
way such as totally banning burning practices in the haze case and prohibiting the 
trade of ivory, since changes to traditional practices like using fires for land clearing 
and to cultural beliefs like consuming wildlife for medicine takes time. A compromise 
approach would help people gradually adjust and conform to more environmental 
rules. However, this approach often results in policy failures since culprits attempt to 
benefit from legal loopholes. For instance, the practice of burning under particular 
exceptions, such as controlled burning in the haze case, or breeding and farming rare 
species for consumption purposes, in the wildlife case, allows the practice to 
continue. The haze case can better present the state’s problem of implementation. 
Clearing land without using fires comes with higher costs, so this policy is not practical 
for small farmers. To impose the zero-burning policy strictly regardless of traditional 
practice and individuals could lead to the question of legitimacy. Another example, 
which both cases share, is the conservation policy to support protected areas. For 
both cases, conserving land by reserving wildlife habitats or the biodiversity balance 
in the peat soils cannot be addressed by the government, even though preserving 
forests or creating protected areas is the best way to prevent environmental 
degradation. This is because the rights of indigenous people who live in the forest 
should also be in the government’s consideration. Therefore, considering these 
examples, even though it is clear what should be done to effectively tackle the cause 
of the issue, in reality the government cannot make a sudden change in 
environmental policy and law since it also has to accommodate the needs of various 
interest groups. Considering this factor together with people’s huge support for 
politicians who back development policy, there is relatively little incentive for the 
government to shift the policy from pro-development to pro-conservation. The 
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absence of political will in encouraging policy to tackle environmental issues could be 
partially explained by these reasons. 
For the reasons stated above, it is not surprising that resources allocated to 
governmental agencies to implement environmental policy and activities to deal with 
the issues are insufficient. Despite the lack of resources for operations, positive 
signals such as the establishment of a special governmental body or a department for 
better coordination with national enforcement agencies on overlapping 
responsibilities for managing environmental issues are hardly set out by 
governments. 
At the international level, environmental issues come second to economic 
development. The issues were brought into the ASEAN forum when they threatened 
members’ economic development. ASEAN cooperation on environmental issues is 
not based on members’ needs to protect the environment but the environment 
issues are international because they affect the economic development of member 
countries. In the haze case, the Indonesia–Singapore tension persists since Indonesia 
is not likely to trade her economic development for a forest conservation policy. 
While Singapore has requested several times that Indonesia follow ASEAN guidelines 
to tackle the issue, Indonesia has made little progress to fulfil the objectives of the 
ASEAN Haze Agreement. For example, although Indonesia has been urged to prevent 
the haze by conserving and restoring peatlands, in most incidences Indonesia has 
chosen to spend huge budgets on firefighting, especially after the government had 
been politically criticized by people and countries when the fires were less likely to 
be controllable. 
In the wildlife case, even though ASEAN-WEN was created to fulfil the objectives of 
CITES, it also aims to avoid the members getting trade sanctions if they fail to detect 
shipments of illegal trade of wildlife. If the trade sanction is imposed, the business 
related to the legal wildlife trade will also be banned. This harms the national 
economy as many countries in the region are rich in biodiversity and the wildlife trade 
is an important source of national income. Apart from the goals for increasing the 
effectiveness of law enforcement, states also use the ASEAN-WEN forum to discuss 
their mutual interest deriving from collectively updating the CITES appendices before 
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proposing them to the CITES committee. That updating information is also included 
the intention of states to downgrade or remove some wild species such as crocodiles 
from the list. According to a national environmental official, fewer restrictions on 
exporting wildlife products internationally means more revenues for the state, and 
CITES is about the politics of interests in the wildlife trade. From this example, 
international cooperation on CITES among ASEAN countries is improved. However, 
this is not for environmental conservation but for economic gain, through the 
increasing of international exports of wildlife. Wildlife species are seen as a kind of 
national commodity which brings about economic development rather than a part of 
the biodiversity in ecosystems that should be protected from human over-
exploitation. 
Based on ASEAN’s position, cooperation on transnational environmental issues in 
both cases is not driven by states’ intention to sustain the environment but on the 
national interests in economic development. While ASEAN cooperation in the haze 
case is driven by the needs of Indonesia to develop her economy and the cost to 
Singapore when the haze comes each year, ASEAN-WEN cooperation is driven by 
economic disadvantage from trade sanctions. These driving forces also demonstrate 
why the environmental issues, which are always last on any agenda, can gain more 
concern and attention from states. Since the CITES regime is more progressive and it 
is legitimately supported by a sanction mechanism, regimes’ development in terms 
of policy and laws can be seen more obviously at the national and operational levels. 
The state’s consideration and exploitation of the environment and the underlying 
driving forces on those environmental issues can be used to explain why the progress 
of environmental policy and law within ASEAN cooperation on the two environmental 
issues has developed differently. In the haze case, under the ASEAN principles of non-
interference, aside from Indonesia and her affected neighbouring countries other 
members are not involved. The progress of cooperation depends on the negotiation 
and consent of Indonesia in balancing her economic development and the 
conservation of the forests and peatlands. On the other hand, to avoid trade 
sanctions from CITES, each country has to report its progress on the national action 
plan and related laws to the CITES; further, national authorities have to improve their 
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capacity for monitoring and enforcing the environmental law on the wildlife trade. As 
the objective that ASEAN-WEN was set is better coordination among ASEAN member 
countries for the control of the illegal wildlife trade at international transit points, the 
more active and collective reaction from ASEAN countries at the regional level has 
resulted in more successful regional operations in seizures and the formulation of 
better environmental policy at the national level. 
Although the two cases reflect the different progress of international regimes on the 
development of environmental policy, ASEAN as a regional organization has instead 
taken an insignificant role in moving forward the regional policy on the environment. 
In the haze case, the issue has been taken into the ASEAN forum since 1990s, 
however the forum seems to have has little influence on Indonesia to adopt and 
develop environmental policy to prevent seasonal fires. The conversation in the 
forum has been about what Singapore has asked Indonesia to do and Indonesia’s 
excuses for her failure to deliver on those requests. The progress of the cooperation 
may constrain Indonesia’s development and the government may lose political 
popularity. Moreover, it may cause conflict among different interest groups within 
the country. In contrast, apart from political and diplomatic tensions from 
neighbouring countries, failing to comply with the ASEAN agreement costs nothing 
for Indonesia since ASEAN’s principle of non-interference and the absence of sanction 
mechanism in the ASEAN Haze Agreement allow its members to act voluntarily. Even 
though recently there have been several projects to support the Indonesian 
president’s moratorium policy, this policy shift was not an ASEAN initiative. Instead, 
it was the deal on Indonesia’s carbon trading scheme with other developed countries 
under the REDD programme that motivated the Indonesian government to formulate 
and implement the environmental policy to conserve forests and peatlands. 
Similarly, in the wildlife case, there is scant regional environmental policy on the 
protection of endangered wildlife species initiated by the ASEAN-WEN forum. 
According to Participant G (2015), ASEAN-WEN does not need to create regional 
policy because that policy is every country’s responsible for CITES. States, especially 
those of CITES’s primary and secondary concern, need to develop their 
environmental policy to reach the CITES criteria. Otherwise, trade sanctions will be 
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imposed and affect every department and section related to the wildlife trade. 
Therefore, the forum focused on operations to fulfil the CITES obligations (by 
improving ASEAN’s national agencies’ capacity, communication and coordination) 
rather than collectively developed environmental policy on protecting endangered 
wildlife species. 
In short, the state’s perception and ASEAN cooperation on the environment in the 
two cases are the reasons behind the slow pace of the regional response in terms 
of policy to the transnational environmental issues. ASEAN, as a regional 
organization, does not serve as a forum for developing regional environmental 
policy to tackle the issues seriously. On the contrary, the ASEAN meetings are 
for discussing the state’s interests in the wildlife case, and the endless negotiation 
without satisfactory solution for affected countries in the haze case. However, this 
does not mean that ASEAN cooperation on the environmental issues is meaningless. 
ASEAN cooperation has initiated and established mutual goals for managing them, 
even though the issues cannot currently be solved successfully. Within the context of 
developing countries, whose governments have to give priority to economic 
development, there is less possibility for them to shift their development policy to 
focus more on environmental protection. Since the development of policy to protect 
the environment seems less attractive for governments and the ASEAN forum, to 
understand how policy can be shifted in a more conservation-focused way would 
necessarily consider from the activities of non-state actors who could be a key factor 
in slowing down or adjusting the balance of states’ policies, which is currently 
dominated by development over the environment. 
6.3.2 The role of CSOs and their networks in developing environmental 
policy and governance 
The second observation derived from comparing the two cases is the active role of 
environmental NGOs in urging governments to shift from a development policy to an 
environmental policy. Although the two cases are different in terms of the advance 
of policy and law on the environment, most NGOs encourage states to formulate a 
tougher policy aimed to protect the environment. In both cases, sustainable policy to 
balance the needs of economic development and the awareness of limitation of the 
- 218 - 
environment is referred to by non-state actors involving in dealing with transnational 
issues. In the wildlife case, in which illegal practices and sustainable exploitation of 
wildlife are more clearly defined, the network of NGOs with connections to CITES at 
the global level can act better nationally to observe and advocate the development 
of environmental policy. For example, WWF-Thailand worked closely with 
governmental agencies to draft the CITES national ivory action plan to better 
controlling the trade in ivory. In addition, NGOs are generally taking a leading role in 
objecting to the government’s development plans such as dam and road construction 
threatening the forests and wildlife species. With the clear common goal in protecting 
the wildlife species guided by the CITES agreement, environmental NGOs have 
applied different approaches to slow down development policy and/or push forward 
environmental policy. Their different strategies range from the extreme (such as 
protesting development policy, supporting the total ban of the wildlife trade) to the 
moderate (such as working closely with the government to gradually close the 
national legal loopholes). 
Similarly, in the haze case, non-state actors involved in non-government networks act 
to support particular environmental policies to decrease the degradation of the 
environment caused by development policy. Even though the policy to ban the slash-
and-burn method completely is currently problematic and states are in the process 
of negotiation, network actors in different subgroups of the macro-structural 
network support pro-environmental policies ranging from a zero-burning policy for 
agricultural businesses to a moratorium policy for reducing the use of land in fire-
prone areas and a reforestation policy to restore degraded peatlands. As the haze 
case is more complicated than the wildlife case owing to its inclusion of the question 
of different groups’ interests, poor land use management, poverty and the absence 
of a global regime (with a sanction mechanism) guiding states on what practice is 
legal or illegal, the balance of development and environmental policy to deal with the 
haze issue is vague and based highly on actors’ interpretations. Disagreement – over 
the extent to which the environment should outweigh people’s need for 
development – sometimes causes conflicts among subgroups; however, these actors 
who support sustainable development policy and environmental policy are necessary 
to decelerate the development force by proposing that government take time to 
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reconsider the more seriously negative impacts derived from economically oriented 
development. 
6.3.3 The role of non-government networks in connecting to the global 
regime 
Since the development of environmental policy at the national and regional level 
gains meagre attention from governments in developing countries, CSOs have to 
make considerable efforts and techniques to raise the importance of their issues if 
their goal is to make changes in terms of policy. This brings about two significant and 
related roles of networks. The third observation from comparing the networks is that 
their role in advancing environmental policy can be more successful through global 
regime since ASEAN cooperation on the environment rarely offers a political channel 
for networks to engage in the policy development process. Even though the wildlife 
case seems to have more channels for the network to shape policy at the national 
level, this can be done through the CITES forum. If there is a global regime with an 
effective sanction mechanism similar to the CITES agreement to support the 
sustainable exploitation of peatlands, this could increase the role of the non-
government networks in the haze case to support, pressure or monitor states in their 
formulation of national policy to comply with such a regime. Ongsiriwittaya (2015) 
notes that raising the importance of environmental issues in the region through 
ASEAN bodies is hard to achieve since ASEAN gives more priority to regional security 
and political issues like the South China Sea. The haze issue, which should be the most 
important environmental agenda for ASEAN, cannot be cooperated on successfully. 
In the illegal wildlife trade issue, the development of environmental policy is hard to 
achieve since ASEAN has a principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. More 
importantly, since the development of policy is based on the principle of consensus, 
the development of environmental policy in the ASEAN forum is possible but minimal 
owing to each ASEAN country having its own environmental problems. For example, 
in the ASEAN SOMTC (the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Transnational Crime), 
environmental crime was proposed to be included as an additional category of 
transnational crime. However, when the meeting discussed in detail what 
environmental crime should be included, certain environmental issues such as 
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electronic waste were rejected by some countries that were facing the issues 
domestically. Therefore, the ASEAN forum is not attractive for NGOs compared to 
other regional organization bodies on environmental issues as the shift of policy 
requires a lot of energy and time. Therefore, in advocating policy at the international 
level, WWF will choose to engage with more constructive international bodies that 
can bring about expected outcomes with less time and resources being consumed 
(Ongsiriwittaya, 2015). 
The context of developing countries makes the development of environmental policy 
difficult to achieve, and the shift of environmental policy rarely happens suddenly 
and obviously by states. Therefore, the functional role of policy networks should 
receive more attention to better understand how the environment in the region is 
sustained. Networks’ functional activities to improve the effectiveness of regimes 
would be a crucial factor in tipping the balance between the overwhelming need for 
development and environmental conservation. More importantly, network 
perspectives can better illustrate how transnational environmental issues in the 
region are actually managed through the connections of different kinds of actor 
across levels of governance. Since ASEAN does not significantly influence its members 
to comply with what they have agreed on environmental issues, environmental 
governance does not often result from the ASEAN forum at the regional level. On the 
other hand, the connections between network actors initiate and operate lots of 
activities to fulfil the objectives of those international agreements. Therefore, 
focusing only on high-level inter-state governance on the progress of environmental 
policy and law may reflect only a partial understanding of environmental governance 
in the region since inter-state cooperation cannot do much as their negotiation is 
highly dominated by economic development. This also results in the ineffectiveness 
of regimes in responding to environmental issues. However, underlying the failure of 
inter-state cooperation in safeguarding the environment, networks are crucial 
components that function to govern transnational issues. 
While networks can do little to shape environmental policy, they are significant, as in 
the fourth observation, in sustaining and improving the quality of environmental 
regimes through functional activities. The network actors in the two cases act 
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similarly in bypassing the objectives of state agreement through functional 
governance activities. Transnational environmental governance happens significantly 
by collaboration among network actors at different levels and across levels. The links 
between NGOs and governmental agencies mostly at the national level and also 
across levels are obvious since their works complementary to each other. Their works 
obviously emphasize practical policy implementation and enforcement rather than 
accelerating the formulation of environmental policy. This is because of the limited 
political opportunity for them to participate at the national and/or ASEAN level in 
general. 
While the existing environmental regimes contain governance gaps – including 
several loopholes and insufficient resource allocation for environmental department 
and law enforcement agencies – primary role of the network actors is to minimize 
those gaps and bolster the implementation of environmental policy through projects 
and activities. Even though these activities may not cause a dramatic change to 
regional and national policy on the environment, they attempt to slow down the 
harsh pressure on the environment deriving from the development priority set by 
governments. 
6.3.4 The role of policy networks in sustaining regional environmental 
governance 
The network analysis method reveals complementary functional relationships 
between state and non-state actors in governing transnational environmental issues 
at different levels, even though non-state actors’ political opportunities to shape 
policy at ASEAN meetings is limited in both cases. These non-state actors play a 
complementary role supporting states to achieve the objectives of international 
regimes. Firstly, NGOs are key actors in the process of implementing regional projects 
guided by regimes. At the regional level, it can be observed that, while ASEAN 
meetings are forums for members to cooperate and negotiate on environmental 
issues, implementation of what they have agreed depends on individual states. Apart 
from regular ASEAN meetings, joint projects or activities to fulfil objectives of the 
cooperation funded by ASEAN are rarely found. In the haze case, the approval from 
Indonesia to accept Malaysian and Singaporean assistance and to extend the MOU 
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to prevent future fires was not easily achieved. This is similar in the ASEAN-WEN 
forum, where the budget for strengthening the network’s capacity to function better 
has been problematic. The implementation of projects to achieve the objectives of 
ASEAN cooperation on transnational environmental issues has been highly reliant on 
funds from international agencies as well as financial and technical resources from 
NGOs. Therefore, even though NGOs cannot gain direct access in the ASEAN 
dialogues, especially in the environmental policy development process, they regularly 
carry on and concretely implement regional projects by working with communities, 
authorities and other NGOs at the local level. 
Secondly, at the national and community levels, NGOs regularly work to support 
governmental agencies, especially in the areas where policy choices have been clearly 
made by states. In the illegal wildlife trafficking issue, which is less conflict-ridden 
than the haze, NGOs individually and collectively work with national government 
agencies to promote wildlife protection activities and strengthen law enforcement 
operations. For example, NGOs in Vietnam and Thailand present similar functions in 
supporting governmental agencies. Normally, they work as partners of authorities 
from different departments. In addition, they can work collectively to promote public 
campaigns to protect the wildlife as a task complementary to reducing people’s 
wildlife consumption and raising people’s awareness of the importance of 
endangered species. However, they can act together in protesting against national 
policy that severely harms the environment. In the haze case, where the president’s 
moratorium policy is in conflict with the national development policy, NGOs and the 
environment research centre have entered fire-prone areas then worked with local 
governments and communities to implement reforestation and peat restoration 
projects. Even though the problem of land management persists, local NGOs act as 
key actors to support better law enforcement by handing strong evidence to the 
courts. Further, they are active in following up the implementation of environmental 
policy and sending alerts to their network members and the public to keep an eye on 
contradictory practice on land use policy, for example the issuing of concessions 
licences for palm oil businesses by local authorities or the Ministry of Agriculture 
despite the president’s moratorium policy. In this aspect, although the watchdog role 
of NGOs seems opposed to the government’s development policy, it can be 
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considered a complementary role for supporting the forest and peat conservation 
policy led by the president’s initiative and the Indonesian Ministry of Environment 
and Forest. 
Thirdly, to achieve the objectives of international regimes, NGOs, which are the 
centres of the network’s subgroups, work transnationally with states and non-state 
actors at different levels. They have a critical role in linking information hierarchically 
and horizontally: the objectives from the top and the results after implementing 
policy from the bottom; sending requests and suggestions to the leaders from the 
bottom; and sharing of best practices and experience to network actors. In addition, 
these transnational NGOs are linked by governmental agencies, local NGOs and 
communities by participating in projects. Even though these different kinds of actors 
may have different prioritized needs, transnational NGOs can pool their collective 
concerns and invite them to work together to carrying out the project relevant to 
their issues. 
These activities show that the network perspective is a better approach for 
understanding the actual process of environmental governance in the region. By 
comparing the two cases, it is revealed that there has been little progress in what 
ASEAN can do through regional cooperation on the environment. As governments of 
developing countries, their interactions are dominated by concerns of national 
economic development, even though the forum should be for finding collective 
solutions for effectively dealing with environmental issues. Therefore, apart from 
regular ASEAN meetings to agree on environmental policy – which always minimizes 
substance to gain all members’ consent – environmental governance is 
underdeveloped at the ASEAN level. By investigating what non-state actors had done, 
which has a significant impact in pursuing the objectives of international agreements, 
it is apparent that these activities constitute the macro-structure of networks, which 
includes different kinds of actors contributing to the common ultimate goal of dealing 
with the issues, even though they may apply different means. Therefore, comparing 
the two cases indicates the similar role of networks in functioning to improve the 
effectiveness of environmental regimes. NGOs at different levels are linked by 
information and resource sharing for improving the monitoring system to deal with 
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deviations from agreed practices. The networks also link with national governmental 
authorities, local government and communities to implement projects to directly 
fulfil the objectives of the regimes. 
6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter applies a comparative method and network perspectives to answer the 
research questions. In the first section, the cases are compared through the structural 
framework developed in Chapter 3. It is found that despite the cases being ongoing 
environmental problems and CSOs being involved in managing them, there are fewer 
political channels for CSOs to work with the ASEAN forum in the haze case. This 
distinct difference results from the differences in the nature of the international 
cooperation problem. This condition sets different international political contexts 
and determines political opportunities for CSOs to support states/IGOs on 
information sharing and regional monitoring mechanism. Comparing the 
effectiveness of regimes and policy networks in two cases, the wildlife case is more 
effective, and different kinds of policy networks are revealed. This section, therefore, 
presents the nature of the international problem, the kinds of policy networks and 
the maturity of international regimes as key differences for explaining why 
environmental cooperation in the wildlife case is more successful than for the haze. 
The second section examines the macro-structure of networks and uses the network 
analysis method to investigate the relationships between the macro-structure of 
networks and its impacts on the effectiveness of regimes. There are three parts in 
this section. The first part emphasizes the functional roles of policy networks that 
support particular environmental policy through information and resource sharing 
activities. Policy networks in both cases play a crucial role in improving monitoring 
systems and implementing environmental projects to achieve the objectives of 
international agreements. Supporting the monitoring system helps to strengthen law 
enforcement and deterrence. However, since the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre 
does not accept information sharing from non-government networks, the networks’ 
attempt can only and partially control some groups of transnational business such as 
palm oil plantations which have company assets in Singapore. Therefore, in 
improving the effectiveness of regimes, policy networks in the wildlife case that are 
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recognized by ASEAN can have more impacts on the effectiveness of regimes. Even 
though policy networks in both cases have different political opportunities to work 
with ASEAN, their works intentionally contribute to improving the effectiveness of 
the regimes. Actual environmental governance in managing the transnational 
environmental issues can be presented through the connections of actors linked by 
functional activities at different levels and across levels. 
The second part of the second section analyses why there is more development of 
environmental policy in the wildlife case than for the haze. The number of subgroups 
and the number of links between state and non-state actors are investigated to 
analyse the influential role of policy networks in shaping environmental policy at 
different levels. From the macro-structure of networks, subgroups in the haze case 
are more noticeable than in the wildlife case. The more the subgroups are clearly 
seen, the more signals on conflicts and disagreement among them can be assumed. 
Therefore, even though there is a common goal of ending the problem in terms of 
problem-solving, disagreement on approaches to manage the problem can lessen 
their influential efforts in shaping policy. Compared to the wildlife case, network 
actors are closely linked and it is harder to identify the subgroups. Information and 
resources are complementarily shared among network actors. Although they bolster 
different policy, they do not work contradictorily. This makes policy networks in the 
wildlife case more influential in shaping environmental policy than those in the haze 
case. Observing the number of information sharing links between CSOs and IGOs 
and/or state actors at different levels and across levels, there are many more links in 
the wildlife case. NGOs in the wildlife case can also connect to other international 
forums, apart from ASEAN-WEN PCU. Therefore, NGOs in the wildlife case have more 
capacity to expand their concerns to other political channels outside the ASEAN 
forum. While the capacity of non-government networks to advance regional 
environmental policy is constrained in both case, the networks of NGOs in the wildlife 
case can work transnationally to monitor states’ compliance with CITES by reporting 
the progress of environmental law development at the national level to the CITES 
Secretariat. With the sanction mechanism, the adjustment of policy to protect the 
environment in the wildlife case is more obvious than in the haze case. This section, 
therefore, identifies the less obvious of the subgroups, the more connections 
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between CSOs and IGOs/states and the existence of alternative political channels for 
NGOs as factors that lead to a more influential role of policy networks in moving 
environmental policy at different levels in the region. 
The third part of this section applies the network analysis method to examine the 
internal attributes of the macro-structure of networks in the two cases. Comparing 
the structure of networks in the two cases reveals that the better structure of 
networks, including more ties among centralities, more ties among network actors 
and more links among different kinds of network actors, makes networks in the 
wildlife case operate more effectively than in the haze case. Regimes’ monitoring 
systems can be better improved by policy networks whose structure possesses better 
coordination in sharing responsibility, better communication among network actors 
and better participation through collaborative work among different kinds of actors. 
This part also examines the connections among actors in particular positions: the 
regime coordinating centres and their existing links to other network centralities. It 
is shown that the regime coordinating centre in the wildlife case, which is more open 
to transnational actors, makes better progress for state cooperation in managing the 
transnational issues. In contrast, the regime coordinating centre in the haze case has 
very limited links to CSOs and it does not have links to the SIIA, the centrality of the 
macro-structure of the networks. The links between centralities and the regime’s 
coordinating centre not only imply the openness of regimes to transnational actors 
but also confirm the importance of transnational CSOs and the openness of inter-
state cooperation as factors that potentially lead to better effectiveness of regimes 
and the environmental outcomes once CSOs can engage with states and IGOs in form 
of networks. 
The final section discusses the similarities and differences of the two cases to point 
out some features of environmental governance and to emphasize the role of policy 
networks to shape international cooperation on the environment in the region. There 
are four key observations that can be taken from comparing the case studies. The 
first observation is the similarity of states and ASEAN in generally responding to the 
environmental problems sluggishly. The environmental issues are not appealing for 
politicians and they are always last on the agenda, with less priority than other issues. 
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Also, political will in raising the importance of the environment is absent. Insufficient 
resource allocation for managing environmental issues is obvious at the national level 
and ASEAN cooperation. The only way to raise the importance of the environmental 
issues is to relate it to other issues such as the economy and people’s health in the 
haze case or economic sanctions from CITES and transnational crimes and terrorists 
in the wildlife case. Although in the wildlife case ASEAN-WEN achieves more for 
ASEAN cooperation to fulfil CITES obligations through better implementation and law 
enforcement, ASEAN coordinating centres in both cases do not play a significant role 
in formulating, strengthening and/or moving forward regional environmental policy 
in a more conservation-focused way. National and regional policy focuses pretty 
much on economic development. In states’ economic-oriented circumstances, the 
second observation that can be seen commonly in both cases is the active role of 
CSOs, which attempt to slow down the natural degradation resulting from 
unsustainable economic development. CSOs and their networks apply several 
approaches to support sustainable development and environmental protection 
policies. 
The third part of this section notes the different progress in terms of policy shift. 
Policy networks in the wildlife case have more opportunity to transnationally engage 
with CITES as well as work complementarily with environmental departments at the 
national level. While the ASEAN forum is less open and less attractive to CSOs owing 
to the consensus system, NGOs in the wildlife case can have many more channels to 
communicate and operate in other international forums. The better structure of 
networks and their connections to work with the CITES Secretariat in the wildlife case 
provides network actors with more opportunities to play a role in shaping 
environmental policy at the national level. However, since instant changes in terms 
of policy in developing countries can rarely happen, the focus should be on the 
functional activities of policy networks. The connections among various kinds of 
actors in complementary operations to support existing regional and national 
environmental policy reveal actual governance activities. These activities bolster and 
contribute to the better achievement of international environmental agreements. 
Regimes can function better once states and IGOs provide a political channel to CSOs 
who are part of policy networks. Policy networks, discussed in the fourth part of this 
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section, therefore, sustain regional environmental governance by having crucial roles 
in providing resources for regional and national project implementation, 
complementarily working to support environmental and enforcement agencies for 
better law enforcement, and coordinating and improving communication among 
state and non-state actors across levels.  
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 Conclusion 
7.1 Summary of the thesis 
ASEAN cooperation on transnational environmental issues has always been judged a 
failure and ineffective owing to the recurrence of the problem. Previous studies have 
identified several factors explaining why states and regional IGOs have not been able 
to solve the issues effectively. This thesis does not refute those analyses; however, it 
explores current governance activities confronting those issues with an aim of 
identifying an alternative approach for strengthening environmental governance in 
the region. Since environmental issues in Southeast Asia are complicated, ongoing 
and unlikely to be solved in a short time, this research assesses the effectiveness of 
regimes in terms of process rather than product. Since network governance is 
considered a kind of global governance mechanism that potentially affects 
international outcomes in areas that are not priorities for states, the network 
approach has been applied to compare two case studies to confirm whether policy 
networks are factors which can lead to a better international policy process. This 
study observes the influential role of policy networks in different stages of the 
international policy process to find out the circumstances in which policy networks 
can facilitate inter-state cooperation on transnational environmental issues in the 
region. To answer the main research question, four subquestions are developed to 
examine factors which are later considered in the comparative analysis chapter. 
These subquestions are: 
1. What are the components (kinds of actor, number of ties, subgroups and central 
nodes) of policy networks? 
2. How do policy networks operate to improve the effectiveness of international 
regimes? 
3. To what extent can non-state actors in policy networks engage in the ASEAN policy 
development process? 
4. What are the significant roles of policy networks in governing the transnational 
environmental issues in the region? 
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The issues of transboundary haze and transnational illegal wildlife trade are selected 
to answer these research questions. Two methods – which are together called 
comparative network analysis – are applied to find an explanation for relationships 
between the policy networks and the effectiveness of regimes. Firstly, a structural 
framework for comparative study is constructed as a guideline to examine different 
stages of the international policy process, where policy networks can potentially play 
a role in improving the effectiveness of regimes. Secondly, the network analysis 
method is applied to identify actors (states, IGOs and CSOs) involved in the policy 
networks. Connections among network actors are identified by information and 
resource sharing activities which support specific policies to achieve the ultimate goal 
of international regimes. The network analysis method is used to compare the macro-
structure networks of the two cases. This allows us to analyse the attributes of 
network actors, the number of ties among actors, and the role of the coordination 
centre. These components of the policy network indicate the effectiveness of 
network, which can be considered a critical factor contributing to the effectiveness 
of regimes. 
In the transboundary haze issue, the policy network comprises groups of non-
government networks. The members of the subgroups are tied by information and 
resource sharing to monitor and implement a particular policy which they agree to 
be the best means to end the haze problem. These policies include zero-
deforestation, conservation of the peatlands and forest, and sustainable 
management and development. Since these policies provide benefits and costs to 
different interest groups, they constrain cooperative efforts among groups in the 
policy network. The complicated nature of this international cooperation problem 
does not only result in limited political opportunity for policy networks to engage in 
the ASEAN meetings on haze; ASEAN ignores information on maps gathered by the 
policy network to make the regional monitoring system function temporarily. 
Therefore, even though the policy network attempts to improve the effectiveness of 
the haze regime by improving the monitoring system – which can lead to better 
deterrence and law enforcement – the network’s role in directly influencing or 
improving ASEAN cooperation on haze is very limited. However, subgroups of policy 
network are significantly taking two functional roles in governing the haze issue in 
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the region. Firstly, the network attempts to support the establishment of sanction 
mechanisms. On-the-ground evidence, satellite data and map information are sent 
to Singapore and the RSPO Secretariat to deter companies from using the slash-and-
burn method. Their second role is in implementing regional projects, for example 
ASEAN peatland management in the haze case and capacity building for ASEAN 
governmental agencies in the wildlife case, to achieve the objectives of the policy. 
While ASEAN cooperation does not respond to the issue sufficiently, the policy 
network, which includes the subgroups of non-government network, can have an 
effect on the development of the regime. More importantly, policy networks operate 
to enhance environmental governance on the haze issue in the region. 
In the case of the transnational illegal wildlife trade and trafficking, the policy 
network comprises the transgovernmental network (ASEAN-WEN) and non-
government networks. Freeland and TRAFFIC – key transnational NGOs and central 
nodes of non-government networks – are included in ASEAN-WEN to strengthen the 
capacity of the network. As a member of the transgovernmental network, Freeland 
and TRAFFIC play a crucial role in establishing the ASEAN-WEN PCU, organizing 
workshops to coordinate governmental agencies better, and increasing the capacity 
of governmental agencies in operations. These activities can noticeably improve the 
effectiveness of ASEAN cooperation for better implementation of CITES. 
Improvement of ASEAN cooperation in tackling the illegal trade in wildlife can be 
perceived from the increased number of seizures. In addition, transnational NGOs in 
ASEAN-WEN have identified their key task by sharing their responsibilities based on 
each organization’s expertise to support government agencies. On the other hand, as 
a member of the non-government network, Freeland and TRAFFIC also take a 
coordinating role as they possess a number of ties with central nodes of subgroups 
whose concerns are based on wildlife species. Freeland and TRAFFIC also monitor 
states’ compliance with the CITES regime. They work together to monitor and 
implement projects on wildlife conservation. Information from different areas are 
collected and circulated among network actors. Importantly, this information can be 
submitted to the CITES Secretariat. However, although Freeland and TRAFFIC are 
partners of ASEAN-WEN, they barely have a role in shaping regional policy in the 
policymaking process. The forum is reserved only for state actors. At the regional 
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level, ASEAN-WEN’s close session makes states work closer; however, the decisions 
made in the meeting do not always develop environmental policy to conserve 
wildlife. This is because they are based closely on the national interest and the 
perspective of seeing wildlife as a kind of national commodity. Therefore, instead of 
shifting individual states’ environmental policy through ASEAN, transnational NGOs 
in non-government networks choose to work with CITES since the forum gives a 
political channel for them to support the global monitoring system on the trade in 
wildlife. Despite NGOs in the region having different organizational mandates, they 
rarely work against each other. They can actively work together to oppose 
development projects which can cause immense harm to the environment. Apart 
from NGOs’ cooperative efforts in the form of network, NGOs are individually key 
actors in wildlife and forest conservation by working with people, communities, 
government agencies and intergovernmental organizations. 
By comparing the two cases, it is clear that the CITES regime is more effective than 
the anti-haze regime. Policy networks can be a crucial factor supporting the regimes’ 
effectiveness. Examining the components of the network (the number of network 
actors, the number of ties, the ability of the network’s coordinator and centrality) 
helps to explain why the regime governing the illegal trade in wildlife functions more 
effectively. Policy networks in the two cases are similar in taking functional roles 
through operations to strengthen the regime’s monitoring system and better 
implementation to fulfil the objectives of international agreements. However, the 
non-government networks in the two cases are different in their ability to push target 
states to develop environmental policy and mechanisms. Although in both cases non-
government networks cannot shape environmental policy through the ASEAN 
framework, transnational NGOs in the wildlife case can find alternative political 
opportunities by engaging with other IGOs at the international level and with states 
at the national level. More political opportunities in the wildlife case can be observed 
from the distinct numbers of ties between CSOs and IGOs. The nature of the 
cooperation problem and the quality of regimes are key factors underlying different 
political opportunity structures for CSOs in each case to connect with states and IGOs. 
The nature of the international problem in the haze case contains high degrees of 
conflict, not only between Indonesia and affected states but also among subgroups 
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of policy networks whose concerns relate to the interests of different groups of 
stakeholders. Political opportunities for non-governmental actors is very limited. 
Apart from GEC, which implements the ASEAN peatland management project, other 
key transnational NGOs that are central nodes of subgroups of networks are 
disconnected from the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre. On the other hand, the 
wildlife issue is the inter-state operational problem in controlling the wildlife 
exploitation. The key central nodes of non-government networks can link with the 
CITES Secretariat, IGOs and states. Therefore, in the wildlife case, as central nodes of 
non-government networks, Freeland and TRAFFIC take dual roles in supporting 
ASEAN countries for better implementation of law enforcement, and in influencing 
the improvement of individual states’ environmental policy by providing information 
on compliance and the progress of implementation to the CITES Secretariat. With the 
CITES economic sanction mechanisms and a political opportunity for non-
government networks to strengthen the monitoring system, the non-government 
networks can play an influential role in shifting policy in a more conservation-focused 
way. Comparing the two cases reveals particular features of the state, non-state 
actors and ASEAN’s coordinating centre in governing transnational environmental 
issues in Southeast Asia as set out below. 
1. ASEAN member countries will not take any serious action on an environmental 
issue unless the issue causes negative effects to their national interests, especially on 
the economy. International agreements in both cases were signed by relevant 
parties, with various incentives based on their national interests. Indonesia signed 
the ASEAN agreement on haze because the agreement neither assigned any 
obligations nor imposed sanctions on parties. The agreement, on the contrary, 
confirmed the principle of sovereignty; in particular, any assistances must get 
approval from the requesting or receiving party. In the wildlife case, states signed 
CITES as a requirement to engage in the legal international trade on wildlife with 
other parties, even though the agreement came with obligations and sanction 
mechanisms. The interest-based orientation of ASEAN states is obvious in both cases. 
In the haze case, ASEAN countries which do not suffer the negative externalities from 
the smoke exclude themselves from the issues, even though they are parties to the 
agreement. The progress of the regime depends on Indonesia’s willingness to 
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improve her development policy and land management system, while Singapore and 
Malaysia, which suffer from the issue annually, cannot do much more than blaming 
and offering assistance to Indonesia. Similarly, in the wildlife case, ASEAN countries 
are more active in responding to the illegal wildlife trade issue once they are 
threatened by the CITES Secretariat with economic sanctions if they continue to fail 
to control illegal trade and trafficking. 
2. As a regional organization, ASEAN cannot play a significant role in accelerating 
inter-state cooperation on environmental issues. The ASEAN coordinating centre in 
each case does not take an effective role in gathering the necessary information from 
member countries. Based on the ASEAN principles of non-interference, consultation 
and members’ voluntary rather than mandatory international responsibilities and 
obligations, the coordination centre does not have any authority to obtain data or 
records since the members do not have an obligation to provide them. Furthermore, 
the ASEAN forum is very state-centric and serves only for the interests of its 
members, which prioritize economic development. Although some NGOs can engage 
in ASEAN-WEN, they cannot have an influential role to shift regional policy in a pro-
environmental direction. Therefore, this leads to the conclusion that ASEAN is not a 
suitable platform for advocating environmental policy since the forum is highly 
dominated by the state and the coordinating centre does not have sufficient ability 
to advance the needs of different stakeholders involved in the environmental issues. 
3. Non-state actors, especially NGOs, are in both cases taking a critical and functional 
role in sustaining the quality of the environment and in supporting environmental 
policy in the region at different levels and across levels of governance. At the national 
and community levels, NGOs normally do projects advocating the environment to the 
public, working as a watchdog on governments’ policies that harm the environment, 
and collaborating with government authorities to implement environmental 
programmes and/or strengthen the effectiveness of law enforcement. Furthermore, 
the network approach proposes the significant role of network actors – who work at 
different levels but are transnationally connected to each other – in strengthening 
the international regime by improving the functioning of the regime’s monitoring 
system. Even though these non-state actors cannot have a political opportunity to 
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develop regional environmental policy, they still have a crucial direct role in 
implementing conservation policy and supporting pro-conservation policy in the 
region. 
By comparing the two cases, the power relationships between ASEAN states and non-
state actors in governing the issues can be noted. States are the most powerful actors 
and they decide who can be engaged in the international policy process. Observing 
the connections between states and non-state actors, it is found that NGOs can 
complementarily work with the state when mutual objectives can be identified. 
Within these relations, NGOs which take a compromising, non-aggressive and 
constructive approach are allowed to supply their resources, knowledge and 
expertise to states. In this aspect, even though the NGOs at the national level want 
to achieve a more extreme goal in conserving the environment, they have to trade 
their ambition for better political opportunities to develop trust and work closely 
with the government. 
7.2 Summary of the findings 
The findings can be summarized as follows. 
1. What are the components (kinds of actor, number of ties, subgroups, and central 
nodes) of policy networks? 
Policy networks are groups of actors linked by resource and information sharing with 
a particular aim to support an environmental policy. Applying the network analysis 
method reveals the macro-structure of the network in each case, which presents 
kinds of actor, ties among them, subgroups and the central node. Focusing on the 
connections between IGOs and NGOs, this thesis classifies policy networks into two 
categories: the non-government network (the majority of network actors are non-
state actors with few links to states and/or IGOs) and the transgovernmental network 
(network actors are a mixture of states, IGOs and NGOs, with several links between 
IGOs and CSOs). The components of the policy networks in each case are set out 
below. 
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In the haze case, key policy network actors are states, IGOs (the ASEAN Haze 
Coordinating Centre), NGOs and the private sector. While many links among actors 
can be identified, it is obvious that there is only a direct link between GEC (an NGO) 
and the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre (an IGO) at the international level. The 
subgroups, which are mostly non-governmental, can be easily noticed from the 
macro-structure of the networks. However, the central nodes of each subgroup do 
not connect directly with each other. Although the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre 
is the centre for ASEAN cooperation in managing the issue, it is not the centrality of 
the macro-structure of the network. 
On the other hand, in the wildlife case, actors governing the transnational illegal 
wildlife trade issues include states, IGOs and NGOs. There are a number of links 
among IGOs and NGOs at the international and transnational levels. Furthermore, 
there are many ties between governments and NGOs at the national and community 
levels. Considerable ties linking different kinds of actor in the networks make it less 
easy to identify the subgroups within the macro-structure of the networks. However, 
at the regional level, the key nodes responsible for sharing tasks to achieve the goal 
of the regime can be clearly seen. Considering the macro-structure of the networks, 
ASEAN-WEN – as a centre for ASEAN cooperation in tackling the illegal wildlife trade 
issue – is well connected with Freeland and TRAFFIC, which are key central nodes of 
the macro-structure network at the international level. 
2. How do policy networks operate to improve the effectiveness of international 
regimes? 
Policy networks in both cases share similar functions to improve the effectiveness of 
international regimes. The first function is developing regional monitoring system, 
which is a foundation for better deterrence and enforcement. The second is 
strengthening regional policy and project implementation. Information, knowledge, 
best practice and resources are allocated to environmental governmental 
departments and communities to increase the capacity of those actors in on-the-
ground operations. 
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In the haze case, actors in the subgroups work at different levels but are connected 
by transnational NGOs. While the absence of an Indonesian official authoritative map 
weakens the deterrence and enforcement mechanism to punish wrongdoers, 
subgroups of policy networks have revealed their own maps – which have been 
developed through their collaboration among organizations – in the public domain. 
Even taken together with the Singapore law on transboundary haze and the 
certificate system of the RSPO, this network’s deterrence mechanism can only control 
the business sector’s use of fires to clear land. In addition, transnational NGOs and 
local NGOs which support the president’s moratorium also work in a form of network 
to implement peat and forest conservation projects; at the same time, they also keep 
an eye on the national development policy, which allows business concession licences 
and affects the protected forests. However, there are few links between the ASEAN 
haze coordinating centre and key transnational CSOs. The maps and satellite 
information gathering by those actors are not approved and used by ASEAN. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of regime in the haze case cannot be significantly 
improved. 
In the wildlife case, transnational NGOs are included in the transnational networks. 
With the aim of enhancing law enforcement in ASEAN countries, transnational NGOs 
are crucial in the establishment of the ASEAN-WEN coordinating centre, sharing 
resources and expertise to state agencies, and organizing workshops for better state 
coordination and communication. Furthermore, NGOs and IGOs are linked through 
forums dedicated to concerns on particular endangered wildlife species. 
Transnational NGOs work closely and complementarily with state actors, 
environmental departments and enforcement agencies in different ASEAN countries. 
This constructs connections between different kinds of actors at different levels and 
across levels. Information gathered from these cooperative operations is shared 
among network actors. Furthermore, key transnational NGOs involved in ASEAN-
WEN have shared responsibilities, according to each organization’s expertise, to 
support government agencies. Furthermore, some of them are linked to CITES. 
Therefore, they are a source of data for supporting the monitoring system in CITES; 
at the same time, they work to strengthen policy implementation enforcement for 
ASEAN-WEN and individual ASEAN countries. 
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3. To what extent can non-state actors in policy networks engage in the ASEAN policy 
development process? 
While key transnational NGOs in the haze case have limited opportunity to engage 
with the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre and the ASEAN forum, those in the wildlife 
case can formally participate in the ASEAN-WEN open session. However, both cases 
show a similar aspect, that they can engage better in the process of policy 
implementation at the national level rather than at other stages of the policy process. 
Although both cases present policy networks’ attempts to develop monitoring 
systems for better deterrence and enforcement, the improvement of the regime at 
this stage happens only in the wildlife case, where links among IGOs and 
transnational NGOs are obvious. The role of non-government networks in shifting 
environmental policy through the ASEAN forum is limited. 
4. What are the significant roles of policy networks in governing transnational 
environmental issues in the region? 
To answer this question, this thesis focuses on the similar functions of policy 
networks in strengthening regional monitoring mechanisms and ensuring the 
implementation of projects to sustain the environment and achieve the goals 
addressed in international agreements. Functional tasks are basic but significant for 
protecting the environment in the region from over-exploitation. Even though the 
environmental problems continue, policy networks are a kind of governance 
mechanism operating to enhance the effectiveness of regimes. The improvement of 
policy monitoring and implementation through collective action in both cases 
supports better environmental outcomes in the region. 
Main research question: under what circumstances can policy networks facilitate 
inter-state cooperation on transnational environmental issues in the region? 
Although both cases present the functional role of policy networks to regional 
environmental governance, their influence in shifting the development of policy and 
law on the environment are different. Applying the comparative network analysis 
method, two contextual conditions determining the effects of policy networks in 
facilitating inter-state cooperation are the nature of the international cooperation 
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problem and the attributes of the regimes. Examining information sharing links 
between CSOs and state and between CSOs and IGOs reveals different political 
opportunities for central nodes of non-government networks to supply information 
to improve regimes’ monitoring systems. The relationships between the problems of 
international cooperation and the attributes of regimes towards the influential role 
of policy networks in improving the effectiveness of international regimes can be 
clarified as follows. 
The nature of the international cooperation problem and the attributes of regimes 
offer policy networks different political opportunities to engage with the ASEAN 
coordinating centres. The more conflict that exists in those inter-state forums, the 
less opportunity there is for CSOs to connect to ASEAN. The unsettled issue between 
states, which relates closely to their national interests in the haze case, excludes CSOs 
from the ASEAN forum. Despite CSOs working closely with stakeholders and being 
able to feed in information to improve the ASEAN monitoring system, they are not 
connected to the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre. On the other hand, the wildlife 
case presents states’ operational problems and ASEAN countries agree to cooperate 
for better implementation. Mutual interests and incentives for cooperation are clear 
since better coordination and cooperation among them also protect individual 
ASEAN countries from receiving economic sanctions – which can be considered 
additional costs – if they fail to carry out their obligations in CITES. As the issue 
contains less conflict among parties and stakeholders, a political opportunity is 
available for NGOs to connect and work complimentarily with the ASEAN-WEN PCU. 
The attributes of regimes also result in a political opportunity for non-state actors. 
Key attributes of regimes include the ability of the regimes’ coordinating centres to 
provide a political channel of communication to central nodes of non-government 
networks and in imposing sanctions on parties. Clear differences between the haze 
case and the wildlife case are not only the ties between CSOs and ASEAN coordinating 
centres; central nodes of non-government networks in the wildlife case can also link 
to the CITES Secretariat – the centre of the global regime acting independently of 
member parties and possessing a sanction mechanism. The CITES Secretariat has 
connections with key central nodes of non-government networks, 
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transgovernmental networks and states to sustainably manage wildlife conservation 
and exploitation. To legitimate the sanction mechanism if the punishment is needed 
to push a state into adjusting its laws, field information from third parties is 
necessary. The transnational NGOs in non-government networks can supply that 
information to the CITES Secretariat. On the other hand, the ASEAN Haze 
Coordinating Centre rarely coordinates with other non-state actors, focusing on 
ASEAN members. Since the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre cannot work 
independently of states’ interests and the development of the regime is still based 
on states’ responsibilities and voluntary action, without any sanction mechanism 
from another global regime to push states to respond to the issue enthusiastically, it 
is difficult to improve the effectiveness of the regime in the near future. 
The nature of the international cooperation problem and the attributes of regimes 
are equally important and cannot be analysed separately to determine the political 
opportunity structure for policy networks in facilitating international environmental 
cooperation. However, while the nature of the problem is difficult to change, more 
attention should be given to the ability of the regime’s centre to provide political 
opportunity for policy networks. What is missing in the haze case is a global 
mechanism with an effective sanction mechanism; a global regime supported by 
sanctions is present in the wildlife case. The existing global regime with a sanction 
mechanism creates more political opportunities as alternative options for non-state 
actors in policy networks to engage. Examining the attributes of the macro-structure 
of networks in the wildlife case, and the higher number of ties between NGOs and 
IGOs, reveals more political space for the central nodes of non-governmental actors 
to strengthen the regimes governing the illegal wildlife trade in the region. If there 
were a global regime with an effective sanction mechanism, similar to the CITES 
Secretariat, the policy networks would be able to facilitate inter-state cooperation on 
haze through other more potential international forums outside ASEAN. In addition, 
with the economic sanction mechanism it could supply a different context of the 
problem of international cooperation as states would have to consider the additional 
cost of non-compliance to what they agreed. 
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Since there are different political opportunities for policy networks to support inter-
state cooperation, the answers to the question of whether policy networks can 
improve inter-state cooperation are various. In the haze case, ASEAN cooperation 
cannot be improved and non-government networks have to work only with affected 
states to set up temporary monitoring mechanisms to govern the plantation 
companies. Even though the non-government networks attempt to fulfil the 
intention of the ASEAN Haze Agreement, their information cannot be used to 
improve the ASEAN monitoring system. However, despite policy networks being 
unable to significantly facilitate ASEAN cooperation, their activities and attempts 
contribute positive impacts to environmental governance in the region. In the wildlife 
case, policy networks can facilitate ASEAN cooperation on tackling the illegal wildlife 
trade through the improvement of communication, participation and communication 
among different kinds of actors, resulting in better implementation by ASEAN of 
CITES and better environmental outcomes in the region. Transnational NGOs in policy 
networks are a critical factor that functions to support ASEAN cooperation and 
individual ASEAN member countries, and to monitor these actors in their compliance 
with CITES. With better political opportunities to connect with CITES, non-
government networks can take a more influential role in shifting national 
environmental policy to balance development policy. In short, despite different 
opportunities for policy networks to facilitate regional environmental cooperation, 
policy networks in both cases do contribute to better environmental outcomes in the 
region. 
7.3 Implications of research findings 
The comparative network analysis approach confirms the similar role of policy 
networks in sustaining the quality of the environment and in attempting to close the 
governance gaps in the areas where states and ASEAN have failed to do so. However, 
their ability to facilitate international cooperation on transnational environmental 
issues is different owing to different political opportunities, which can be observed 
from the connections between the regimes’ coordinating centres and the key central 
nodes of non-governmental networks. Implications of these findings come in the 
form of policy suggestions and alternatives for better environmental outcomes. 
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Transnational environmental governance in the region can be better achieved in 
these ways. 
1. Environmental issues need global regimes or international laws which clearly 
articulate what are legitimate practices in the sustainable exploitation of the natural 
resources and the environment. The wildlife case shows that, even though protecting 
biodiversity in wildlife is very challenging, the CITES agreement sets a clear definition 
in the categories and procedures in the wildlife trade, with separated but adjustable 
lists in the appendices of endangered wildlife species that are annually reviewed. In 
the haze case, part of the problem is the absence of clarity on what sustainable 
development is. There is no scientific system, method or indicator to assess the 
balance of it. Therefore, even though different groups attempt to solve the issues, 
the various interpretations based on the groups’ interests can hinder cooperative 
efforts among them. 
 2. Sanction mechanisms, even from other global environmental regimes or set by 
ASEAN in the future, are necessary for improving the quality of ASEAN cooperation 
on the haze issue. This is because presently ASEAN does not have capacity to 
accelerate or ensure that the parties take responsibility for environmental damage 
which causes harm to their people and neighbouring countries. The effective sanction 
mechanism is more legitimate when third parties are included and acts as another 
informative source supporting the policy monitoring system before sanctions are 
imposed on any non-compliant party. Therefore, this offers a political opportunity for 
the policy network to connect with the regime’s centre. Sanctions will increase the 
cost for states to take more serious action to tackle the issue. Incentives based on 
economic gains from trade, as in the wildlife case, may be necessary to get states to 
sign up to a more restrictive agreement. 
3. Since policy networks are important for sustaining environmental governance and 
to potentially enhance the effectiveness of international regimes through the 
improvement of the international policy process, making a connection to key central 
nodes of non-government networks is an available and practical option for IGOs. The 
ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre may enhance the effectiveness of regimes by 
connecting to and/or investing in capacity with those key CSOs. These crucial actors 
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– especially central nodes of subgroups or the centrality of the macro-structure of 
the networks – can be identified in the macro-structure of networks in each case 
study. These nodes, which currently have a significant role in carrying and sustaining 
the environmental policy, can also have a potentially crucial role in improving the 
regimes if their information, knowledge, expertise and resources are accepted by 
IGOs. Moreover, applying the network analysis method helps to confirm key actors 
and powers related to their position in the macro-structure of networks. Some of 
these actors may not recognize that they are in a position to coordinate the flow of 
information, or have an influential and potential role in negotiating or bargaining the 
needs and objectives of different subgroups. It was shown in the wildlife case that 
the connections among subgroups is related to the better functioning of the 
networks, so an ability of the centrality of the macro-structure of networks to connect 
to every central node of the subgroups and seek a better compromised approach 
would improve the quality of regional governance in the region. 
7.4 Original contribution to the literature 
This thesis makes an important contribution to knowledge and understanding in the 
literature on ASEAN cooperation and environmental governance in Southeast Asia, 
where the application of the network perspective is rather new and very limited. 
Although the concept of international cooperation in neo-liberal institutionalism 
proposes regimes as a tool to facilitate international cooperation and shape 
international outcomes (Young, 1989; Krasner, 1983; Keohane, 2005; Stein, 2008), 
the nature of international cooperation problems resulted in the ineffectiveness of 
regimes without promising the means to improve them, especially when states do 
not have an incentive to cooperate (Mitchell, 2010: 116). Existing studies focus on 
the failure of states and ASEAN in ending transnational issues in terms of problem-
solving (Litta, 2012; Nguitragool, 2011; Aggarwal and Chow, 2010; Elliott, 2003; 
Elliott, 2004). However, regarding difficulties in collectively dealing with 
environmental problems, this thesis assesses the effectiveness of regimes in terms of 
process. On the other hand, many studies emphasize governance activities at the 
national and community levels run by NGOs and non-state actors as counterforces 
reacting to and pressuring those failures (Pas-Ong and Lebel, 2000). These two 
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perspectives have separated state and non-state actors, although their mutual goals 
in terms of problem-solving can be identified. Two hybrid forms of governance which 
can be applied to examine the relationships between different kinds of actors are the 
concept of orchestration and the concept of networks. Even though the concept of 
orchestration was applied to reveal a hybrid form of global governance, the concept 
focuses on the influential role of individual IGOs in enlisting private and NGO actors 
with support to collaborate with target states (Abbott et al., 2012; Hale and Roger, 
2014; Bäckstrand and Kuyper, 2017; Lister et al., 2015). The concept of orchestration 
is practical for IGOs with substantial resources, but ASEAN does not currently 
demonstrate this feature of IGOs. This thesis found that the network perspective is 
more practical for application to the Southeast Asian context. 
Although there are studies about networks in the Southeast Asian literature on 
international cooperation, they are applied in various areas including political 
economic relations (Katzenstein, 1996; Dent, 2003), sustainable energy and resource 
exploitation (Karki et al., 2005; Poocharoen and Sovacool, 2012) and human rights 
(Crouch, 2013). Although there is a body of network literature on the environment, 
networked regionalism is absent owing to the vertical mode of governance covering 
up the horizontal ones (Elliott, 2011). However, by applying the network analysis 
method this thesis reveals policy networks governing transnational environmental 
issues in the region. Linked by information and resource sharing, CSOs can engage 
with states and IGOs to support a particular regional environmental policy. The 
network approach allows us to examine the role of CSOs in complementarily working 
with states and IGOs. This thesis therefore supports Chong’s (2011) notion that CSOs 
in Southeast Asia can also play a possible and crucial role in the areas where the 
market and the state cannot provide public services to their people. 
Applying the network analysis method in the two case studies contributes to 
understandings and debates on environmental governance, international 
cooperation on the environment among ASEAN countries, and the concept of the 
network as a hybrid mode of governance in Southeast Asia as follows. 
Firstly, through the network perspective, international environmental governance on 
transnational environmental issues cannot be sufficiently understood only by 
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examining inter-state cooperation on the issue. In both cases, even though the 
environmental issues are addressed at the ASEAN forum, the forum does not 
prioritize environmental issues. This results in several governance gaps which non-
state actors, especially NGOs, attempt to fill in. Non-state actors who act individually 
and/or collectively take functional roles in supporting the intention of the 
international agreement. The non-governmental network and NGOs in the 
transnational network in the cases close governance gaps by providing information 
to enhance the function of regimes’ monitoring system and directly implement 
projects to achieve particular environmental policies. This highlights the crucial role 
of non-state actors in their efforts to have cooperative operations with state actors 
and ASEAN. Moreover, the network approach provides a tool to explore operational 
horizontal and vertical activities of actors involved in dealing with the issues. Non-
state actors in non-governmental networks are working at different levels and across 
levels of governance to slow down the environmental degradation derived from the 
need for economic development as well as to sustain the quality of the environment. 
Secondly, while there are several and different kinds of actors involved in governing 
transnational environmental issues, the network analysis method helps to identify 
the crucial role of transnational environmental NGOs through the information 
sharing links. The links among actors are drawn from existing empirical evidence such 
as projects and/or organizations’ referrals to each other. The higher the number of 
ties, the more important the actor in coordinating information among the members 
of the network and connected with the centralities of other subgroups. Therefore, 
apart from the IGOs and states, transnational NGOs are taking an important role in 
governing environmental issues through developing the monitoring system and the 
environmental policy in the region. 
Thirdly, the connections between different kinds of actors present the existence of 
cooperative relationships among state and non-state actors who work 
complementarily at different levels of governance to achieve their mutual goals. 
Therefore, governing transnational environmental issues in the case studies 
exemplify that relations between state and non-state actors do not always appear in 
confronting and conflicting positions. Some NGOs apply a non-aggressive and 
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constructive approach to work with governmental agencies. Thus the network 
perspective gives another aspect to broaden understandings of environmental 
governance from cooperative attempts among state and non-state actors in addition 
to activities managed by states or non-state actors. Therefore, as observed in the 
case studies, transnational issues in the region are governed by actors involved in key 
categories: inter-state cooperation (ASEAN), state and non-state cooperation, and 
non-state governance activities. The network approach creates the structure of 
connections among these actors in different categories to reveal how and to what 
extent these actors can connect to each other in governing transnational 
environmental issues in the region. The network perspective, in this way, broadens 
our understanding on environmental governance. 
7.5 The research limitations 
Some points which this research cannot reveal and can limit the study are as follows. 
The first limitation is related to the network method. As the links are defined by 
information and resource sharing, this means that the conflictual relationships 
among actors cannot be revealed. Therefore, while the well-defined ties are strong 
in providing empirical evidence on the existing cooperative relations between two 
actors, the method is limited in presenting the counter link. Therefore, agriculture 
businesses which are against environmental protection policies or are acting 
unlawfully – businesses that the network actors attempt to monitor – cannot appear 
on the network graph. In addition, since the network method reveals actors operating 
at different levels and across levels, this research cannot analyse all actors in the 
network equally in detail; rather, it selects for analysis some organizations in key 
positions, not those located marginally. 
The second category of this study limitation is on language barriers. In Southeast Asia, 
national languages are used officially in governmental documents, laws, news or even 
websites. Therefore, accessing some of these primary documents written in their 
national language is part of this research’s constraints. Language barriers are the real 
challenge for me as a researcher, for potential informants and for forming networks 
across countries. As a researcher, I can access only data collected from documents 
and participants in English and Thai. Considering the diversity of languages used 
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across the region, this factor potentially blocks the network’s formation, 
development and expansion since the networks are fundamentally based on the flow 
of communication among actors. 
7.6 Prospects for future research 
Since the application of network analysis in the study of environmental governance 
in Southeast Asia is quite new, more studies on other environmental issues outside 
ASEAN or in different context may be useful to test the validity of this approach. The 
studies may include further investigation of how key position actors in networks 
strategically manage to negotiate different approaches to achieve their ultimate 
common goal, to reduce the tension among subgroups and to share tasks within the 
network. While the ASEAN Haze Coordinating Centre is not yet fully functioning, the 
effectiveness of the Singaporean unilateral sanction mechanism to punish 
agricultural companies causing fires in Indonesia should be extensively investigated 
in the next few years. The connections between the Singaporean government and 
the transnational NGOs which link to groups of Indonesian NGOs and communities 
may be empirical evidence to prove the role of policy network. 
The development of land use management in Indonesia and the establishment of the 
ASEAN Haze Centre are the two advances which should be noted in the near future 
if these can improve the haze issue in the region. Recently, ASEAN has agreed on the 
settlement of the Haze Centre, which is expected to be located in Indonesia. 
According to the Haze Agreement, the centre functions as a coordinating centre for 
parties, donors and experts from organizations. Therefore, the centre is expected to 
have more authority in coordinating information, assistance, funds and resources 
from different kinds of non-state actors. Therefore, if the centre can provide a link 
with the governance network, this would be a point for observing whether the haze 
regime would be improved by these non-state actors. 
Although ASEAN-WEN has succeeded in improving the implementation of the CITES 
agreement, it was merged with the ASEAN Expert Group on CITES in March 2016 to 
restructure on a new 10-year action plan to combat wildlife crime (ASEAN Secretariat, 
2016). This is a means to solve a technical problem, which can be considered a 
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drawback of cooperation in the form of the network. Since the network is not a legal 
entity, fundraising as well as direct support from sponsors cannot be done directly 
through a formal process. The transformation of ASEAN-WEN and AEG-CITES as a 
regional mechanism to deal with the transnational illegal wildlife trade issue should 
be investigated alongside the changes in the ASEAN regime in managing the issue, 
especially whether ASEAN-WEN is terminated or strengthened. The observation of 
the role of the policy network in the wildlife case would be more obvious by 
comparing the case across time. 
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